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I. European Union and Financial Stability  
The European Union (“EU”) and, even more, the Eurozone, was created with 
the intention of formulating a strong monetary union that would not only ensure 
cooperation between member states, but also, safeguard peace, price stability and 
economic growth. To this end, the founding treaties of the EU contain several 
provisions regulating the financial standing of member states, aiming, inter alia, to 
ensure that the Member States’ economies will be financially sound and be able to 
contribute to the aforementioned EU goals. Thus, for example, in order to qualify for 
the Eurozone, EU imposes a reference value of the public debt that should not surpass 
60% of the Member’s Growth Domestic Product (“GDP”).1 Additionally, an EU 
Member State’s financial position needs to be “sustainable”.2 Furthermore, Article 
126 para. 1 of the Treaty of Functioning of the EU (“TFEU”), prescribes that the 
Member States of the EU “shall avoid excessive government deficits”.  
 However, although, EU primarily law provides several safeguards to ensure 
financial stability and avoid financial crisis and sovereign default in the EU,3 
nonetheless, it does not regulate the implications in case such default does, indeed, 
occur. This became obvious during the financial crisis that “hit” the global 
community in the summer of 2007. 
II. The Financial Crisis in Europe 
The financial crisis was undoubtedly an unprecedented phenomenon both in 
terms of proportion as well as in terms of implications. Most analysts failed to realize 
the seriousness of the situation and categorized the crisis as a mere liquidity shortage 
that would limit itself in the US and would not greatly affect the “strong” and 
“healthy” European economies that were based on solid fundamentals, such as rapid 
export growth and sound financial positions of households and businesses.4 These 
perceptions dramatically changed in September 2008, due to the rescue of Fannie Mae 
and Freddy Mac, the “shocking” Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the worries for the 
                                                          
1 Article 126(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) and Protocol No 12 
2 Article 140 (1) indent 2 TFEU 
3  See H. Siekmann, ‘Life in the Eurozone With or Without Sovereign Default?—The Current Situation, 
'Politics, Economics and Global Governance: The European Dimensions' (PEGGED) Contract no. 
217559 Deliverable N. 46, Policy Report (WP1) 2011, pp. 18-23 
4 Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission, Economic Crisis 
in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses, Economy in Europe 7/2009, BU24, B-1049, (2009) 
p.4 
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insurance company AIG taking down major US and EU financial institutions in its 
way.5  
As a result, the Member States began to realize that they could not handle the 
crisis individually and that a common response was required. Firstly, the European G8 
members,6 at their summit in Paris on 4 October 2008, undertook to act jointly and 
take all necessary measures in order to secure their banking and financial systems. 
Not too long after that, at the Economic and Financial Affairs Council’s (ECOFIN)7 
meeting of October 7, 2008 all Member States came together to plan common 
principles to guide their respective reactions to the crisis.8 These principles were 
turned into a concrete action plan on October 10, 2008 by the Eurogroup,9 which was 
thereafter endorsed by the European Council on October 15, 2008. In particular, at the 
Eurogroup summit, the Eurozone countries, along with the United Kingdom, urged all 
European governments to adopt a common set of principles to combat the crisis.10 The 
measures suggested included, inter alia, the following practices, mostly in relation to 
strengthening the banks:11 
a) Recapitalization: Governments undertook to provide funds to banking 
institutions that faced liquidity problems and further to re-structure the 
management and monitoring mechanisms; 
b) State Ownership: Governments indicated that they would acquire part of 
the share capital of those financing institutions seeking recapitalization; 
c) Government Debt Guarantees and 
d) Improved Regulatory System 
In November 2008, the European Commission formulated a recovery plan (the 
“Plan”) that was based in two interdependent main elements. The first element 
entailed short-term measures to boost demand, save jobs and help restore confidence. 
The second element referred to "smart investments" to yield higher growth and 
sustainable prosperity in the long-term. The Plan called for a timely, targeted and 
temporary fiscal stimulus of around €200 billion or 1.5% of the 2008 EU Growth 
Domestic Product (GDP), stemming from both national budgets (around €170 billion, 
1.2% of GDP) as well as the EU and European Investment Bank budgets (around €30 
billion, 0.3% of GDP)12 and aimed to enhance the purchasing power of consumers in 
the economy, to protect jobs and address the long-term job prospects of those losing 
                                                          
5 Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission, Economic Crisis 
in Europe, ibid p.8 
6 France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom 
7 EU organ composed of the Economics and Finance Ministers of the 27 EU Member States 
monitoring, inter alia, the budgetary policy and public finances of the Member States. 
8 Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council held in Luxembourg on October 7, 2008 (Doc. 13784/08) 
9  Meeting of those EU countries that share the Euro as currency 
10 “Declaration on a concerted European action plan of the eurozone countries”, October 10, 2008, 
available at www.ue2008.fr; European Council of October 15 and 16, 2008, Presidency Conclusions 
(doc.14368/08). 
11 James K. Jackson, The European Crisis: Impact on and Responses by the European Union, CRS 
Report for Congress, June 24, 2009 
12 IP/08/1771, Brussels, 26 November 2008 
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their jobs. The Plan was, finally, adopted on December 11-12th, 2008 and, in 
conjunction with some unused EU resources, and an additional 15 billion investments 
per year for two years by the European Investment Bank, a sum equivalent to 1.8% of 
the 2008 EU GDP was raised. This sum would act as a fiscal stimulus over a period of 
2 years (2009-2010) with 1.1% of the EU GDP occurring in 2009 and remaining 0.7% 
in 2010. 
Having, as mentioned, underestimated the financial crisis, EU’s response to it 
was delayed. Furthermore, when the EU finally responded, the Plan taken was rather 
“small-scale” in comparison to the extent of the crisis.13 That, in conjunction with the 
very high direct fiscal costs that the measures of the Plan entailed, along with the fact 
that the economic activity was at unprecedented low levels, led to a rapid rise in 
government deficits and debt in all the Eurozone countries. In fact, given that national 
fiscal policies remained unchanged, the rise in government debt-to-GDP ratios 
continued, even as the recovery proceeds and the short-term fiscal stimulus measures 
were phased out.  
This led many EU states on the verge of bankruptcy with their deficits 
reaching up to 160% of their GDP. In 2009, the government deficit and government 
debt of both the Eurozone (EU16) and the EU increased compared with 2008, while 
the respective GDP fell. In the Eurozone, the “Government deficit/GDP” ratio 
increased from 2.0% in 2008 to 6.3% in 2009, and in the EU27 from 2.3% to 6.8%. In 
the Eurozone, the government debt to GDP ratio increased from 69.4% at the end of 
2008 to 78.7% at the end of 2009, and in the EU27 from 61.6% to 73.6%.14 Soon 
thereafter, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus requested the assistance of the 
EU/ International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) “bailout” mechanism, taking several 
measures that proved detrimental to investors’ rights.   
Indeed, the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2009 in the EU, investors in the 
EU found out the “hard way” that the financial system of the EU was not immune to 
crisis, as it had been previously envisioned. During the financial crisis, we witnessed 
the collapse of EU banks, with devastating implications, not only for shareholders, but 
also for depositors. Indicatively, in the case of the Cyprus Banking Haircut, depositors 
in Bank of Cyprus incurred a loss of 47.5% on their deposits over €100.000,15 while 
Cyprus Popular Bank’s depositors faced losses reaching up to 80% on their deposits 
over €100.000.16 Apart from the Banking Crisis, however, we also witnessed states 
                                                          
13 E. Luce, C. Freeland, Financial Times published: March 8 2009 22:03 available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5d8b5e18-0c14-11de-b87d-0000779fd2ac.html#ixzz1YsnQRuoH/> 
accessed 10 September 2017 
14 Provision of deficit and debt data for 2009 - first notification Eurostat News release, 55/2010 - 22 
April 2010, (2010) available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-22042010-
BP/EN/2-22042010-BP-EN.PDF/> accessed 10 September 2017 
15 M. Hadjicostis, 'Bank Of Cyprus Depositors Lose 47.5% Of Savings' (USA TODAY, 2017) available at 
<https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/07/29/bank-of-cyprus-depositors-lose-
savings/2595837/> accessed 10 September 2017. 
16 'Cypriot Finmin “Uninsured Popular Bank Depositors Could Face 80% Haircut” - Keep Talking 
Greece' (Keep Talking Greece, 2017) available at 
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heavily indebted unable to repay the principal and interests of the loans already 
contracted, with the notorious Greek haircut being the most indicative example. The 
losses sustained by investors in such cases were immense.  
III. Definition and Legal Framework for sovereign default  
In most cases, if an individual or a company does not have sufficient funds to 
meet its financial obligations, it will file for insolvency or bankruptcy. When a 
country does not make its payments to its creditors on time, it is termed a “default”, 
which is, in essence, is similar to going bankrupt.17 The debt incurred by governments 
is termed as sovereign debt. However, this is where most of the similarity to 
individual insolvency and corporate bankruptcy ends. That is because when faced 
with a sovereign default, creditors have a much more difficult time in attempting to 
reclaim their dues or investments from a sovereign entity.  
More precisely, while a natural or legal person’s insolvency is de jure subject 
to national and international rules and regulations, that contain specific details on the 
procedure to be followed for the insolvency to proceed, the priority of creditors, the 
person who will manage the firm etc.,18 there is not a similar regime for states in 
default.19 
In fact, there is not even a uniform definition of sovereign default. Instead, the 
latter can be defined in several different ways.20 From a strictly legal perspective, a 
sovereign default would be defined as a failure of the state to repay a scheduled debt 
service within the specified period of repayment, including any grace period provided 
in the sovereign bond contract.21  Investment treaties follow this definition to a large 
extend, but they also contain a list of events that constitute “events of default”, which 
list varies from one treaty to the other. Additionally, the term of sovereign default has 
been defined differently from a financial and/or political perspective. Various 
economic researchers, mostly economists, list certain credit events that would 
constitute default.22 In the financial world, credit-rating agencies, such as the "Big 
                                                                                                                                                                      
<http://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2013/03/27/cypriot-finmin-uninsured-popular-bank-depositors-
could-face-80-haircut/> accessed 10 September 2017. 
17 'What Happens When a Country Goes Bust' (Economist.com, 2014) 
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/11/economist-explains-20> accessed 4 
November 2017.  
18 M. Guzman, J.E. Stiglitz, “Creating a Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring That Works: The 
Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises” in M. Guzman, J. A. Ocampo, J. E. Stiglitz “Too Little, Too 
Late: The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises (Initiative for Policy Dialogue at Columbia: 
Challenges in Development and Globalization)”, (2016), p. 28 
19 Ibidem. The article points to the exceptional situation of an unarmed Argentinean naval ship that 
was held in Ghana for 10 weeks in 2012.  
20 P. Manasse, N. Roubini, "Rules of Thumb" for Sovereign Debt Crises, Working Paper, International 
Monetary Fund, (2005), p.6 
21 L. B. Smaghi, “Sovereign Risk” in A. R. Dombret, O. Lucius, Stability Of The Financial System: Illusion 
Or Feasible Concept?, Edward Elgar Publishing (2013), p.237, See also R. W. Kolb, Sovereign Debt: 
From Safety To Default, Wiley (2011). 
22 P. Manasse, N. Roubini, "Rules of Thumb" for Sovereign Debt Crises, Working Paper, International 
Monetary Fund, (2005), p.6.  
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Three" ones - Moody's, S&P, and Fitch Ratings -, rate as a “technical” default any 
instance where a sovereign entity makes a debt restructuring offer on terms less 
favorable than those provided for in the original agreement.2324 International tribunals 
in determining if a sovereign default has taken place, have used this technical 
definition.25 Under this technical definition, sovereign default does not consist in the 
total repudiation of an outstanding debt, but it suffices that, following a negotiation 
between the country’s creditors and its government vis a vis debt restructuring, this 
leads to a rescheduling of payments, lower principal instalments, reduced interest 
rates and/or the lengthening of the payment general terms.2627 For the purposes of this 
Thesis, unless another Chapter contains a more specific definition, the term sovereign 
default shall refer to the meaning followed by the Credit Agencies described above. 
IV. Definition of Investors 
Apart from the definition of sovereign default, it is equally important to define the 
terms “investor”. Despite the fact that the term is often used in our everyday language, 
it is not an easy one to define, as there is no uniform definition used in investment 
treaties. Indeed, with over 2.500 BITs and multilateral treaties there are several 
variations of the definition of the term.28 This is partly intentionally; as many States 
considered that a set and rigid definition of the term could negatively affect their 
nationals’ ability to invest abroad.29 Hence, the interpretation of the term “investor” 
has puzzled investments tribunals in several occasions. 
In the case of Fedax v Venezuela30 and most notably in the case of Salini v 
Morocco31, the ICSID Tribunal set the long-standing test for the determination of a 
protected investment under the ICSID as having four elements: (1) a contribution of 
money or assets (2) a certain duration  over which the project was to be implemented 
(3) an element of risk and (4) a contribution to the economic development of the host 
                                                          
23 J. C. Hatchondo, L. Martinez, and H. Sapriza, ‘The Economics of Sovereign Default’s, 93 ECON. QTR. 
163 (2007), at 163-164. 
24 As to what constitutes a debt restructuring see Udaibir S. Das, Michael G. Papaioannou, Christoph 
Trebesch, “Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950–2010: Concepts, Literature Survey, and Stylized 
Facts”, IMF Working Group, (2012) where it is defined as  “an exchange of outstanding sovereign debt 
instruments, such as loans or bonds, for new debt instruments or cash through a legal process”. 
25 See indicatively Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, (2007), para.28 
26 Ibidem. Credit-rating agencies define the duration of a default event as the time between the 
default event and when the debt is restructured, even if there are holdout creditors.  
27 Although for the deifferences between a default and a debt restructuring see Udaibir S. Das, 
Michael G. Papaioannou, Christoph Trebesch, “Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950–2010: Concepts, 
Literature Survey, and Stylized Facts”, IMF Working Group, (2012) 
28 Michael Waibel, The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 
2010), p.11 
29 Michael Waibel, The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 
2010), p.11 
30 Fedax N.V. v. The Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3 (1997), para 43 
31 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4 
(2001) 
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state.32  However, despite the adoption of the Salini test by several tribunals, it does 
not meet uniform acceptance and, in fact, it has recently been the object of 
questioning as well as rejection by several tribunals.33 Hence, to respond to the 
question of what constitutes an investment and subsequently who is an investor, there 
are several elements to consider, while each case needs to examined separately. 
For the purposes of this Thesis, unless otherwise mentioned in any one 
separate Chapter, the definition of investor will not follow the Salini test. Instead, a 
broader definition will be followed in keeping with recent trends in international 
investment law,34 where a growing number of investment treaties contain a wide, 
open ended phrase, stating that investment refers to “every kind of asset” or “any kind 
of asset”, including, inter alia, an illustrative list of categories of assets, interest and 
rights.35 This is particularly true for the BIT entered by Member States of the EU that 
cover any kind of asset having an economic value.36  Hence, under this broad 
definition of investment, investors will include all persons, both legal and natural, that 
make an investment, including therefore all portfolio investors in sovereign bonds, as 
well as deposit-holders holding deposits above the threshold of secured deposits. 
Additionally, this Thesis will examine the rights of both foreign as well as domestic 
investors.  
V. Available Remedies for investors 
Aside from investors receiving less than the full amount of the loans they 
agreed upon, a sovereign default, as defined above, can also be extremely stressful for 
the financial well-being of the borrowing country. A fall in the value of a country’s 
currency will quickly trigger a money-flight from local banks, leading to a banking 
crisis that can further affect investors’ rights. In response, in order to avoid a run on 
its banks, the borrowing government may close the financial institutions and impose 
increased capital controls in an effort to avoid further currency depreciation.37  In light 
                                                          
32 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4 
(2001), para 52 
33 See Alex Grabowski, "The Definition of Investment under the ICSID Convention: A Defense of 
Salini," Chicago Journal of International Law: Vol. 15: No. 1, (2014) as well as the case of Deutsche 
Bank AG v Sri Lanka (ICSID Case No ARB/09/02) (2012) para. 294, where the Tribunal noted that that 
the Salini criteria "are not fixed or mandatory as a matter of law. They do not appear in the ICSID 
Convention." 
34 Malik Mahnaz, 'Recent Developments in the Definition of Investment in International Investment 
Agreements', 2nd Annual Forum for Developing Country Investment Negotiators [2008]. 
35 Malik Mahnaz, 'Recent Developments in the Definition of Investment in International Investment 
Agreements', 2nd Annual Forum for Developing Country Investment Negotiators [2008]. 
36 Anna De Luca,  Bank Rescue Measures under international investment law: What Role for the 
principle of causation, in Christian J. Tams, Stephan W. Schill, Rainer Hofmann (eds.) International 
Investment Law and the Global Financial Architecture. Edward Elgar, p. 214 
37 See J. A. Cordero and J. A. Montecino, Capital Controls and Monetary Policy in Developing 
Countries, Center for Economic and Policy Research, Washington, D.C. (2010), pp.12-13, 
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of the above, it is evident that, mutatis mutandis, all investors’ situation – be they 
small or big, private or public, institutional or sovereign (e.g. sovereign wealth funds) 
– might worsen, too. All these concerns materialized in the case of the Greek 
sovereign default of 2012,38 which also had spillover effects and contributed to the 
development of the Cyprus banking crisis. 
In the aftermath of the Greek sovereign default and the Cyprus’ banking crisis 
affected investors, who sustained loses, resorted to litigation almost immediately. 
However, given the lack of a regulatory framework, investors’ options were limited 
and specific. Such remedies could be founded on the general legal framework 
founded in national law as well as EU and international law. Primarily, investors both 
foreign and nationals invoked national law before national courts both in Greece and 
Cyprus respectively, as well as in their home states. Additionally, they have resorted 
to the Court of Justice of the European Union claiming breach of EU law. Moreover, 
foreign investors have raised claims before international arbitration tribunals based on 
international investment treaties, claiming for breach of treaty standards. Last, but not 
least, investors have resorted to the European Court of Human Rights claiming for 
breach of human rights. As indicated, to date, none of these venues and legal 
instruments has been sufficient to restore investors’ damages. 
Hence, this raises the question if the existing legal framework, both in the EU 
as well as internationally, is appropriate and sufficient to safeguard investors’ rights 
and award reparation for the loses sustained by them in cases of extreme financial 
crisis and sovereign default. This is the issue examined by the present study.  
VI. Scope of Research and Significance of the Project 
The aim of this study is twofold. Primarily it explores the measures taken by 
investors to date, in response to the losses they sustained as part of the EU Financial 
Crisis. In particular, this study deals particularly with the case of the Cyprus Banking 
Crisis and the Greek Financial Crisis and explores the steps taken by investors in each 
case, examining the procedural issues faced by investors, the arguments produced by 
them on the substantive law, the counterarguments raised etc. The Thesis critically 
reviews the courts and/or tribunals’ rulings. Based on this, this study reaches 
conclusions on the anticipated outcome of pending investors’ cases that have yet to be 
decided on the above facts. Additionally, it examines the effectiveness of these 
measures to rectify the damages sustained by investors, taking into account investors’ 
accessibility to such measures and investors’ ability to enforce them.  
Secondly, by highlighting the vacuum existing in investors’ protection in cases 
of sovereign default or extreme financial crisis, this study argues that a more efficient 
and specific legal framework is required in order to address investors’ losses in such 
                                                                                                                                                                      
<http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/capital-controls-2010-04.pdf> accessed 29 October 
2017. 
38Deutsche (www.dw.com), 'Greek Creditors Receive Official 'Haircut' Notification | Business | DW | 
24.02.2012' (DW.COM, 2012) <http://www.dw.com/en/greek-creditors-receive-official-haircut-
notification/a-15767530> accessed 11 July, 2015. 
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cases. Considering that circumstances of sovereign default can lead to aggrieved 
violations of investors’ rights, it is imperative that investors have a legal way to react 
and lessen their losses. The main idea is to research – by extrapolating the conclusions 
in the Greek Sovereign Default and the Cyprus Banking Haircut– how and how much 
investors’ interests are protected by means of international and EU legal instruments. 
The study reaches wider conclusions about investors’ rights in the EU and identifies 
and establishes a minimum threshold of protection that should be awarded to 
investors. At the same time, it proposes ways in order to achieve such harmonised 
protection within the EU. 
Hence, this study aims to respond to the following research questions: 
In cases of sovereign default and severe financial crisis in the EU, where a sovereign 
takes measures detrimental to investors’ rights: 
1) Can investors raise claims against the EU for such measures? 
2) Is Investment Law as provided under Investment Treaties sufficient to 
safeguard and restore investors’ rights? 
3) Similarities of Investment and Human Rights Law. Is Human Rights Law able 
to safeguard and restore investors’ rights and/or offer additional remedies to 
investors? 
4) What are the procedural hurdles faced by investors when resorting to claim 
against states in sovereign default and how to overcome these? 
VII. Methodology 
In light of the fact that the Greek and Cyprus Haircut have recently taken place 
and their effects had not yet fully unfolded, there is limited scholarly research on this 
topic. To this end, my Thesis primarily follows a descriptive approach, detailing the 
facts of the Greek and Cyprus Haircut as well as legal measures taken by investors to 
date and the outcome of such measures. Additionally, this Thesis evaluates the 
effectiveness of such measures and extracts wider conclusions as to whether the 
relevant legal remedies are adequate to safeguard investors’ rights and compensate 
their losses. To this end, I examine relevant case law of Investment Tribunals, the 
European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (“CJEU”) as well as national courts in specific cases. Furthermore, I examine 
applicable International Treaties that relate to the research questions and examine how 
these were interpreted by Courts and Tribunals in similar cases. Lastly, in certain 
instances, conceptual research is used, by analyzing concepts like sovereignty, and 
extracting relevant conclusions as to the practical applicability of such concepts for 
the examination of the research questions.  
VIII. How this study is structured. 
This study consists of five separate articles that have been accepted for 
publication in peer reviewed academic journals. These articles explore and address the 
aforementioned research questions. Each of the articles will address one of the above 
research questions, highlighting all aspects of all proceedings and reaching useful 
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conclusions about the effectiveness of such proceedings to award reparation to 
investors. Examining the articles together, they offer a comprehensive analysis of the 
substantive remedies available to investors in case of sovereign default and financial 
crisis in the EU, depicting the need for a specifically designed framework for 
sovereign default that will set specific rules, proceedings and principles and will take 
into account investors’ rights beforehand and not when it is “too late”. Hence, this 
study offers a complete review of the legal framework available to safeguard investors 
rights in crisis such as the Greek Sovereign Crisis and the Cyprus Banking Crisis, 
aspiring to make a contribution to the body of knowledge of the existing literature on 
the matter. 
Firstly, it needs to be stipulated that despite the fact that both the Greek 
Sovereign Crisis and the Cyprus Financial Crisis had substantial repercussions on 
investors, nonetheless, sovereign default is different from banking default and 
banking crisis. Hence, despite the fact that investors rights are, to a large extent, based 
on the same legal bases, available remedies will be presented separately, and each will 
be discussed against the background of the facts that led to each crisis. Hence, the first 
chapter will mostly deal with the facts of the Cyprus Banking Crisis, making only a 
small reference to the Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis, by exploring the implications of 
the Greek Sovereign Default on the Cyprus Banking Crisis and the judgment of the 
European Court of Justice in the case Alessandro Accorinti and Others v European 
Central Bank.39 Similarly, the second and third chapter will refer to the investors’ 
remedies from a human rights perspective, with the second chapter referring to the 
Cyprus Banking Crisis and the third chapter referring the Greek Sovereign Crisis. The 
fourth chapter will explore investment treaty protection awarded to investors in case 
of sovereign default specifically referring to the Greek Sovereign default while the 
fifth chapter will explore sovereign default from a contractual perspective. This study 
ends with general conclusions and a brief discussion of a proposed framework for 
investors’ protection in in Chapter 6. 
The detailed presentation of each chapter is as follows: 
Chapter One seeks to determine if there is a legal basis for EU’s Institutions to 
be held accountable for measures taken by an EU Member State in case of financial 
distress. It begins by exploring the concept of sovereignty and then evaluates the 
limitations placed on such sovereignty to States by participation in the EU. 
Furthermore, it explores the notions of economic coercion and countermeasures 
within the context of the Cyprus Banking Haircut and considers whether the actions 
taken by EU institutions within the said context can fall within the above definitions. 
Lastly, the paper studies whether EU law can provide a basis for liability of EU 
institutions in case of actions of States in financial distress that target investors’ rights 
and, in particular, in the Cyprus Banking Haircut. 
The Second Chapter explores the measures taken by investors affected by the 
Cyprus Banking Haircut to date. It explores the arguments produced by both the 
                                                          
39 Alessandro Accorinti and Others v. European Central Bank, T-79/13, (2015) 
18 | P a g e  
 
Republic of Cyprus as well as investors before national courts in the Republic of 
Cyprus, the European Court of Justice (“CJEU”) and international tribunals, such as 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) and 
considers the reasoning of the Court or Tribunal respectively. Recognising that all 
such proceedings are founded on human rights’ considerations, but have to date been 
unsuccessful in effectively dealing with the substantive elements of the Cyprus 
Haircut,  this Chapter explores the implications of the Cyprus Banking Haircut on 
bondholder from a human rights perspective, reviewing investors’ rights and remedies 
once a claim is brought before the Court most appropriate to deal with human rights’ 
violations, namely the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”). On the basis of 
such analysis, this Chapter concludes on the suitability of Human Rights Law to 
properly address investors’ rights in banking crisis.  
Similarly, the Third Chapter explores the events of the Greek Debt 
Restructuring of 2012 from a human rights perspective and studies the human rights 
implications of such actions. In particular, this chapter draws an analogy between 
protection awarded by human rights law and investment law by exploring the Greek 
Sovereign Default as well as other cases of debt structuring reviewing caselaw from 
both human rights’ venues, as well as in international investment tribunals. This 
chapter depicts the interrelation between human rights and investment law and 
demonstrates that, despite, the tendency to distinguish the evolution of human rights 
law from that of investment law, these fields are not completely dissimilar as, inter 
alia, they both aim to safeguard investors’ right to property, promote respect for due 
process and address the undisputed position of power of the State against the 
individual.  This chapter finally concludes by examining the suitability of Human 
Rights Law to address investors’ claims in case of sovereign default. 
On the other hand, Chapter Four explores the actions taken by investors in 
Greek sovereign bonds to date to reconcile the losses sustained due to the Greek Debt 
Restructuring. It recognizes, that despite Human Rights’ Law importance to secure 
investors rights, to date the ECtHR has not awarded investors the desired 
compensation. This Chapter explores the reasons that led to the failure of 
bondholder’s cases and explores if there is room for a different result for bondholders 
before investment tribunals under investment treaty law for breach of standards of 
treatment (including Most Favoured Nation, Fair and Equitable Treatment, 
Expropriation and Umbrella Clauses). Additionally, this Articles explores the 
defaulting state’s available defenses, making specific reference to Greece. Lastly, the 
Article aims to suggest alternative ways for bondholders to obtain reparation, 
including Credit Default Swaps. 
Chapter Five addresses sovereign default and, in particular bond restructuring, 
from a contractual perspective and explores investors’ remedies for breach of bond 
contract’s provisions. This Chapter analyses the issue of applicable law in State 
contracts and particularly in sovereign bonds. Additionally, the chapter explores how 
applicable law affects the competent venue and how the latter affects enforcement, 
especially due to State immunities. All such findings are explored in the context of the 
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Greek Sovereign Default aiming to assess investors ability to enforce a potentially 
successful judgement and gain true reparation.  
Finally, Chapter Six provides the general conclusions of this study and 
demonstrates the linkage that exists between the chapters in demonstrating the 
deficiencies in investors’ protection on the current legal framework for both banking 
default as well as sovereign default. This chapter also discusses the need for the 
establishment of an efficient and equitable framework that will specifically address 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Acts of financial distress in the EU; Is EU to blame? Liability of EU Institutions 
in case of acts of default within the EU-  
(accepted for publication by Washington International Law Journal to be published in 
Volume 27, Issue 2, April 2018) 
I. ABSTRACT 
 
Founded on the allegation made by the Cyprus Government that it was 
coerced to take legal measures to enforce a haircut on deposits in Cyprus’ two major 
Banks; this Article seeks to determine if there is a legal basis for European Union 
(“EU”) Institutions to be held accountable for measures taken by an EU Member State 
in case of financial distress. It begins by exploring the concept of sovereignty and 
then evaluates the limitations placed on such sovereignty to States by participation in 
the EU. Furthermore, it explores the notions of economic coercion and 
countermeasures within the context of the Cyprus Banking Haircut and considers 
whether the actions taken by EU institutions within the said context can fall within the 
above definitions. Lastly, this Article studies whether EU law can provide a basis for 
liability of EU institutions in case of acts of financial distress that target investors’ 
rights and, in particular, in the Cyprus Banking Haircut. 
 
Key Words: Sovereignty, Countermeasures, Sanctions, Financial Distress, 
Cyprus Haircut, Economic Coercion, Liability of EU Institutions 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is no question that in case of extreme financial crisis, investors’ 
expectations and the value of their investments may be greatly affected by measures 
taken to avert or minimise the results of the crisis. Seeking recourse, however, is not 
always an easy task. Apart from the procedural and substantive law hurdles an 
investor will face, he must, most importantly, decide on the most suitable defendant. 
This question is of material importance, as it will determine competent courts, 
applicable law and available property for enforcement. The question, “who is the 
responsible party,” appears, at first sight, easy to answer, as, in most cases, the States 
adopted the negative measures themselves.  
However, in the recent case of the Cyprus banking haircut that took place in 
2013 and lead to the haircut of deposits in the two largest banks in Cyprus, this 
answer has been challenged. Indeed, it was proclaimed that the decision for the 
haircuts were actually imposed by European Institutions.40 This article explores such 
allegations and attempts to answer the question of whether, in the case of sovereign 
                                                          
40 See Anastasiades redress to the people of Cyprus on March 17th, where he stated that Eurogroup 
had given him two blackmail-style options, either disorderly bankruptcy or the depositors’ bail in. 
21 | P a g e  
 
default within the European Union (“EU”), the latter can be held accountable for 
investors’ loses. To respond to the above question, I first explore the concept of 
sovereignty in Part II. In particular, this Article will review the concept of sovereignty 
vis a vis a State’s participation in international organisations and in particular the 
European Union. In Part III, I study the negative aspect of sovereignty, namely the 
principle of non-intervention, by virtue of which a State is free from any external 
interference by other sovereign States. In this context, I review the notion of 
economic coercion and examine whether economic coercion falls within such 
prohibited intervention. I then explore whether the recent banking haircut in the Euro 
zone and especially the Cyprus banking haircut can be attributed to the EU and its 
institutions on the basis of economic coercion in Part III. Lastly, I explore if the EU 
and its institutions can be held liable for the Cyprus banking haircut under EU Law. 
 
II. THE NOTION OF SOVEREIGNTY 
A.  The History of the Concept of Sovereignty  
As noted, to explore whether liability can be attributed to the EU for the 
Cyprus banking haircut, the notion of sovereignty is of vital importance. The notion 
of sovereignty is controversial and has puzzled law scholars and political scientists 
almost since the inception of international law itself.41  The concept of sovereignty 
first arose in Rome, although without a definite theory for what creates sovereignty.42 
The traditional concept of sovereignty arose much later, in the 16th and 17th centuries.   
In the 16th century, Jean Bodin, in his work Les Six Livres de République, 
recognized sovereignty as the absolute and perpetual power of a State to set binding 
laws, limited only by the laws of God and natural law.43 Thomas Hobbes, a century 
later, indicated that the sovereignty of the State is an absolute power superior to all, 
having a right over all.44 While both these theories conceptualize sovereignty as the 
absolute power of the State, they differ with respect to sovereignty as it relates to 
powers outside that of the State. Specifically, Jean Bodin’s theory identifies 
sovereignty as an unlimited power not subject to external powers, nor human laws45 
and Thomas Hobbes considers sovereignty as an absolute power within the State’s 
territory, but fails to address the relation of sovereignty with international law and 
international organizations.46  
                                                          
41  Helmut Steinberger, “Sovereignty”, in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. IV 501 
(Rudolph Bernhardt 1 ed. 2000). 
42 C. H. McIlwain, A Fragment on Sovereignty, 48 Political Science Quarterly 96 (1933).. 
43 Richard McKeon, The Six Books of a Commonweal. Jean Bodin, 74 Ethics 74-75 (1963).. 
44 Thomas Hobbes, “De Cive” (1651) translated from Latin into English by Thomas Hobbes, Ch 6 pars 
12-15  
45 Urmila Sharma & Sudesh Kumar Sharma, Principles and theory of political science 145 (2000), see 
also William C. van Vleck & Charles Grove Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts, 44 Harvard 
Law Review 317 (1930)., where it is stipulated that Bodin philosophy “tended to discredit the old 
natural law ideas and to make the state the sole source of law”. 
46For an analysis of how what Hobbes considered international relations and the causes for the war 
among nations, see Howard Warrender, The political philosophy of Hobbes 119 (1970). 
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The majority of scholars47 trace the modern concept of sovereignty to the end 
of the thirty-year war with the conclusion, and the Treaty of Westphalia.48  The Treaty 
of Westphalia laid the ground for States to become "sovereign and independent" from 
the Holy Roman Empire.49  These States were sovereign in the sense that they 
enjoyed “supreme authority” within their territory in relation to their both internal 
affairs, but also independence in their external relations.50 Such authority was secular, 
derived out of self-assertion and survival, rather than stemming from religious 
grounds.51  The Treaty of Westphalia recognized States were equal regardless of their 
allegiance with the Catholic or the Protestant Church or their form of governance.52 
As a consequence of these concepts of sovereignty and equality, the principle of non-
intervention, or the idea, that other States cannot interfere in a State’s internal affairs, 
became a well-established principle of international law.53. 
 
B.  The Current Concept of Sovereignty 
Since the Treaty of Westphalia, case law and scholarly research more 
extensively explored the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. However, 
despite this analysis, both continue to be fluid and puzzling notions. The first case to 
set out a widely accepted definition of sovereignty, which is accepted to date, was the 
Island of Palmas Arbitral Award of 1928 where it was stipulated that: “Sovereignty in 
the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a 
portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, 
the functions of a State”.54 As the Palmas case indicates, independence is inherently 
linked with the element of territory, in the sense that, for an entity to be independent, 
it should be able to freely dispose of its own territory without external interferences.55  
This definition also directly linked sovereignty with the concept of statehood, 
although the two concepts are not identical. Indicatively, Art.1 of the Montevideo 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933 that echoes customary 
                                                          
47Although elements of statehood can be traced before that time, see Robert Roswell Palmer & Joel 
Colton, A History in the Modern World 148 (7 ed. 1992). For a dissenting opinion see K. J. Holsti, 
Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999., 1 
Japanese Journal of Political Science 157-172 (2000). 
48G. John Ikenberry & Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern 
International Relations, 80 Foreign Affairs 157 (2001). 
49 D. W. Greig, International Law in a Divided World. By Antonio Cassese. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986. xv + 429 pp.  45, 58 British Yearbook of International Law 366-368 (1988) 
50 Ninčić Djura, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and in the Practice of the United Nations” 5 
(1 ed. 1970) 
51 Helmut Steinberger, “Sovereignty”, in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. IV 501 
(Rudolph Bernhardt 1 ed. 2000) 
52 BRIAN R URLACHER, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS NEGOTIATION 19 (1 ED. 2016). 
53 Michael Wood, Non-Intervention (Non-interference in domestic affairs) | Encyclopedia 
Princetoniensis Pesd.princeton.edu, https://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/258 (last visited Nov 27, 
2017). 
54 Island of Palmas Case (or Miangas), United States v Netherlands [1928] Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, II RIAA 829, ICGJ 392 (Permanent Court of Arbitration) p. 838 
55 Geert Van Calster, International Law and the age of Globalisation, in International Law and 
Institutions 106 (Aaron Schwabach & John Cockfield 1 ed. 2009) 
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international law, defines a State as a person of international law which possesses: (a) 
a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government in the sense of 
dominion; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States”. 56 Indeed, it is a 
principle of international law that sovereign States enjoy absolute dominion within 
their territory not subject to extrovert interventions, being in a relationship of parallel 
equality with each other.  
 
C.  The Sovereignty of International Entities 
These definitions focus on States. However, they do not indicate whether 
international entities other than States may enjoy sovereignty in the sense described 
above. This question is of particular relevance in relation to international 
organizations, particularly the European Union (EU), which is the subject of this 
study. In particular, this section aims to review whether the sovereignty of Member 
States in the EU ia affected by their participation in the EU. 
EU institutions possess unusual powers and traits, including, inter alia, 
citizenship, the lack of internal borders within member States, and the development of 
a supranational legal system of “EU law”.57 Such powers and traits, however, were 
awarded to EU by the Member States through international conventions rather than 
arising as inherent EU characteristics. In particular, the Treaty of Rome,58 the Treaty 
of Maastricht59 and the Treaty of Lisbon60 created the EU institutions which enjoy 
these powers, and thus played a large role in the creation of the EU.  
These powers were, prior to these treaties, exercised by the governments of 
each Member State. Through these treaties, States agreed to award such powers to EU 
institutions. As with any other international treaty, the obligations assumed by the 
States through these treaties are mandatory on the basis of States’ consent and on the 
well-established international law principle “pacta sunt servanda”.61 In this sense, no 
Member State can enjoy sovereignty in the manner described above of an absolute 
power free from extrovert interventions, as, inter alia, within the EU, member States 
have delegated parts of their sovereignty to the EU and they now share sovereignty in 
many policy areas. 
  The creation of the EU has led scholars to question the previous definition of 
sovereignty and to seek alternative theories of sovereignty that will adequately 
include the EU in their ambit.  This is because Bodin's unitary and indivisible nature 
of sovereignty does not allow for delegation of powers by a State to an external 
                                                          
56 Art.1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933 
57 See Costa v ENEL [1964] ECJ "…the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system which…became an 
integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound to apply." 
58 European Union, Treaty Establishing the European Community, Rome Treaty, 25 March 1957 
59 European Union, Treaty on European Union, Treaty of Maastricht, 7 February 1992,  
60 European Union, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, 2007/C 306/01 
61 Fabrizio, Capogrosso, “Shared Sovereignty and Denationalisation of Statehood in the European 
Union” 11 (1 ed. 2008).. 
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authority and could not, therefore, address the current situation with the EU. 62  
Scholars, in response, invoke other theories of sovereignty, such as that of pooled 
sovereignty.63 Indeed, EU is considered a prominent example of pooled sovereignty,64 
i.e. a “poly-centred sovereignty” where the powers are disaggregated, in the sense that 
the state does not enjoy exclusive authority over its policies,65 as well as reaggregated, 
due to EU Regulations and Directives that are adopted by the EU institutions and 
apply uniformly to all member states. .66 In pooled sovereignty, States, while they 
remain sovereign, contractually delegate their powers to an external Institution which 
operates collectively, since it is comprised by all member States, and will set policies 
that may differ from each individual State’s ideal standpoint, in the interest of 
international cooperation.67  
Some commentators suggest that pooled sovereignty is not an appropriate 
concept for the EU because this type of sovereignty is exercised by several actors, and 
is therefore unable to address the current status of the EU, and especially of the 
Economic Monetary Union (“EMU”).68  On one hand, transfer of sovereignty exceeds 
mere “pooling” in the area of monetary policy, as monetary authority is exercised 
almost exclusively at an EU level, while on the other, in areas such as fiscal policy, 
the power is, for the most part, exercised by the States independently.69 It is argued 
that in such case, sovereignty is divided, in a sense that certain competences are 
prerogatives of the State, while others belong to the EU. 70 
  Even this notion, however, appears simplistic and falls short of addressing the 
shared competencies that belong both to the States and the EU.71 In response, scholars 
developed the theory of co-operative sovereignty.  Here, sovereign States collaborate 
with other sovereign entities while applying the same rules and principles in a 
pluralist constitutional order.72 These rules are applied without operating in a 
                                                          
62 Stephen D Krassner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (1st edn, Princeton University Press 1999) 
63 See Nannerl O Keohane, Philosophy and the State in France (1st edn, Princeton University Press 
1980). p.71, (stating "we see the principal point of sovereign majesty and absolute power to consist in 
giving laws to subjects in general, without their consent"); Robert Keohane, Ironies of Sovereignty: 
The European Union and the United States, 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 743-765 (2002). 
64 pooled sovereignty - oi, Oxfordindex.oup.com (2017), 
http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100336931 (last visited Nov 30, 
2017). 
65 Hadii M. Mamudu, Donley T. Studlar, Multilevel Governance and Shared Sovereignty: European 
Union, Member States, and the FCTC, 22 Governance 73-97 (2009). 
66 Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 Ethics 48-75 (1992)., See also Neil 
Walker, ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’ in Neil Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart 
Publishing 2006) p. 15. 
67 Nicolas Jabko, Which economic governance for the European Union? Facing Up the Problem of 
Divided Sovereightny”, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies 13 (2011), 
http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/2011_2_1.pdf (last visited Apr 10, 2017). 
68 Samantha Besson, Sovereignty in Conflict (1st edn, British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law 2006) 
69 Jabko, ibid at p.13 
70 Jabko, supra 
71 Enzo Cannizzaro, The European Union as an actor in international relations xiv (1 ed. 2002) 
72 Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2008).  
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hierarchical order, but by working towards the same end, namely the fulfilment of 
their shared sovereign values, including, inter alia, common market free from internal 
borders, common agriculture and fishery policies, common minimum standing on 
human rights etc.73 This notion has been criticized as “unsound,” on the basis that 
sovereignty in itself cannot be divided. 74 Dividing a sovereignty would undermine the 
nature of sovereignty as an absolute power, as only competences can be limited. 75  
Nonetheless, this notion supports that delegation of competencies through 
international treaties is nothing other than the demonstration and reaffirmation of this 
sovereignty.76  
While it is clear that the concept of sovereignty, in particular as it relates to the 
EU continues to be unresolved, a few conclusions can be drawn. Specifically, it can 
be concluded that sovereignty allows a State, in such fields and policy areas where it 
has not delegated authority to other institutions, to regulate its internal affairs at will 
free from external interferences. The EU is a unique case, enjoying sui generis 
powers, similar to the sovereignty awarded by the member States through 
international conventions. 
 
III.  THE NEGATIVE ASPECT OF SOVEREIGNTY 
A.  The Non-Intervention Principle 
As noted above, sovereignty entails the absolute dominion over a State’s 
territory, free from any external interference by other sovereign States. The definition 
of sovereignty, thus, implies that sovereign States have a negative obligation not to 
interfere in the internal affairs of other States, as all States are equal. The principle of 
non-intervention echoes customary international law, constituting one of the 
fundamental norms of international law, and is argued, by scholars such as Antonio 
Cassese and Jianming Shen, to enjoy the status of “jus cogens”.77 The principle is 
embodied, inter alia, in the Charter of the United Nations, although non-explicitly, but 
it can be inferred from Art. 2(4) and 2(7).78  It can also be inferred from the Friendly 
Relations Declaration.79  
                                                          
73 Id., Besson, ibid at. 14 
74Richard Rawlings, Peter Leyland and Alison L Young, Sovereignty and The Law: Domestic, European 
And International Perspectives (1st edn, OUP Oxford 2013). 
75 Rawlings, supra. 
76 Id.  
77 See Antonio Cassese, International Law in A Divided World (1st edn, Clarendon Press ua 1986). 
“[t]he importance of this principle [i.e., the principle of nonintervention] for States leads one to 
believe that it has by now become part and parcel of jus cogens”. Additionally, see Jianming Shen, The 
non-intervention principle and humanitarian interventions under international law, 7 International 
Legal Theory 5 (2001), See also L Oppenheim, R. Y Jennings & Arthur Watts, Oppenheim's 
international law 428 (1 ed. 2008). where it was stated that the principle "is a corollary of every 
state's right to sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence". 
78 Philip Kunig, Intervention, Prohibition of Opil.ouplaw.com (2008), 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1434?prd=EPIL (last visited Apr 10, 2017).. 
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The principle of non-intervention is explicitly identified in the UN General 
Assembly Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the 
Domestic Affairs of States.80 Furthermore, Art. 32 of the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States prohibits “the use of economic, political or any other type of 
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the 
exercise of its sovereign rights”.81 The principle was also recognized by the 
International Court in its very first case, Corfu Channel, United Kingdom v Albania.82  
Finally, it was emphasized in the renowned judgment in Nicaragua vs. United 
States where the Court determined that:  
“The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign 
State to conduct its affairs without outside interference; though 
examples of trespass against this principle are not infrequent, the Court 
considers that it is part and parcel of customary international law”.83 
(emphasis added). 
The Court later stated: 
 “[T]he principle forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly 
or indirectly in the internal or external affairs of other States” and that 
“a prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in 
which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to 
decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social 
and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is 
wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, 
which must remain free ones. […] the element of coercion […] defines, 
and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention”84  
(emphasis added).  
According to Professor Tzanakopoulos, the court in the Nicaragua case 
recognized that States enjoy an area of freedom where each respective State, alone, 
may act in the manner it pleases, stemming from that State’s own sovereignty.85 That 
area includes, inter alia, various policy areas, including fiscal, tax, foreign policy and 
the free choice of political, economic, social and cultural system.86  Within that area, 
as discussed above, no external intervention is permissible. That freedom may be 
                                                          
80 UNGA resolution 2131 (XX) 1965 
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circumcised, however, due to the obligations assumed by such States by the execution 
of international treaties. 
Despite the seemingly established status of the principle of non-intervention 
however, as will be demonstrated below, not only is its content unclear, 87 but the 
principle has also been set aside or abused several times by States with significant 
economic power, exercising economic coercion.88.  
In relation to the issue of clarity of the principle of non-intervention, case law 
is limited to specific cases with very specific fact patterns. Indicatively, the 
International Court of Justice has only examined three cases relating to the principle 
of non-intervention, namely the Corfu Chanel Case,89 the case of Nicaragua v. United 
States of America90 and the case of DRC v. Uganda,91 all of which had very particular 
facts that related to the use of military force.92Thus, for the most part, there is no 
consensus on what constitutes intervention and is therefore not allowed under 
international law.9394 For the purposes of this study, I shall focus only on examining 
the notion of “economic coercion” that may constitute a form of prohibited 
intervention.  
 
B. Economic Coercion 
Defining economic coercion is not an easy task, as, undoubtedly, a large part 
of the actions taken by a State in optimizing their economic self-interests lead to 
detrimental consequences to other States.95 Economic coercion can include all 
methods traditionally used for economic compulsion.96 In fact, since World War II, 
economic relations among States have been shaped by the practice of economic 
coercion.97 Clearly not every such action can be deemed illegal and prohibited. 
Rather, only these that are unnecessarily or unreasonably destructive to the essential 
                                                          
87 Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public 
Order: The Legal Regulation of International Coercion, 76 Harvard Law Review 668 (1963). 
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90 See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
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93 John Charvet & Elisa Kaczynska-Nay, The liberal project and human rights 275 (2008). 
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95 Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public 
Order: The Legal Regulation of International Coercion, 76 Harvard Law Review 668 (1963).. 
96 The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United 
Nations, 122 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 983 (1974). 
97 T. Akinola Aguda, Miroslav Nincic & Peter Wallensteen, Dilemmas of Economic Coercion: Sanctions 
in World Politics., 81 The American Journal of International Law 284 (1987).  
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values of an innocent target State, or which might significantly endanger international 
peace, are prohibited.98  
Professor Bowett has suggested that the decisive element of whether various 
economic measures should be considered illegal coercion is whether the action taken 
by the involved State can be attributed to an improper motive or intent.99 Put simply, 
an act on its own cannot be coercive, but it may become illegal coercion upon proof 
of improper motive or purpose.100 Since a State’s mens rea is not easy to deduct, let 
alone prove, Professor Bowett indicates that “it will require a great deal of practice, of 
“case-law”, to give the concept of illegal economic coercion substance and 
definition”.101   
Another criterion that was suggested to determine whether economic measures 
could constitute illegal coercion is based on whether the State imposing the measures 
does so to obtain “advantages of any kind” while subordinating the sovereignty of the 
state upon which the coercion is inflicted. 102 Again, however this criterion is vague as 
economic measures cannot be deemed illegal on the sole basis that they convey 
advantages to a State while damaging the interests of another State, particularly given 
the competition existing between various economies.103 According to Professor 
Tzanakopoulos, a decisive conclusion can be inferred from Article 52 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which refers to the case when a State is coerced to 
enter into an international treaty. In such case, the treaty is nonetheless valid, unless 
coercion was exercised by the threat or use of force.104  
"Force" certainly refers to any military force or physical force, used or 
threatened. However, it is unclear whether economic or political force is included in 
the definition of "use of force".  The definition of “force” becomes of the essence in 
such case, as a literal interpretation of the word might lead to the conclusion that force 
is tantamount to armed force, while a broader, liberal interpretation of the term would 
factor inclusion of political and economic force in this definition. This matter troubled 
the States when negotiating the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties105 but the 
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choice of words of Art. 52 thereto demonstrates their lack of willingness to clear up 
this matter.106   
As might be expected, the views of scholars on this topic are divided. Some 
commentators have supported the view that political and economic pressure is not 
included in the notion of force.107 Others argue that the term "force" should not be 
limited to military action, but should also include economic and political coercion that 
may endanger international peace, security or justice.108 This view is supported by the 
Separate Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, Political and Economic Coercion 
in the conclusion of Treaties, which was separately adopted in 1969 by the delegates 
of the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties.109 The said declaration specifically 
condemns “the threat or use of pressure in any form whether  military, political or 
economic by any State in order to coerce…”110 
 In all cases, the equation of coercion with illegal intervention should be 
interpreted to mean that anything short of coercion, e.g. mere interference with a 
State’s choices, is lawful so long as the interfering State does not breach any of its 
own obligations under international law.111  Thus, identifying the scope of what is 
considered coercion is necessary to identify whether the recent haircuts in the Euro 
zone, and especially the Cyprus Banking haircut, can be attributed to the EU and its 
institutions on the basis of coercion. 
 
IV. THE FACTS OF THE CYPRUS HAIRCUT 
Cyprus is the third smallest country in the EU and is situated in the north-
eastern Mediterranean Sea, to the south of Turkey. Although it joined the EU as a de 
facto divided island, the entire country is part of the EU territory.112 Cyprus is a well-
established financial and investment center due to its investor-friendly tax regime and, 
up to 2013, had a strong financial and service sector.  
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In March 2013, Cyprus was shocked by the decision to close the second 
largest Bank, Cyprus Popular Bank (“CPB”), the imposition of a depositor bail-in on 
the deposits in the largest bank, namely Bank of Cyprus (“BOC”) and the imposition 
of capital controls on all deposits in Cyprus Banks. Other authors have explored 
reasons behind the financial and banking crisis in the Republic of Cyprus.113 This 
article focuses on the facts leading to the decision for the Cyprus’ banking haircut to 
explore whether it was a product of coercion by the EU’s Institutions, especially the 
ECB and the Council of the European Union, as was contemplated by the President of 
Cyprus, Mr. Anastasiades.114  
The problems faced by the two major banks in Cyprus did not appear 
unexpectedly. Indeed, there were several signs that the banks were in distress well 
before March 2013, but these were neglected. Indicatively, as part of a Capital 
Exercise conducted on October 26, 2011 by the European Banking Authority (EBA) 
and the Central BOC, BOC identified a capital buffer shortfall of EUR 1,472 million 
(EUR 1.5 billion) and CPB identified a capital buffer shortfall of EUR 2,116 million 
(EUR 2.1 billion).115 As a result, at the beginning of November 2011, the Credit 
Ratings Agency Moody’s downgraded three Cypriot banks. In particular, BOC was 
downgraded by one notch to Ba2 from Ba1, Hellenic Bank by one notch to Ba2 from 
Ba1 and Marfin Popular Bank Public Co Ltd. by three notches to B2 from Ba2.116 Not 
long after the downgrades, EBA issued its recommendation on the creation and 
supervisory oversight of temporary capital buffers to restore market confidence.117 
This recommendation required national supervisory authorities of participating EU 
member State banks to raise their Core Tier 1 Capital to 9% after accounting for an 
additional buffer against stressed sovereign risk holdings by June 30, 2012.  
Both BOC and CPB needed to source additional funding. Correspondingly, on 
March 2, 2012, CPB announced a capital-raising plan, but the Greek PSI had 
immediate and devastating implications for both banks. Indeed, the two banks had 
purchased vast amounts of Greek Government Bonds and lost billions of Euros with 
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the Greek PSI.118 In particular, BOC announced losses of 1 billion euro, while CPB 
announced losses of 2.5 billion euro,119 something that further increased the needs for 
additional capital buffer. Cyprus could have requested support for its banks by the 
European Union, but same would have required agreeing to a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Troika, something that the Cyprus government was not 
prepared to do at the time. Instead, in an attempt to help salvage CPB, the Cyprus 
Parliament agreed on May 18, 2012 to underwrite the rights issue of capital of an 
amount of €1.8 billion for the bank’s recapitalization, in case the latter was unable to 
raise funds from private sources. This underwriting raised state aid concerns, but it 
was approved by the European Commission on 13th September 2012, on the 
precondition that the Cyprus Authorities would submit a plan no longer than within 6 
months from the date of the European Commission’s approval, to demonstrate how 
the bank would become viable with the assistance of the State.120  
By the deadline of June 30th, 2012, CPB had only raised €3 million, although 
the Cyprus government acquired bank shares amounted for the equivalent of about 
€1.8 billion.121 The State paid CPB by transferring to it a 12-month sovereign bond, 
which would be rolled over for a period of five years. By that time, all three major 
credit rating agencies had downgraded Cyprus' sovereign debt to junk status, thus 
eliminating the possibility that the ECB (“ECB”) could accept Cypriot bonds as 
collateral for a loan.122   
On June 25, 2012, Cyprus entered the European Stability Mechanism without 
specifying the amount of money it required. Unfortunately, a settlement wasn’t 
reached until after the Eurogroup meeting on March 15, 2013. In the meantime, both 
major banks in Cyprus required Emergency Liquidity Assistance (“ELA”) from the 
Central BOC. This was approved by both the Central BOC and by the ECB. The 
details of this provision were unknown at the time as neither the ECB nor the National 
Central Banks, including the Cyprus Central Bank, publish details on their collateral 
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holdings that are part of the monetary policy operations of the Eurosystem.123 As was 
later revealed, CPB had resorted to ELA already from September 27, 2011124 
requesting initially 300 million. That amount constantly grew to 1.8 billion on January 
2012, 3.8 billion in May 15, 2012, 4.2 billion by February 2013 and to a staggering 
9.1 billion Euros by the time the Bank was led into resolution.125   
The two Banks received ELA from the Central BOC until March 21, 2013, 
with the consent of the Governing Council of the ECB. On 21 March 2013, the ECB’s 
Governing Council announced that, in accordance with prior decisions, it would on 
March 25, 2013 cease to provide ELA to both Cypriot banks, due to “the lack of clear 
and binding policy decisions on behalf of the Cypriot side to implement a preliminary 
agreed financial assistance programme”.126 However, it was clear already from 2012, 
that CPB would become insolvent by the end of 2012, as it was in no position to 
service ELA past June 2012.127  
This fact appears to have been known to the ECB, as in response to a request 
for an opinion on the Cypriot’s government’s plan for the recapitalization of CPB, the 
ECB stated on July 2, 2012, that ‘the objectives pursued by the support measures may 
be better achieved through bank resolution tools’.128 The Central BOC's, with the 
ECB’s consent, continued provisioning of ELA was questionable given that it is 
contrary to the ECB rule that ELA is awarded only to solvent institutions.129 The 
Central BOC, in an attempt to defend its actions, argued that not assisting CPB would 
lead to same going bankrupt something that would cause panic and threaten the entire 
banking system.130   
In addition to the problems with the two major banks, Cyprus had also to 
address its own debt. It is estimated that at March 2013, the country was in need of 
seventeen billion Euros, which corresponded approximately to the size of the 
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country’s entire economy.131 Thus, in March 2013, the newly appointed Cyprus 
Government was faced with the following difficult choice: either accept the terms of 
the bailout programme offered by Troika “as is” or delay further the negotiations to 
achieve a better deal and face a possible collapse of its banking system and overall 
collapse of its economy. The initial deal negotiated by European finance ministers, the 
ECB, and the IMF, provided for a one time “haircut” of 6.75% for deposits of up to 
€100,000 and 9.99% for deposits above €100,000. This included all deposits (in 
current and deposit accounts, interest bearing or not) and all banks (including 
branches of international banks) operating in Cyprus.132 The said measure was 
strongly criticized as a “disastrous precedent”,133 and on March 18, 2013, the bill for 
the said measure was debated in the Cypriot parliament and was rejected on March 
19, 2013.134  
On March 21, 2013, the Governing Council of the ECB decided to maintain 
the current level of ELA until March 25, 2013. After that, ELA could only be 
considered if an EU/IMF program were put in place that would ensure the solvency of 
the concerned banks. Thus, the deadline for the Cypriot Government to reach a 
bailout program was March 25, 2013, following which “Pandora’s Box” would open.  
On March 22, 2013, the Cypriot Parliament started focused negotiations to 
find a way to reach a bailout deal before the 25 of March, but this required that 
Cyprus would gather six billion Euros to fund its share of the bailout.135 During that 
period, the Cyprus banking system remained closed while the terms of the bailout 
required the Cyprus Parliament to enforce capital controls. In response to these 
developments, the Cyprus government enacted eight distinct laws aimed at emergency 
assistance for the economy and banks (the “Bank Resolution Framework”), including 
Law 17(I)/2013 for the Consolidation of the Banks. These provisions awarded the 
Central BOC extensive powers to take a series of measures to assist in the 
consolidation or liquidation of financial institutions in Cyprus. The law further 
provided for the creation of a Consolidation Authority that would act as a “Receiver 
Manager” with extensive authority for the consolidation of the banks.  
Finally, on March 25, 2013, a deal was reached. In fact, on March 25, 2013 
the Euro Group made a statement that an agreement had been reached with the 
Cypriot authorities on the key elements necessary for a future macroeconomic 
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adjustment programme and same was supported by all euro area Member States and 
by the Commission, the ECB and the IMF. The statement contained an annex with the 
terms of the Agreement; the annex provided inter alia the following136: 
• It was agreed that Cyprus would receive Euro 10 billion as financial 
assistance; such assistance would not be used to recapitalize either CPB or 
BOC. All other Banks in Cyprus would be provided with unlimited funds as 
needed. 
• Additionally, the Annex provided for certain measures to be taken 
immediately in relation to the two problematic banks: 
o CPB would be resolved immediately — with full contribution of equity 
shareholders, bond holders and uninsured depositors — based on the 
Bank Resolution Framework. CPB would be separated into a good 
bank and a bad bank; the good bank will be folded into BOC along 
with 9 billion of ELA, while the bad bank will be run down over time. 
o BOC would be recapitalized through a deposit/equity conversion of 
uninsured deposits with full contribution of equity shareholders and 
bond holders, so that a capital ratio of 9% would be secured by the end 
of the programme. 
On March 25, 2013, the Governor of the Central BOC placed both banks into 
resolution. On March 26, 2016 the Memorandum of Understanding was adopted by 
the ESM and the Republic of Cyprus reiterating the terms of the Eurogroup’s 
announcement. Shortly thereafter, on 29 March 2013, two decrees were published by 
the Cyprus Central Bank, decrees no. 103 and 104, materializing the agreement 
reached with the European Stability Mechanism (“ESM”).  
 
V. THE CYPRUS HAIRCUT, COERCION OR JUST HARD POLITICS? 
The Cyprus Banking haircut was unprecedented. It is unclear, however, 
whether the bail-out terms were willfully accepted by the Cypriot Government or 
whether the latter was coerced and forced to accept same as a “take it or leave it plan” 
with the alternative being financial collapse of the Country. 
A. Coercion 
Undoubtedly, Cyprus was “forced” to accept some difficult decisions. 
However, does this mean that the banking haircut in the two major Banks in Cyprus 
was a product of economic coercion? To analyze whether the facts of the Cyprus 
banking haircut satisfy the aforementioned criteria for economic coercion I focus on 
the decision of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (“ECB”) of 
March 21, 2013. As a result of this decision, the provision of ELA to BOC and CPB 
was to be stopped on March 25, 2013 unless and until Cyprus agreed to a bailout 
programme. To respond to this question, we must first examine the legal framework 
surrounding ECB’s decision. This is the topic that we now turn.  
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Primarily, the legal nature of ELA must be identified. ELA is a temporal 
measure to support solvent credit institutions that are facing temporary liquidity 
problems.137 The provision of ELA is a competence enjoyed by each Member State 
through their National Central Banks (“NCBs”),138 separately from their functions 
that arise from their membership in the European System of Central Banks (“ESCB”) 
or Eurosystem.139 ELA is therefore not a monetary policy instrument, nor is it an 
ESCB or Eurosystem function, but it is awarded by the NCBs. Hence, to a large 
extent the provision of ELA facilities is a national matter governed by the national 
laws of the NCB’s state of incorporation, under the national NCB legal framework.140  
As the NCBs are responsible for granting ELA, they enjoy wide discretion to 
decide the terms and conditions on which ELA is offered. In particular, Article 14.4 
of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB explicitly stipulates that NCBs may perform 
functions other than those specified in the Statute… “Such functions shall be 
performed on the responsibility and liability of national central banks and shall not 
be regarded as being part of the functions of the ESCB.”   
That said, such discretion should not be exercised in contravention with other 
legal obligations of the States or the NCBs. In particular, the granting of ELA facility 
to a specific banking institution should not be contrary to the rules on state aid. The 
European Commission has, to this end, issued Guidelines on how state aid rules apply 
in case of ELA, recognizing four conditions which, if met, indicate there is no 
violation of the state aid rules. These conditions are: a) an ELA should be awarded 
only to solvent but illiquid banking institutions,141 and should be part of a larger 
“rescue package” but a limited and exceptional temporary case, b) the facility should 
be secured by adequate collateral, c) the Central Bank should impose a punitive 
interest rate to the beneficiary institution and d) lastly, ELA should be provided at 
NCB’s discretion and should not be supported on/by State’s guarantees.142 
Furthermore, although ELA is not provided within the ESCB framework, 
nonetheless it should not interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB and it 
should be consistent with the ‘monetary financing prohibition’ as defined under 
Article 123 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, which prohibits 
overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with an NCB in favour of the 
public sector, including ‘any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis 
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third parties.143 The ECB has in several opinions stressed the criteria that should be 
followed by ELA under Art. 123; these are: a) the credit provided by the NCB should 
be provided for as short term as possible; b) there must be systemic stability aspects at 
stake; c) there must be no doubts as to the legal validity and enforceability of the State 
guarantee under applicable national law; and d) there must be no doubts as to the 
economic adequacy of the State guarantee, which should cover both principal and 
interest on the loans, thus fully preserving the NCB’s financial independence.144  
Lastly, Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB grants the 
Governing Council of the ECB the right to stop or restrict an ELA facility from 
operating. This can occur if the ECB considers that ELA is interfering with the 
objectives and tasks of the Eurosystem, and at least two thirds of the votes cast oppose 
to further ELA. It is for these reasons that a NCB granting ELA must inform the ECB 
with all relevant details within 2 days.145 
The decision of the Governing Council of the ECB of March 21, 2013 
deciding to maintain the level of ELA granted to Cyprus Banks until Monday, 25 
March 2013, at which time it would be abruptly terminated unless a financial stability 
pact was reached with Troika, was founded exactly on this Article 14.4. As can be 
determined from the wording of Art. 14.4, there are two conditions that should be met 
for the Governing Council to decide to terminate or otherwise restrict ELA.  The first 
one is procedural and dictates that such a decision should be taken and ratified by at 
least two thirds of the votes. The second one is substantive and provides that the 
decision should be based on the premises that the continuance of ELA would impair 
some specific object and task of the Eurosystem. Clearly, the second condition cannot 
be subject to review by any State or other European Institution for that matter and is 
decided solely on the Governing Council’s discretion. So, to the extent that the 
procedural condition of receiving at least 2/3 of the votes was met, the Decision of the 
Governing Council of March 21st, 2013 can be considered justified. However, it is 
necessary to examine whether the exercise of such discretion constitutes coercion. 
This is the topic we now turn to. 
 
a. Theories of Coercion 
As discussed, the definition of economic coercion is not yet settled in 
international bibliography and the consideration of this issue is complicated and 
requires examination of several factors. Nonetheless, we are going to examine 
whether the facts of the Cyprus banking haircut can satisfy the aforementioned criteria 
that have been recognized by the different scholars as ingredients of economic 
coercion.  
                                                          
143  See for example ECB, Opinion of the ECB of 24 January 2012 on a guarantee scheme for the 
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The first criterion, proposed by Professor Bowett, requires an improper motive 
or intent on the part of the State exercising the coercive act. 146  Such intent should be 
primarily for the purpose of damaging the economy of another State, or as a means of 
coercing another State.147 The question here, therefore, is whether the ECB acted with 
an improper motive for the purpose of damaging the Cyprus economy, when it 
decided to suddenly stop the provision of ELA to Cyprus’ second largest banks. As 
discussed above, the intent of a State or an EU Institution, as in this case, is not easy 
to detect, let alone prove, something that would require a thorough examination of the 
surrounding situations. In the case of the Cyprus banking haircut, the decision of the 
Governing Council of the ECB was taken at a time when CPB had already been 
insolvent for several months, something that might raise suspicions as to the choice of 
the timing. That stated, at that period the Cyprus Government’s 6-month deadline to 
present to the EU Commission the viability plan for CPB had just expired.  
Furthermore, the ECB, as will be discussed below in detail, acted legally and in 
accordance with its policy when it decided to stop funding the insolvent CPB. Thus, 
although the timing of the decision, the very short notice given by ECB prior to the 
implementation of the decision, and the unprecedented terms Cyprus of the bailout 
programme, certainly raise some questions regarding ECB’s motives, these motives 
do not clearly demonstrate coercive intent. It is, therefore, very difficult to 
persuasively demonstrate that the ECB intended to damage the Cyprus economy. 
Furthermore, it is also not demonstrably within ECB's interest to inflict this damage 
since it would ultimately only end up hurting ECB’s goals of price stability. 
For ECB’s decision to constitute coercion under the second criterion, ECB 
must have imposed the decision to obtain some benefits of any kind by way of 
subordinating the Cypriot sovereignty. Any claim that the ECB aimed to obtain 
specific benefits from exercising pressure on the Cypriot Government is not supported 
by any official documentation. The decision was taken in accordance with Art.14 of 
the ECBS Statute to safeguard Eurosystems tasks and goals and it was taken to restore 
legality under ECB’s statute. Furthermore, it cannot be effectively claimed that the 
ECB subordinated the sovereignty of the Cyprus State, as Cyprus has itself awarded 
such powers to the ECB.  
The last criterion requires that the coercion is tantamount to force in the sense 
that it can endanger the coerced State’s security, economy and other structures. 
Certainly, the collapse of the Cypriot Banking System that was imminent upon CPB’s 
collapse, was a credible threat to Cyprus’ social security, safety and economy and 
could be directly linked with the ECB’s decision. Even so, ECB was not responsible 
for the financial position of CPB and the latter’s insolvency, nor for the dire State of 
the Cyprus economy which was clearly attributable to the inadequate management of 
the Bank and of the Cyprus Government. Professor Farer argues that non-concession 
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of assistance or aid to another State falls short of coercion in every case.148 In this 
case, therefore the ECB’s decision to cease providing ELA to the Cypriot Banks 
cannot be classified as coercive. 
As such, it does not appear clear that the Cyprus Government was coerced to 
agreeing the bailout program. Even if such was the case, however, as indicated below, 
not all forms of coercion are illegal under international law. 
 
b. Retorsion and Reprisals 
Not all hostile and unfriendly competitive acts can be considered as illegal 
coercion. Indeed, international law recognizes that a State is free to respond to an 
injurious act done by another State through a hostile, yet legal, act.149 Such acts of 
retorsion are considered as a State’s means of self-help, when it is subjected to an 
illegal act. Retorsions aim to compel the party acting illegally to rescind such act.  
Overall acts of retorsion are deemed to be legal, even in the absences of a 
previous injurious act, since States retain the right to be unfriendly to one another in 
pursuit of their interests.150 It has, however, been argued that if retorsion is in pursuit 
of a wrongful end, such as an act for the sole aim of causing harm to another State, it 
becomes illegal.151 Once an act ceases to be legal it no longer constitutes retorsion. 
Hence, retorsion falls short of coercion in the legal sense of the term. If a hostile act is 
of such degree so as to constitute coercion it is considered a prohibited/illegal 
intervention under international law and thus no longer qualifies as retorsion.152 
Retorsion is distinguished from reprisals in exactly this sense, i.e. that reprisals are in 
themselves illegal acts, which are justified under international law as they constitute a 
response to a previous violation of the law by the State to which the reprisal is 
directed.153 Reprisals are allowed under international law allowing States to respond 
to a prior illegal act as means of “self-help”.  
Self-help is a necessary remedy since international law does not provide an 
effective enforcement mechanism.154 There is no “Court [or] central authority above 
the Sovereign States which could compel a delinquent State to give reparation”.155  
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The arbitration Naulilaa case has provided the classic definition of the tem reprisal 
and its elements, providing that:  
“Reprisals are an act of self-help on the part of the injured states, 
responding after an unsatisfied demand to an act contrary to international 
law on the part of the offending State . . . They would be illegal if a 
previous act contrary to international law had not furnished the reason for 
them. They aim to impose on the offending State reparation for the offense 
or the return to legality in avoidance of new offenses”.156  
Reprisals can constitute a form of coercion. The Institut de Droit 
International, in fact, defines reprisals as: 
“[M]easures of coercion, derogating from the ordinary rules of the law of the 
people, determined and taken by a State, following the commission of illicit acts 
against it by another State, and having as their aim to impose on the second State, 
through pressure exerted by means of harm, a return to legality.”157   
Traditionally, reprisals included any illegal act, including measures of 
economic coercion as well as armed attacks.158  The term, however, has been replaced 
by two concepts, belliquent, or self-defence, reprisals used in armed conflict, and 
countermeasures, or those of a non-forcible nature.159 Economic coercion can be 
considered a type of countermeasures. 
Countermeasures are an exception to the rule that coercion constitutes an 
illegal intervention, in that they are illegal per se, but they can be justified provided 
certain conditions are met. 160 This is recognized by the Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, (“DASR”), which 
although do not constitute a multinational convention, nonetheless the codify 
customary law.161 Indeed, Art. 22 of the DASR provides that “The wrongfulness of an 
act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation towards another State 
is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure”, provided 
certain substantive and procedural conditions are met.162  Such substantive and 
procedural conditions constitute the limits of countermeasures. If these conditions are 
not met, countermeasures are illegal as coercive acts. The same principle is reiterated 
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on Art. 22 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations 
(“DARIO”), which aim to clarify the circumstances under which an International 
Organization is liable for breach of an international obligation and the consequences 
of such breach. It must be stipulated that DARIO does not enjoy the status of 
customary law, as is the case with DASR. In fact, DARIO has been met with 
skepticism by States, International Organizations and academia. Nonetheless, as 
argued by Ass. Professor Kristina Daugirdas, DARIO can lead to the formation of 
customary law.163 Thus, these conditions provide a means for testing the potential for 
the Cyprus bank haircut to be the result of coercive actions. We shall now examine 
such substantive and procedural conditions that constitute the limits of 
countermeasures 
 
c. Limits of Countermeasures 
Initially, arbitral tribunals, such as in the Naulilaa case above, set out certain 
conditions that had to be met for countermeasures to be legal.164 The Naulilaa 
indicates that for countermeasures to be legal (1) they must be executed only by a 
State through its institutions; (2) they must be proportionate and (3) they must follow 
an illicit act where negotiations to restore legality have failed.165  
These criteria were re-affirmed in the arbitration case Air Service Agreement, 
which referred exclusively to countermeasures. 166 This case examined the decision of 
the United States to ban certain French flights from landing to the United States, 
following France’s decision to not allow Pan American passengers to disembark in 
Paris. France's decision was due to an alleged breach of the 1946 bilateral Agreement 
between France and the US, which provided for civil air flights between the two 
countries. The tribunal reaffirmed States’ right to resort to countermeasures, but noted 
that such measures should 1) be relevant to a previous violation by the state receiving 
the countermeasures and 2) be proportionate in light of the previous violation. In 
relation to the third requirement that was upheld in the Naulilaa case, namely that a 
countermeasure should constitute the last resort following failed negotiations, the 
Tribunal in the Service Agreement case resolved that starting countermeasures during 
negotiations was not prohibited. Similar recognition of the legitimacy of 
countermeasures was indicated in the “Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project”167 case and 
the “Cysne”168 case.  
These conditions were codified in Art.22 of the DASR, which as stipulated, 
echoes customary law. Furthermore, Art. 49-51 of the DASR outline the limits of 
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economic countermeasures. These are distinguished between substantive and 
procedural limits; the procedural limits are set in Art. 49, while Art. 50 and 51 set out 
the substantive limits. According to Art. 49 countermeasures are permissible if taken 
by an injured State so as to induce the responsible State to cease its internationally 
wrongful conduct. This upholds the principle initially set out in the GabčÌkovo-
Nagymaros Project case169, by virtue of which, the existence of an internationally 
wrongful act is a prerequisite for the justification of a countermeasure.170 This leads to 
the following conclusions: 
• Primarily, countermeasures may only be taken against the violating State 
alone and therefore acts directed against third States would not be justified as 
countermeasures. That said, if countermeasures taken against the violating 
State also indirectly or consequently affect third States, this alone does not 
necessarily render a countermeasure illegal under the scope of article 22 of 
the DASR.171  
• Secondly, countermeasures can only be taken by an injured State, meaning 
that non-injured States may not affect countermeasures. That said, in case 
there is a serious violation of an obligation owed to the international 
community as a whole, any State may take countermeasures.172 
• Lastly, countermeasures can be taken to induce a State to cease its 
internationally wrongful conduct. Hence a countermeasure cannot be justified 
if it goes beyond the goal of economic inducement to (economic) coercion to 
force the other State to do something it is not obligated to do under 
international law.173 This also means that countermeasures should cease as 
soon as their aim of inducement is met, and shouldn’t continue thereafter as 
they would no longer constitute a response to an illegal act. 
The wrongfulness of an international act can only be judged retrospectively, so 
a State resorting to countermeasures due to alleged wrongful violations, does so at its 
own peril.174 
Apart from the procedural limits described above, Art. 50 and 51 of the DASR 
set various substantive conditions for counter measures to be justified. Art. 50 
provides that countermeasures should refrain from violating international obligations 
regarding the use of force, fundamental human rights, obligations of a humanitarian 
character prohibiting reprisals, and obligations under obligations under peremptory 
norms of general international law. 
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  Lastly, Art. 51 sets a substantive limit on the nature and extent of 
countermeasures providing that countermeasures should respect the principle of 
proportionality. Proportionality essentially requires that adoption of countermeasures 
does not lead to inequitable results. Hence, for countermeasures to be proportionate 
they should assess both the amount of injury suffered, but also the nature of the rights 
in question and the seriousness of the breach.175 The reference to “the rights in 
question” should be broadly interpreted so as to refer not only to the rights infringed 
but also on the rights of the violating State. Considering this, punitive 
countermeasures will never be permitted under international law.  
In relation to the limits set to countermeasures taken by an International 
Organization against a State, DARIO do not specifically regulate this issue, but 
instead Art. 22 of DARIO refers to the “substantive and procedural conditions 
required by international law”. As per the Commentary of DARIO, Art. 49 to 54 of 
DASR should be applied respectively.176   
I shall now examine whether the decision of March 21, 2013 of the Governing 
Council of the ECB, if deemed to be coercive can be justified as countermeasure or an 
act of retorsion.  As we have already established the decision of March 21, 2013 was 
legal, so this would render it an act of retorsion that, as advised, is permitted under 
international law, even if it is punitive and/or hostile to the extent that it’s not 
disproportionately hostile. 
Only if ECB’s Decision was illegal, would we examine coercion, but, as 
examined, we cannot classify ECB’s decision as illegal under any of the coercion 
criteria, given that ECB acted within its scope of powers, rightfully exercising its 
discretion. Even, however if ECB’s decision was deemed illegal, again the ECB could 
raise the defense of countermeasures given that all the respective conditions are met, 
namely Cyprus was in breach of an obligation due to the European Union under the 
Stability and Growth Pact, by a rising government debt ratio well over the 60% of 
GDP reference value in 2010, 2011, 2012 and reaching 102% in 2013. It can be 
argued further that ECB’s decision of March 21st, 2013 that “ELA would be 
continued if and only if a program was in place that would ensure the solvency of the 
banks concerned,177 was taken as a direct consequence of that breach, given that 
ELA could not be continued to be given to an insolvent bank, as this would be a credit 
facility aimed to defer government-funded recapitalization, in breach of Art. 123 of 
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Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), which prohibits the 
financing of public budgets in Member States through the ECB and the NCB.178  
To conclude, establishing liability of European Institutions on the above grounds 
appears to be a very difficult task for Cyprus, while investors would be barred from 
even bringing such claims as, not only is DARIO not binding at its present state, but 
also DARIO can only be invoked by States and International Organizations and not 
by individuals. 
This analysis indicates that it is a very difficult task for investors to render the 
European Institutions liable or co-liable for such loses. 
 
B. Basing Liability on other grounds 
Due to these difficulties, it is worth exploring if investors can base their claim 
against European Institutions for loses associated with financial distress ‘measures on 
other grounds and especially on the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”). To this end I will examine available remedies under the TFEU. 
 
1. Art 263 TFEU-Annulment of Illegal actions 
Art 263 TFEU contains a provision on judicial review of the acts of EU 
institutions. In particular, it allows, inter alia, individuals to bring actions in the Court 
of Justice of the European Union against EU institutions that have acted illegally.179  
However, before individuals can demonstrate that the EU institutions’ act is illegal, 
they must first demonstrate they have fulfilled the locus standi preconditions set out in 
the relevant article. It is worth mentioning that before the Lisbon Treaty, Art 263 had 
been scarcely used as means of enforcing individual rights, due to the onerous 
requirements, which individual applicants must meet, namely that they must prove the 
act was a matter of “direct and individual concern” to them.180 Indeed, in the leading 
Plaumann case, the Court held that an applicant would be successful in showing that 
they had direct and individual concern by a Decision, only if that decision affects 
them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of 
circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of 
these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person 
addressed.181 
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Following the Lisbon Treaty, the conditions for the admissibility of actions 
brought by individuals have been eased, depending on the act challenged, so that 
individual applicants can now challenge: 
• An act addressed to them; 
• An act addressed to another person, which was of direct and individual 
concern to them; or 
• A regulatory act which was of direct concern to them and did not entail 
implementing measures.182  
In relation to what constitutes regulatory act, De Witte argues that same is 
tantamount to non-legislative acts, i.e. “acts not adopted in accordance with the 
ordinary or special legislative procedure”.183 For such acts, according to Girón 
Larrucea, there is no need that they directly affect an addressee, except for the sole 
reason that they are one of the participants in a certain area of activity for the general 
regulation of which the act was adopted.”184 
Decisions of EU Institutions taken in the framework of sovereign default, 
which constitutes exceptional circumstances, are likely to be regulatory acts, although 
this is not always the case. This issue was examined by the General Court when 
distressed depositors from the Cyprus Bank that had sustained haircuts in their bank 
deposits, resorted to the Court requesting the cancellation of the sale of operation in 
CPB in cases T-327/13 until Τ-331/13.185 The Applicants in all five cases turned 
against the European Commission and the ECB, as according to the applicants the 
decision of the Eurogroup of 25 March 2013 should be attributed to them. In their 
view, the decrees issued by the Cyprus Central Bank were simply materializing 
Eurogroup’s statement. Their main argument was that the Eurogroup’s decision of 
25th of March, which was materialized through the Banking Resolution Framework 
[Decree No. 103 and 104 of the Governor of Cyprus Central Bank as the 
representative and/or agent of the European System of Central Banks], was in excess 
of Eurogroup’s power and authorities and thus intervening on Cyprus’ sovereignty. 
The General Court initially examined whether the Eurogroup Statement could, in fact 
be attributed to the ECB or the European Commission as otherwise the application 
would be inadmissible.  The General Court concluded that the Eurogroup is an 
informal discussion forum, at ministerial level, between representatives of the 
Member States whose currency is the Euro, without any legislative decision-making 
competences. The General Court noted that despite ECB’s participation in its 
meetings, nonetheless its actions could not be attributed to the ECB or the European 
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Commission. The General Court, further, considered if the statement could be 
attributed to the ESM, rather than to the Euro Group. The applicants claimed that in 
such case, the act would be attributable to the ECB. The General Court ruled, 
however, that, even in such case, this fact would still not allow the inference that the 
Commission or the ECB instigated the adoption of that statement. As such, it ruled 
that an annulment was not possible under Art. 263 TFEU and that the application was 
inadmissible. The case would be different if the statement was issued by the Council 
under its ECOFIN configuration, as in such a case, the Degrees 103 and 104 would in 
fact be implementing EU law.186  
The decision of the General Court was appealed (Joined Cases C-105/15 P to 
C-109/15 P), but the CJEU upheld the dismissal. The CJEU reiterated that the 
Eurogroup’s Statement could not be regarded as a joint decision of the Commission 
and the ECB, as, under the ESM framework, these did not have the power to make 
decisions of their own under the ESM Treaty and the mere participation of the EU 
Commission and the ECB in the meetings of the Eurogroup was not sufficient to alter 
the nature of Eurogroup’s statements and render such statements the expression of a 
decision-making power of the ECB and the EU Commission. Finally, CJEU noted 
that as Cyprus adopted the legal framework for the banks’ restructuring, this cannot 
be regarded as having been imposed by an alleged decision joint taken by EU 
Commission and the ECB expressed in the Eurogroup statement. 
 Therefore, only in cases where investors can prove an act addresses to them 
or with direct and individual concern to them or a regulatory act, can investors 
challenge the legality of an act of an EU Institution taken within the framework of 
sovereign default, to the extent, of course, that such act directly affects the interests of 
such investors. However, for investors to succeed they must further demonstrate that 
such act actually contradicts to EU Law, something that seems difficult to do given 
the wide discretion that is enjoyed by EU institutions in this field. 
 
2. Art. 265 TFEU-Complaint for failure to Act 
Art. 265 TFEU provides that in cases where a European Institution has an 
affirmative duty, and not just discretionary power, to act, but it omitted to do so, such 
inaction can be deemed an infringement of the TFEU and as such an illegal 
omission.187 This article applies specifically in cases of inaction of European 
Institutions, when there was a legal obligation to act and thus “inaction” means non-
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adoption of a legal act188. Additionally, the term “inaction” also includes the case 
when an EU institution abuses its discretion.189 
In case the European Court rules that there was in fact an infringement of EU 
law due to inaction, it will order the respective Institutions to take all necessary acts to 
remedy the omission.190 Art. 265 differentiates between privileged and non-privileged 
applicants, with the former comprising Member States and institutions of the EU and 
the latter private parties who  have a limited right of locus standi.191 In that they must 
have a personal interest in taking action in order to bring proceedings before the Court 
of Justice.192 In particular, the Court has stressed in several occasions that applications 
by individuals should be limited to Decisions addressed to such individuals.193 
An action based on Art. 265 can be brought only against an EU institution (i.e. 
against any of the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the 
Commission or the ECB)194.  This course of action might be used by investors in case 
any EU institution failed to take action it was legally required to have taken to avert or 
minimize investors’ losses due to sovereign default. The crucial element for investors 
is to demonstrate that the EU institution has unlawfully failed to act, when such action 
was required by EU law. In such case, Investors could resort to the European Court of 
Justice, provided they had followed the procedural conditions provided for in Art. 
265, including the preliminary procedure.195  
To explore if investors can resort to this alternative, I will once again explore 
the case of CPB. In the latter case, it is striking that although CPB was insolvent and 
that this was known to the ECB, the Cyprus NCB continued to provide ELA to it, 
contrary to Art 123 TFEU and ECB’s policy. It is therefore questionable whether the 
ECB had a duty to intervene and stop ELA before the situation evolved so 
dramatically. The answer to this question is negative; the ECB had no duty to 
intervene, because, as stipulated above, the provision of ELA is a national matter, 
while national central banks and respective national authorities maintain ultimate 
responsibly for prudential supervision of Eurozone banks.196 Indeed, in accordance 
with TFEU, ECB had no duty to maintain financial stability197; instead ECB’s 
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authority is limited to “contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the 
competent authorities”.198 To this end, ECB had no duty to stop ELA from being 
granted to CPB by the Cyprus NBC and in fact the Decision of the Governing Council 
of March 21st 2013 was a negative action that does not justify the use of Art.265 
TFEU. 
It is therefore difficult to imagine that in matters of extreme financial distress, 
where national States still enjoy exclusive sovereignty to decide, there will be 
situations where EU institutions will have a duty to act to prevent a decision or 
situation personally affecting investors. 
 
3. Non-contractual liability of EU institutions 
Finally, it is worth examining the non-contractual liability of EU institutions, 
which can be found in Article 340 TFEU. The latter article provides that the EU shall 
make good damage caused by its institutions. Within the definition of an attributable 
act, they are included also wrongful omissions.199 In the case C-352/98 Bergaderm, 
the CJEU set a set of conditions that must be met for establishing the existence of 
liability under Article 340 TFEU. 200  These are: 
• The rule of law which has been breached must be one which is intended to 
confer rights on individuals. Here, later case law has adopted a more 
liberal approach. 201 In particular, the Kampffmeyer case202 established that 
it suffices to show that the rule infringed was intended generally for the 
protection of individuals, and not necessary for the that the applicant was 
‘directly and individually concerned’ as required in Article 263 TFEU. 
Indicatively, in the more recent case, Camos Grau v Commission, the 
requirement of impartiality into the conduct of Commission employees, 
was found to aim not only to the respect of the public interest, but also to 
confer a right to individuals to see that the corresponding guarantees are 
complied with. 203 
• the breach must be sufficiently serious to merit an award of damages;204 
and,  
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• there must be a direct causal link between the infringement of the rule and 
the damage suffered by the claimant. 
 
All three conditions governing the EU’s liability must jointly be satisfied. If 
one of them is not fulfilled the application is dismissed in its entirety without the 
necessity for the Union courts to examine the remaining conditions for such 
liability. The Case T-79/13 Accorinti v ECB is indicative of this matter.205 The case 
revolved around the Greek Sovereign Bonds Haircut through Private Sector 
Involvement (PSI). It was filed by Allessandro Accortini along with over 200 
plaintiffs from Italy, all holders of Greek Sovereign bonds.  
Plaintiffs claimed that, by virtue of the Exchange Agreement of 15 February 
2012 and the ECB’s Decision 2012/153/EU which provided that Greek bonds had to 
be guaranteed by the Greek Government in favour of the ECB and the NBCs in order 
to be eligible for Eurosystem operations, ECB and the NBCs received preferential 
treatment over all other holders of Greek Sovereign bonds. Plaintiffs claimed the 
above constituted a breach of the principle of equal treatment amongst private 
creditors, while the fact that the ECB was buying Greek sovereign bonds, while 
issuing calming statements for private investors was infringing their legitimate 
expectations and the principle of legal certainty. For these they claimed damages of 
more than 12.5 million Euros in accordance with Article 268 and 340 TFEU.  
As noted above, Art. 340 TFEU provides the cumulative conditions that must 
be satisfied for the European Union to be liable under non-contractual liability; in 
particular these are: a) that the institution must act unlawfully, b) actual damage must 
have been suffered and c) lastly, there must be a causal link between the unlawful and 
the damage pleaded.206 The General Court in the Accorinti Case concluded that the 
first condition of Art. 340, namely the existence of an unlawful conduct was not 
fulfilled as the ECB acted within the discretion awarded to it by Art. 127 and 282 
TFEU and, therefore, acted in compliance with EU law. The General Court concluded 
that bond holders’ losses could not be attributed to the ECB, as economic risks are 
inherent in the commercial activities carried out in the financial sector. To this end 
private investors could not rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate 
expectations or on the principle of legal certainty.  
Furthermore, the General Court found that ECB’s statements were generic and 
bondholders, as diligent and well-informed investors, should have had knowledge of 
the highly unstable economic circumstances the Greek sovereign bonds.  The Court 
further concluded that in all cases, the decision of the Greek sovereign debt 
restructuring was taken by the Greek Government, which enjoyed exclusive 
competence on this matter and could not be attributed to the ECB. Lastly, the General 
Court rejected that the general principle of equal treatment could apply between 
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private investors and the ECB as same were not in a comparable situation, given the 
different motives that driven them, namely public interest in the case of ECB and the 
pursuit of private profit in the case of private investors. Greece, and not the ECB, was 
only bound under pari passu clauses in the Greek Sovereign Bonds to ensure equal 
treatment of investors by ensuring that bonds were treated on “the same level footing 
without preference or priority among themselves…”.207 On the above grounds, the 
General Court dismissed the application.  
The same result was also reached in the case Nausicaa Anadyomène SAS and 
Banque d’escompte v ECB,208 which was based on the same set of facts. The General 
Court found that the ECB had not infringed the legitimate expectations of the private 
holders of Greek bonds, the principle of legal certainty and the principle of equal 
treatment of private creditors. The Court said that in a field such as that of monetary 
policy, which is subject to constant changes, commercial banks may not rely upon the 
principle of the protection of legitimate expectations or upon the principle of legal 
certainty.209 Hence, as the ECB had not actively encouraged investors to acquire or 
retain Greek debt instruments through its acts or statements, the General Court held 
that the ECB is not bound to compensate the loss sustained by commercial banks, 
holding Greek debt instruments by the restructuring of Greek debt.210 
CJEU also examined the partial annulment of the Memorandum of 
Understanding of 26 April 2013 entered between Cyprus and the ESM in the Ledra 
Joined Cases T 289-/13 to T-291/13.  In the said cases, applicants were depositors that 
claimed specific provisions of the Memorandum was in breach of human rights 
considerations, referring to the European Convention of Human Rights and the EU 
Charter of Human Rights. Initially, the General Court did not proceed to examine the 
merits of the cases, but ruled the claim in admissible as, notwithstanding that the EU 
Commission signed the Memorandum, it had done so on behalf of the ESM and so as 
with the activities pursued by the Commission and the ECB in the context of the 
ESM, only the ESM is committed. As such as “neither the ESM nor the Republic of 
Cyprus is among the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union, 
the General Court has no jurisdiction to examine the legality of acts which they have 
adopted together”.211 The cases were appealed in the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (“CJEU”) and on September 20, 2016 the CJEU set aside the previous 
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judgement and proceeded to examine the case on its merits.212  On the grounds of 
admissibility, CJEU held that, as the EU Commission acts as the guardian of the EU 
Treaties, it must therefore refrain from signing a Memorandum of Understanding, 
whose consistency with EU law is questionable, as would be the case in the event of 
breach of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. On the merits, CJEU examined held 
that the Commission, considering the imminent risk of financial losses that would 
have been sustained by depositors if the banking system had collapsed, absent an 
agreement for Cyprus bailout, the measures do not constitute a disproportionate and 
intolerable interference with the appellants’ right to property and that therefore the 
wasn’t a breach of the Charter. Hence, CJEU found that the EU Commission was not 
in breach and thus the conditions of Art.340 were not met. 
The above case demonstrates the large discretion enjoyed by EU institutions 
and the difficulties to attach liability to them for actions related to measures taken in 
case of sovereign default, especially when such institutions have acted lawfully within 
their wide discretionary powers. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
In cases of sovereign default, investors often sustain significant loses and are 
left looking for remedies. Recognizing the responsible actors is of paramount 
importance as it dictates the available remedies for investors. In particular, in case a 
measure can be attributed to more actors this grant investors additional legal 
recourses. Additionally, the party responsible will also determine competent Courts, 
applicable law, and available property for enforcement. 
In the recent case of the Cyprus Banking haircut investors were told by the 
Cypriot President that the measures that led to the haircut were in fact attributable to 
the EU and its institutions. To this end, several investors brought claims against 
Eurogroup and the ECB. 
This paper examined whether in fact liability could be attributed to the EU for 
the acts of a member state.  As demonstrated above there are several bases upon 
which investors can claim compensation from EU institutions in the framework of 
sovereign default within the EU. However, none of these conditions is easy to identify 
or fulfil.   
Primarily, investors can examine whether sovereign actions can be attributed 
to EU institutions through coercion. As noted above, this will be very difficult to 
prove, since economic coercion is not as clear as military coercion, and its definition 
is vague and subject to interpretation on a case-by-case basis. Even if coercion is 
indeed found, investors might still not be able to achieve in their claim, if such 
coercion was triggered as countermeasures, which can justify an illegal act.  In this 
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respect, TFEU might offer some other alternatives, but once again, case law seems too 
restrictive on such claims which must be examined in each separate case. 
 The above demonstrate that investors are unlikely to succeed in their claims 
against EU institutions in case of measures taken during extreme financial crisis as the 
concept of sovereignty sets several obstacles on investors seeking remedies against 
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I. ABSTRACT  
 
The Cyprus Banking Haircut of 2013 was unprecedented and had devastating 
implications for investors, be they shareholders, bondholders or depositors. However, 
although more than 4 years have passed from the Cyprus banking haircut, depositors 
and shareholders in Cyprus’ two largest banks at the time, namely Bank of Cyprus 
and Cyprus Popular Bank, are still trying to find restitution. Indeed, several depositors 
have during the Cyprus Banking Crisis sustained significant loses reaching up to 80% 
of their deposits and despite these significant loses, depositors have still not been able 
to find compensation. 
To this end, depositors have resorted to national courts in the Republic of Cyprus, 
the European Court of Justice (“CJEU”) and international tribunals, such as the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”). However, none 
of these forums has effectively dealt with the substantive elements of the Cyprus 
Haircut to date. 
What is common in all these proceedings brought to date is that depositors, in one 
way or another, have relied to human rights considerations, as a basis for their claims 
and have to date been unsuccessful to demonstrate a breach has occurred. This Paper 
will explore the implications of the Cyprus Banking Haircut on bondholders from a 
human rights perspective, reviewing investors’ rights and remedies once a claim is 
brought before the Court most appropriate to deal with human rights’ violations, 
namely the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”). 
II. The Cyprus Haircut- Factual Background 
A. Summary of Facts 
Before we establish depositors’ rights due to the Cyprus financial crisis, it is 
first imperative to examine the facts that led to such crisis and the measures taken by 
the Cyprus Government in such context. 
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The Cyprus economy largely has and continues to rely heavily on the tourism 
and services sector. In fact, Cyprus has managed to become a reputable business 
center, taking advantage of its competitive tax system and stable political regime. 
Consequently, its tax, fiduciary, legal and banking services flourished. Indicatively, 
the size of the banking sector in Cyprus was such, that the assets of the entire banking 
sector in Cyprus exceeded the Cypriot GDP more than eight times in 2011. As evident 
from the table below, which demonstrates the size of the banking sector, in 2012 
Cyprus had one of the largest banking sectors amongst the EU Member States, with 
its banking sector becoming larger each year. 
 
However, as it was evidenced shortly thereafter “big banks” meant “big problems”. 
The two major banks in Cyprus, namely Bank of Cyprus and Cyprus Popular 
Bank, began to face problems from the midst of the financial crisis in Europe. 
However, despite the signs of economic problems, the two Banks continued “business 
as usual”. Indeed, as part of a capital exercise conducted by the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) and the Central Bank of Cyprus on October 26th, 2011, Bank of 
Cyprus identified a capital buffer shortfall of EUR 1.5 billion and Cyprus Popular 
Bank identified a capital buffer shortfall of EUR 2.1 billion. Earlier that year, EBA 
had announced that the two banks combined needed to find EUR 3.6 billion. As a 
result, in early November 2011, the Financial House Moody’s downgraded three 
Cypriot Banks immediately following the Cyprus sovereign downgrade. In particular, 
Bank of Cyprus was downgraded by one notch to Ba2 from Ba1, Hellenic Bank by 
one notch to Ba2 from Ba1 and Marfin Popular Bank Public Co Ltd by three notches 
to B2 from Ba2.  
Shortly thereafter, Bank of Cyprus Public Co. Ltd. announced a capital-raising 
plan through the issuance of shares to the public. The capital-raising plan of Bank of 
Cyprus resulted in an increase of its share capital by EUR 592 million that managed 
to keep the Bank going for a short period. However, not long thereafter, in December 
2011, EBA issued a Recommendation by virtue of which all-participating EU banks 
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had to raise their Core Tier 1 ratio to 9% after accounting for an additional buffer 
against stressed sovereign risk holdings by end-June 2012.213 This meant that Bank of 
Cyprus and Cyprus Popular Bank needed to find additional funding by 30 June 2012. 
 To this end, on 2nd of March 2012 Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co. Ltd. 
announced a capital-raising plan. Again, however, the Greek PSI214 devastated the 
plan’s chances of success and resulted in further worsening of the financial position of 
both Banks. Indeed, the two Banks had purchased huge amounts of Greek 
Government Bonds (“GGBs) from the secondary market and lost billions of Euros 
with the Greek PSI.215 In particular, Bank of Cyprus announced losses of 1 billion 
euro, while Cyprus Popular Bank announced losses of 2.5 billion leading to further 
increases in their capital buffer. Indicatively, as evidenced in the table below, the 
losses sustained by the Cyprus banks from the Greek PSI were the most significant 
within the EU in comparison with Cyprus’ GDP. 
 
Source: Stavros A Zenios216 
 
As a result, of these losses, it became clear that, at least Cyprus Popular Bank 
was insolvent. In an attempt to help salvage Cyprus Popular Bank, the Cyprus 
Parliament, on 18th May 2012, decided to underwrite a capital increase equal to one 
billion and eight hundred million euro (€1.800.000.000) for the bank’s 
recapitalization, in case the latter was unable to raise funds from private sources. By 
the deadline of 30th June the bank had only raised €3 million and consequently the 
Cyprus Government acquired shares in Cyprus Popular Bank for the equivalent of 
EUR one billion seven hundred and ninety-six million nine hundred and eighty-six 
thousand four hundred and thirty-nine (€ 1.796.986.439). The State paid the bank by 
transferring to the latter a 12-month sovereign bond, which would be rolled over for a 
period of five years. Notably, by that time, all three major credit rating agencies had 
downgraded Cyprus sovereign debt to junk status, thereby eliminating the possibility 
that the European Central Bank could accept Cypriot bonds as collateral for loans.217   
The above re-capitalization of Cyprus Popular Bank through the State’s 
participation raised state aid concerns with the European Commission. However, in 
                                                          
213 European Banking Authority, Recommendation on the creation of temporary capital buffers to 
restore market confidence, (2011) 
214 The Greek Private Sector Involvement (“PSI”) was a bond exchange program aiming to restructure 
the Greek sovereign debt held by private investors. 
215 “Cyprus requests Eurozone bailout,” Financial Times, June 25, 2012. 
216 S. A Zenios, “Fairness and reflexivity in the Cyprus bail-in” Empirica, Springer (2016), Volume 43, 
Issue 3, pp 579–606. 
217 “Cyprus Requests Eurozone Bailout,” Financial Times, June 25, 2012. 
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early September 2012, the European Commission approved the above rescue re-
capitalization of Cyprus Popular Bank on the premise that the Cypriot authorities 
would submit a restructuring plan for Cyprus Popular Bank within six months from 
the decision. The plan would demonstrate how Cyprus Popular Bank would be viable 
without continued state support, although by that time, both Bank of Cyprus and 
Cyprus Popular Bank had requested Emergency Liquidity Assistance (“ELA”) from 
the Central Bank of Cyprus. The initial amounts and terms of such ELA request have 
not been officially announced, but it is estimated that Cyprus Popular Bank obtained 
1.8 billion in January 2012, 3 billion in May 2012, and 4.2 billion by February 
2013.218  
Negotiations of a bailout between the Troika and Cyprus occurred during the 
summer and fall months of 2012. Preliminary terms of a bailout were made public on 
November 23, 2012, and included strict austerity measures, including cuts in 
government employee salaries, social benefits, and pensions, and increases in taxes 
and health care charges.219  On the financial system the memorandum, inter alia, 
instructed the Central Bank of Cyprus to update the liquidity regulations such that 
minimum requirements will be established for: i) diversifying investments in eligible 
liquid assets by imposing concentration limits of 25% of regulatory capital and 50% 
for the domestic sovereign; ii) investing at least 50% of the required liquidity into 
instruments of high credit quality with a maturity of up to 3 months and iii) non-
resident deposits (euro and foreign) such that the minimum liquidity ratio is set at 
60%.  
 Complicating and delaying the management of the crisis the former President 
Dimitris Christofias declared the terms were difficult to accept and as of December 
2012, no bailout had yet been signed, the Cyprus Government resorted to borrowing 
from the public authority pension funds to cover its monetary needs for December.  
In the early months of 2013, despite Cyprus’ urgent need for financing, 
negotiations for a bailout package continued slowly. It was only following the 
Eurogroup meeting on March 15th, 2013, that a preliminary agreement was reached. 
According to the latter, Troika would provide Cyprus with €10 billion in funds, while, 
as part of the deal, there would be a levy imposed on deposits at a rate of 6.75% for 
deposits of up to €100,000 and at a rate of 9.99% for deposits above €100,000. This 
included all deposits (in current and deposit accounts, interest bearing or not) and in 
all banks (including branches of international banks) operating in Cyprus.220  
                                                          
218I. Gikas A. Hardouvelis, Overcoming the crisis in Cyprus Eurobank Economy and Markets Volume IX, 






219 Bloomberg.com, November 30, 2012. 
220 “A better deal, but still painful,” The Economist, published at March 25, 2013 available at 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2013/03/cyprus-bail-out 
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On March 18, 2013, the above proposal was up for discussion at the Cypriot 
parliament. The Cypriot government voted against the levy on March 19, 2013.221 
Consequently, on 21 March 2013, the Governing Council of the European Central 
Bank decided to maintain the current level of ELA until Monday, 25 March 2013. 
Thereafter, ELA could only be considered if an EU/IMF program was put in place 
that would ensure the solvency of the concerned banks.  
In light of the above developments, the Republic of Cyprus enacted 8 Laws for 
the emergency assistance of the economy and the banks, including, inter alia, Law 
17(I)/2013 for the Consolidation of the Banks. The relevant law awards the Central 
Bank of Cyprus extensive powers to take a series of measures to assist in the 
consolidation or liquidation of financial institutions in Cyprus. The Law further 
provided for the creation of a Consolidation Authority that would act as a “Receiver 
Manager” with wide authorities for the consolidation of the Banks and appointed the 
Cyprus Central Bank to act such Consolidation Authority. Needless to mention that 
for the period from the 15th of March and until the 26th the banking system 
remaining closed for 11 days. 
Finally, on March 25, 2013, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed 
between Cyprus and the Troika (the “Memorandum of Understanding”) that provided 
for the below measures which were enforced via decrees based on the Bank 
Resolution Framework: 
1) Primarily, it was agreed that Cyprus would receive an amount of Euro 10 
billion, as financial assistance. Such assistance would not be used to 
recapitalize either Cyprus Popular Bank or Bank of Cyprus, while all other 
Banks in Cyprus would be provided with unlimited financial support, if same 
was needed. 
2) Especially for the two problematic banks, the deal provided for the measures 
described below.  
A.1. For Cyprus Popular Bank 
The Central Bank of Cyprus, in its capacity as consolidation Authority 
together with the Minister of Finance, issued inter alia, three decrees for Cyprus 
Popular Bank, namely Decree 94/2013 dated 25.03.2013 (Sale of Banking Operations 
of Cyprus Popular Bank), Decree 97/2013 dated 26.03.2013 (Sale of Banking 
Operations in Greece of Cyprus Popular Bank) and 104/2013 (Sale of Certain 
Operations of Cyprus Popular Bank). By virtue of the said Decrees Cyprus Popular 
Bank entered into liquidation. For this to happen, it was split into two parts, namely 
what is called a “good bank” and a “bad bank”. Bank of Cyprus Ltd absorbed the 
“good bank” together with the insured deposits up to the amount of Euro 100,000.00 
(one hundred thousand Euros) and all performing loans (viable assets), while all 
uninsured assets of approximately €4.2 billion – including deposits over €100,000 – 
                                                          
221 “Walking Back from Cyprus,” published at March 20, 2013available at 
www.voxeu.org/article/walking-back-cyprus, 
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were placed in the “bad bank.”222 Effectively, therefore equity shareholders, 
bondholders and uninsured depositors (deposits with over Euro 100.000) fully 
contributed to the resolution of Cyprus Popular Bank, These depositors of Cyprus 
Popular Bank were given shares of equity in the Bank of Cyprus as “compensation,” 
amounting to an 18% equity interest in the Bank of Cyprus.223    
A.2. For Bank of Cyprus 
Additionally, the aforementioned Consolidation Authority had on the 29th of 
March, 2013 issued a decree for the salvation of Bank of Cyprus by its own funds. 
The relevant decree 103/2017 (Bailing in of Bank of Cyprus by own means) provided 
for the following: 
1) Deposits up to €100.000 would not be affected.  
2) For deposits over €100.000 depositors in the Bank of Cyprus would receive 
shares of value EUR 1, - for every euro over €100.000 and up to 37.5% of 
their overall deposits. Of the 62.5% of uninsured deposits, not converted to 
bank shares, about 40% would continue to accrue interest, but would not be 
repaid, unless the bank’s performance was well (or the Bank went bankrupt at 
which time Art. 300 of the Companies Law Cap.113 would apply), while the 
final 22.5% would cease to attract interest. This 22.5% would either be 
converted into shares as per 2 above or it would be frozen and returned to the 
depositors’ accounts with interest. Uninsured deposits would remain frozen 
until recapitalization has been effected through deposit/equity conversion of 
uninsured deposits. Finally, in late 2013 it was decided that the final haircut 
sustained by unsecured deposits would not exceed 47.5%.224  Moreover, to 
“protect the stability of both the Greek and Cypriot banking systems” the 
Greek branches of Cypriot banks were sold very quickly, excluding such 
depositors from the haircut225. 
Bondholders were also negatively affected. On July 31, 2013, the Bank of 
Cyprus announced that holders of “convertible bonds” and various types of securities 
                                                          
222 Wound down The Economist, published at March 25, 2013 available at 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2013/03/money-talks-march-25th-2013 
223 Matina Stewis, “The Unintended Consequences of Cyprus,” The Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2013 
available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324110404578627881459300990; “Milder 
than expected final terms for Cyprus bail-in unveiled,” Financial Times, published at July 30, 2013 
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/85eb3cea-f943-11e2-a6ef-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3BU0umFoW; “Cyprus bank’s bailout hands ownership to Russian 
plutocrats,” The New York Times, published at August 22, 2013 available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/world/europe/russians-still-ride-high-in-cyprus-after-
bailout.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
224 “Bank of Cyprus Depositors to Lose 47.5% of Savings in Bailout,” Financial Post, published at July 
29, 2013 available at http://business.financialpost.com/2013/07/29/bank-of-cyprus-depositors-to-
lose-47-5-of-savings-in-bailout/ See also Bank of Cyprus Announcement, “Recapitalisation through 
Bail-in and Resolution Exit Bank of Cyprus Announcement,” July 31, 2013 (explaining that 47.5% of 
“eligible deposits” (i.e., exceeding €100,000) were converted to equity). 
225 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/136487.pdf   
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would be converted to Class D shares of the bank at a conversion rate of €1 nominal 
amount for each €1. This is in principal amount of such subordinated debt claims, 
while the nominal value of Class D shares would be reduced from €1 to €0.01 
(reduction to 1/100th of value).226 
Finally, the total bailed-in amount for both Banks turned out to be 
approximately €9.4bn, spread in accordance with the table below. 
 
The above procedure was novel in Europe that never before had made savings 
accounts, bond and shareholders pay for the bank deficit. Certainly, many elements 
allowed this to happen in Cyprus. The small size of the Republic’s economy, the non-
systemic nature of its debt, the need for Germany to set an example for larger 
countries and finally the wide belief that the money held in Cyprus Banks belonged to 
Russian oligarchs that engaged in money laundering, However, the fact remains that 
depositors sustained unprecedented damages which begs the question if and what 
form of protection is available to them.  
III. Review of measures taken by investors to date. 
  Depositors resorted to several legal measures in pursuit of available remedies 
resorting to national Courts in Cyprus, the European Court of Justice (“CJEU”) as 
well as claiming protection under bilateral investment treaties before the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) and other Tribunals. To 
examine if the European Court of Human Rights would be a more suitable venue for 
depositors, it is imperative to examine the measures they have resorted to thus far and 
evaluate their results.  
                                                          
226 See Bank of Cyprus “Notice to holders of debt securities of Bank of Cyprus as of 29 March 2013,” 
dated July 31,  
2013. 
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A. Resort to National Courts 
Following the Cyprus Banking Haircut, Cypriot Courts were flowed with 
petitions from depositors. Indeed, more than 4.000 petitions227 for judicial review 
were filed by virtue of Art.146228 of the Cyprus Constitution, requesting the 
cancellation of the decrees No. 103 and 104/2013 issued by the Central Bank of 
Cyprus in its capacity as the resolution authority for banking institutions.  
The depositors claimed that the said Decrees were unconstitutional, violating 
several Articles of the Cypriot Constitution. Primarily, depositors argued the Decrees 
were violating Article 6 of the Cypriot Constitution that prescribes that laws or 
administrative acts may not discriminate between any person on grounds of his 
Community, as well as Article 28 that sets the principle of equality.  As per the 
depositors, the Decrees discriminated between account holders in Cyprus and abroad, 
as well as between accountholders of the two problematic banks and accountholders 
in all other banks in Cyprus. In particular, as the Decrees aimed to safeguard Cyprus’ 
financial system as a whole, depositors contested that accountholders of all banks in 
Cyprus should have been asked to contribute, as well as accountholders who 
maintained deposits in branches of Cypriot Banks abroad. Therefore, in line with the 
applicants’ reasoning, the fact that only accountholders from the two problematic 
banks in Cyprus sustained losses denoted discriminatory treatment and, thus, a breach 
of the right of equal treatment.  
Additionally, depositors argued that the Decrees violated their right to 
property, as there was an illegal taking of their possessions (deposits) without notice 
nor adequate compensation in breach of Article 23 of the Cyprus Constitution 
pertaining to the right of property. Lastly, accountholders claimed that the termination 
of the contractual relation that existed between account holders and the two Banks 
was abruptly terminated in breach of Art. 26 of the Constitution that regulates 
freedom to contract, without state intervention. 
Due to the significance and the gravity of the cases, the Supreme Court, sitting 
in full bench, decided to hear the petitions themselves on the merits and dismiss the 
interim injunctions. The first 53 applications submitted were chosen for hearing. 
Regretfully, however, the majority of the Full Bench of the Supreme Court (7 out of 
the 9 judges) rejected the applications without examining the merits of the case. The 
Supreme Court raised the preliminary objection of whether the Decrees’ nature was of 
private or public law and thus whether the Decrees could be subject to a judicial 
review procedure before the Supreme Court and proceeded to examine the nature of 
account holders’ rights and whether these were affected by the Decrees. The majority 
of the Supreme Court held that the relevant Decrees affected the legitimate interests 
of affected account holders only indirectly and as such, the depositors did not have a 
                                                          
227 George Yiangou LLC, Legal Actions in Cyprus following the Haircut, available at 
http://yiangou.com.cy/news-read/80 last access 18.07.2017  
228 Art.146 of the Cypriot Constitution awards parties that have a legal interest the possibility for 
judicial review of administrative acts that affects their rights. 
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legitimate interest, and therefore legal standing, to petition recourse under Article 146 
of the Constitution for judicial review of the said Decrees.  
The Court reached the said conclusion as it noted that neither Degree regulated 
the relation between the State and individuals, but instead the Degrees referred to the 
Cyprus Popular Bank and Bank of Cyprus. Depositors were contractually linked with 
the two Banks and as the Banks’ contractual obligations were affected, depositors 
could launch civil lawsuits against the Banks. Hence, the Supreme Court concluded 
that account holders that might have been affected by the sale of the Cyprus Popular 
Bank’s assets sale and the haircut in deposits maintained with Bank of Cyprus, should 
resort to the district courts, as their claims for breach of contractual rights do not fall 
within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court noted, 
civil actions may also be extended against the Republic of Cyprus, as the latter issued 
the Decrees that affected depositors’ rights. 
Following the said judgement, several depositors filled civil suits against Bank 
of Cyprus, the Central Bank and the Republic of Cyprus but to date, 5 years later, no 
judgement has been issued in any of the cases. That stated, District Courts have heard 
applications for interim injunctions and have often ruled in favor of such applications. 
Indicatively, in the case of M. Constantinou v. Bank of Cyprus & others (Case 
Number 2147/14), the District Court of Limassol ruled in favor of the continuation of 
an interim injunction against Bank of Cyprus relating to claim for damages or 
restitution on the grounds that the haircut was incorrectly implemented.229 This is 
important as for a District Court to grant an interim injunction, the Court must be 
persuaded that there is "a probability" that plaintiff is entitled to relief,230 although the 
district Court may decide to reject the plaintiff’s claim in the end. 
It is difficult to predict what the outcome of the civil cases will be, but it is 
hard to imagine that the Cyprus Courts will award monetary damages to the claimants 
equal to the haircut they sustained plus interest, as something like that is likely to 
endanger the Cyprus banking and financial system. In fact, the Supreme Court of 
Justice, despite the fact that, as stated, it did not examine the substance of the 
plaintiffs’ arguments, it went on to examine the issue of the assessment of damages 
and noted that damages may only be the loss sustained by the depositors, to the extend 
they would be able to prove that they are in worse condition than if the two banks in 
question were under liquidation. Without a final determination of such civil cases, 
depositors may not resort to ECtHR as exhausting all available local remedies is a 
precondition for filing a petition before the ECtHR. 
B. Resort to CJEU 
Following the Supreme Court’s Ruling, several accountholders decided to 
resort to the General Court of the EU and subsequently to the CJEU. We may divide 
                                                          
229 A.G. Erotocritou LLC, Landmark decision on the “haircut” of bank deposits, available at 
http://erotocritou.com/en/publications/79-landmark-decision-by-the-limassol-district-court-on-the-
haircut-of-bank-deposits.html, last access 22.07.2017 
230 Odysseos Andreas v A Pieris Estates Ltd, Supreme Court of Cyprus (1982) 1 CLR 557. 
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the cases in to two broad categories, those challenging the validity of the Eurogroup’s 
decision of March 25th, 2013 in cases T-327/13 until Τ-331/13231 and those requesting 
the annulment of the Memorandum of Understanding dated March 25th, 2013 and 
compensation in cases T-289/13, T-291/13 and T-293/13.232  In all cases, the 
applicants, who had sustained financial losses of more than 100,000 Euros each, as a 
result of the Decrees issued by the Central Bank of Cyprus, turned against the 
European Commission and the European Central Bank.   
According to the Applicants in cases T-327/13 until Τ-331/13, the damages 
they had sustained were caused by Eurogroup’s decision of March 25th, 2013 that 
contained the terms of the deal reached between Cyprus and the Troika. Furthermore, 
the applicants contested that the said Eurogroup’s decision should be attributed to 
European Commission and the European Central Bank (“ECB”). Applicants claimed 
that any action taken by the Republic of Cyprus following the aforementioned 
Eurogroup’s decision, including the decrees issued by the Cyprus Central Bank, were 
only implementing the Eurogroup’s decision. 
Applicants argued that the Eurogroup statement of 25th of March 2013 
exceeded the powers conferred to both the European Central Bank and also the 
European Commission by the Treaty on European Union. To examine if the said 
claim was admissible, General Court of the EU initially examined whether the 
Eurogroup Statement could, in fact, be attributed to the ECB or the European 
Commission. General Court noted that Eurogroup is not a formal institution of the 
European Union, but only an informal discussion forum between ministers of the 
Euro area, without any legislative decision-making competences. General Court 
further noted that ECB and the European Commission’s participation in Eurogroup’s 
meetings could not in and of itself lead to the conclusion that the Eurogroup acted on 
their instructions or acted as their representative. As such, Eurogroup’s actions could 
not be attributed to the ECB or the European Commission.  
 General Court further proceeded to consider if the statement could be 
attributed to the European Stability Mechanism (“ESM”), rather than to the 
Eurogroup, and whether in such case the Eurogroup’s statement could be credited to 
the ECB and the European Commission.  General Court ruled that, even if it could be 
inferred that the statement was attributable to the ESM, this would not lead to the 
conclusion that the Commission or the ECB instigated the adoption of the said 
statement. General Court dismissed this argument, on the basis of Articles 4, 5, 6 and 
13 of the ESM Treaty, noting that neither the ECB nor the European Commission 
conferred any powers to the ESM and therefore, none of the two institutions was able 
to control or instruct the ESM. This was in line with CJEU prior ruling in the Case of 
                                                          
231 Court of Justice of the European Union, T-327/13 Mallis and Malli v Commission and ECB, T-328/13 
Tameio Pronoias Prosopikou Trapezis Kyprou v Commission and ECB, T-329/13 Chatzithoma v 
Commission and ECB, T-330/13 Chatziioannou v Commission and ECB and T-331/13 Nikolaou v 
Commission and ECB, General Court of EU (2014) 
232 T-289/13 Ledra Advertising v Commission and ECB, T-291/13 Eleftheriou and Others v Commission 
and ECB and T-293/13 Theophilou v Commission and ECB, General Court of EU (2014) 
68 | P a g e  
 
Pringle v Government of Ireland,233 where it noted that the acts of the ESM are only 
binding on the ESM. As such, it ruled that the application was inadmissible and did 
not proceed to examine the substance of the case.  
Similarly, in cases T-289/13, T-291/13 and T-293/13, General Court ruled the 
applications were partly inadmissible and partly unfounded. General Court noted that 
the Commission signed the Memorandum of Understanding on behalf of the ESM 
therefore only binding on the ESM. General Court further held that the applicants had 
not managed to prove with certainty that they had sustained damage due to the 
Commission’s inaction.  
The decision of the General Court in cases T-327/13 until Τ-331/13 was 
appealed (Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P), but the CJEU upheld the 
dismissal. CJEU reiterated that the Eurogroup’s Statement could not be regarded as a 
joint decision of the Commission and the ECB, as, under the ESM framework, the 
said institutions did not enjoy the power to make decisions of their own under the 
ESM Treaty, but participated in the ESM as “observers”.234 In fact, the ECB and the 
European Commission, when acting within the context of the ESM, they act as agents 
of the ESM. Hence, mere participation of the EU Commission and the ECB in the 
meetings of the Eurogroup, was not sufficient to alter the nature of Eurogroup’s 
statements and render such statements the expression of the decision-making power of 
the ECB and the EU Commission.  
General Court’s judgement in cases T-289/13, T-291/13 and T-293/13, were 
also appealed (Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P). However, in the said case, 
CJEU reiterated that acts of ESM acts do not fall within the scope of EU law,235 but 
the Commission signs on behalf of the ESM in accordance with Art. 13(4) of the ESM 
Treaty. CJEU noted that the Commission as the “guardian of the Treaties”, should 
refrain from signing an act that is inconsistent with EU law.236 Indeed, as CJEU 
stipulated, the Commission has a positive duty to refrain from adopting an ESM 
Memorandum of Understanding, when the latter is in breach of EU law, including the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the “Charter”). Hence, failure 
to abide by such positive duty may render the European Commission liable for 
damages due to non-contractual liability under Article 340 of the Treaty of the 
Functioning of European Union (“TFEU”). 
Within this context, CJEU proceeded to examine if the Commission had, 
through the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, contributed to a 
sufficiently serious breach of the appellants’ right to property under Art.17 of the 
Charter. Referring to Art. 52 of the Charter, CJEU noted that the right to property may 
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be subject to limitations, to the extent that such limitations on the exercise of the right 
to property satisfy an objective of general interest pursued by the EU and do not 
violate the very substance of the right.  CJEU concluded that both these conditions 
were met at present, as there was both an objective of general interest, namely to 
ensure the stability of the Euro areas’ banking system, while also the interference with 
the appellant’s deposits was not disproportionate in light of the imminent risk of 
financial losses that the appellants would have sustained had the two banks failed.  
Although the above ruling was disappointing for depositors, it, nonetheless, 
revealed another way for depositors to gain compensation in case of EU institutions’ 
actions taken in the course of the financial crisis, that of an action for damages for 
EU’s institution non-contractual liability. 
C. Resort to Arbitration 
Several depositors also resorted to arbitration proceedings, claiming protection 
under bilateral investments treaties for breach of treaty standard. In particular, 
depositors claimed that Decree No. 103/2013 (Salvation of Bank of Cyprus by own 
means) issued by the Cyprus Central Bank in its capacity as consolidation authority, 
constituted an illegal interference with their property rights tantamount to illegal 
expropriation.  
Indicatively, the Arbitration Court in Stockholm has recently issued its 
judgement on the claim raised by two Polish investors against the Republic of 
Cyprus237 on the basis of the Bilateral Investment Treaty between Cyprus and Poland. 
The said investors were shareholders in pharmaceutical company, which sustained 
significant damages due to the haircut. The two investors claimed that, by virtue of 
the Decree No. 103/2013, their investment’s value was expropriated. To this end, they 
requested from the Arbitration Court to award them the amount of PLN 1,319,794 as 
direct damages for loss of funds due to the “haircut” imposed on their deposits, as 
well the amount of PLN 16,720,000 as loss of profit, plus interest.238 
The Arbitration Court rejected the claim of the two investors noting that no 
expropriation had taken place and ordered the investors to pay 70% of the legal fees 
of the Republic of Cyprus amounting to 1.1 million Euros as well as 114,300 Euros to 
the arbitration court.239 Regretfully, there aren’t any additional information available 
on the case as all parties had agreed to confidentiality at the beginning of the 
procedure and thus the Arbitration Court’s judgment was not published. 
 There are two additional cases of investors founded on the facts of the Cyprus 
Banking Haircut, brought by Greek investors before ICSID, namely Theodoros 
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Adamakopoulos and others v. Republic of Cyprus240 and Marfin Investment Group 
Holdings S.A., Alexandros Bakatselos and others v. Republic of Cyprus241, both of 
which are still pending. The former case is founded on the Bilateral Investment Treaty 
between Greece and Cyprus as well as the Bilateral Investment Treaty between 
Belgium-Luxembourg and Cyprus, while the latter case is based on the Bilateral 
Investment Treaty between Greece and Cyprus alone. The arguments made in each 
case are presented below. 
 In particular, in the case of Theodoros Adamakopoulos and others v. Republic 
of Cyprus, the application was raised 954 investors, out of which 953 were natural 
persons, nationals of Greece, while there was one only corporate investor founded in 
Luxembourg. Investors that maintained deposits in Bank of Cyprus and/or Cyprus 
Popular Bank claimed that the Cyprus Banking Haircut and, in particular the two 
Decrees No. 103 and 104/2013, were violating treaty standard on numerous grounds. 
Primarily, they claimed that the fact that the Cypriot government did not impose the 
haircut on the deposits of government entities, while also ELA was being repaid to the 
Central Bank of Cyprus, was a breach of the non-arbitrary and discriminatory 
treatment treaty standard. Secondly, investors claimed that the fact that deposits in 
Bank of Cyprus were partly converted into shares in Bank of Cyprus was a prohibited 
transformation of the type of investment under Article 2(3) of the Greece-Cyprus BIT. 
Lastly, investors claimed the deposits’ haircut was tantamount to an unlawful 
expropriation in breach of Article 4 of the Greece-Cyprus BIT.242  
 In the case of Marfin Investment Group Holdings S.A., Alexandros Bakatselos 
and others v. Republic of Cyprus, the applicants Marfin Investment Group holdings 
S.A, and another 18 Greek nationals, were shareholders in Cyprus Popular Bank. 
They claimed that the Cyprus Government, through various acts, including the decree 
104/2013, increased the Government's participation in Cyprus Popular Bank and lead 
to the illegal take-over of Cyprus Popular Bank's management control and its 
subsequent insolvency.243 Based on these facts, they claimed that their investment in 
Cyprus Popular Bank was expropriated and they were subject to arbitrary, 
unreasonable and/or discriminatory measures requesting compensation of 
823,000,000 Euros. 
 It is difficult to predict what the outcome of the above cases will be, but as 
discussed, the Arbitration Court in Stockholm has already concluded on the same 
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facts, that no expropriation has taken place. 244 Indeed, as it stems from ICSID’s prior 
caselaw, the burden of proof of expropriation is high. What’s more, cases pertaining 
to rescue measures for Banks are particular also in the following sense, as correctly 
stipulated by Anna De Luca:245  
1. Primarily, investors’ losses are not so apparent, in the sense that their 
investment was already of no value prior to the State’s intervention, and, in 
this respect, the State’s measure did not in fact cause any loss to the investor. 
This is of particular importance for investors in Cyprus Popular Bank, where 
as stipulated the Bank was already insolvent, before the Decree 104/2013 
(Sale of Certain Operations of Cyprus Popular Bank) was issued. Indicatively, 
a similar case with that of Marfin Investment Group Holdings S.A., 
Alexandros Bakatselos and others v. Republic of Cyprus, although under 
United States law, was examined by the United States Court of Federal Claims 
in the cases of Starr International Co. Inc. v. United States.246 The case related 
to decision taken by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury, which demanded 
79.9% of AIG’s stock in exchange for an $85 billion loan during the financial 
crisis. The Court in such case did find that the Federal Reserve and the 
Treasure had acted outside the scope of their authority; nonetheless it 
concluded that claimants were not entitled to recovery as they hadn’t sustained 
any loss. 
2. Additionally, one cannot overlook the fact that State’s intervention is often 
needed to “salvage” the Bank from its own risky exposure to the financial 
market, and not, from any State-induced measure. Thus, Anna de Luca argues 
that in such cases issues of causation might arise, as causation will break in 
case of intervening factors attributable to the victim.247 In such case, where the 
causal link between the State’s measure and the investors’ loss is interrupted, 
the State will not be held liable for such loss.248  This is also of relevance in 
the case of the Cyprus Banking Haircut, where both Bank of Cyprus and 
Cyprus Popular Bank acted recklessly by purchasing Greek Sovereign Bonds 
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from the secondary markets, at a time when Greece was already in financial 
distress.249 
To this end, we shall now turn to examine if depositors may have better chances to 
obtain some recourse before the European Court of Human Rights based on breach of 
the European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”). 
IV. Human Rights Considerations in case of Extreme 
Financial Crisis 
A. The right to property 
As evident from above, depositors have contested to all proceedings to date, 
that the banking haircut was interfering with their property rights. The ECHR 
regulates the right to property in Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR (“Article 1”). 
As per ECtHR’s caselaw, the said Article comprises of three sentences, each 
of which contains a separate rule for protection.250 The first sentence of the first 
paragraph is general, denoting everyone’s right to peaceful enjoyment of his 
possession and serves as a “catch all” clause attempting to include under its scope 
cases which do not fall within the other two rules.251 The second sentence of the first 
paragraph refers to cases of deprivation of one’s possessions and regulates when such 
deprivation can be justified subject to fulfilment of certain conditions. The second 
sentence is the most commonly used form of protection. Lastly, the third sentence, in 
the second paragraph of the Article, refers to the States’ right to regulate the use of 
property in accordance with general interest, reflecting the limitations of protection 
awarded under the previous sentences. 
 Hence, we may see that each sentence and rule refers to a different kind of 
interference with property rights, with the first rule covering “interference with 
possessions”, the second dealing with deprivation of property, and the third with the 
regulation of the use of property.252 Provided, there is an interference that falls with 
any one of the above rules, we should examine whether such interference can be 
justified. To this end, ECtHR examines three questions to analyze whether an 
interference can be justified, namely: (1) whether the interference is lawful; (2) 
whether it is in the public interest; and (3) whether it is proportionate.253 The positive 
                                                          
249 See the Report by the Committee of Institutions of May 2014 on the causes that led to the collapse 
of the Cypriot economy that finds that Bank Officials were aware of the high risk of Greek Sovereign 
Bonds, but continue purchasing them, despite proving different assurances to the Central Bank, 
available at  
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answer to such questions must be shown by the State, which bears the burden of proof 
to demonstrate that the interference serves a legitimate purpose in service of public or 
general interest.254 Additionally, the State should not only demonstrate that a 
legitimate objective is served, but further the ECtHR will examine ad hoc whether the 
measure is proportionate, in the sense that it must strike a “fair balance” between the 
demands of the general interest of the community and the protection of property 
rights.255  
As can be seen from the wording of Article 1, this refers to peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions. To this end, prior to examining if the Cyprus haircut 
constitutes a violation of the above article we need to first establish what constitutes 
possessions under Article 1 and examine if deposits in the two major Cyprus banks 
fall within the said definition. 
The concept of possessions has been broadly interpreted by the European 
Human Rights Court’s jurisprudence, so as not to only include the right of ownership, 
but also a whole range of pecuniary rights. These include such rights as arising from 
patents,256 shares,257 arbitration awards, established entitlements to a pension, 
entitlements to rent, and even rights arising from running of a business,258 provided 
the object of possession may be specifically defined. Indicatively, in Pine Valley 
Developments Ltd v. Ireland259, the European Court of Human Rights held that a 
legitimate expectation that a certain state of affairs will occur constituted a component 
of the property and was therefore eligible for protection under Article 1. Of course, 
the term legitimate expectation should be interpreted narrowly. A mere hope is not 
worthy of protection; instead a “legitimate expectation” must have a more concrete 
nature and it must be based on a legal provision or a legal act.260 
At present, we need to explore if the affected deposits in Bank of Cyprus and 
Cyprus Popular Bank constitute possessions within the above meaning. ECtHR has 
examined the question of whether bank accounts fall within the concept of 
possessions in several cases. In Benet Czech, Spol. S R.O. V. the Czech Republic261 
the ECtHR found that a seizure of the applicant’s corporate bank accounts for a 
prolonged period of time, was an interference with the applicant’s possessions. 
Similarly, in Appolonov v Russia262, the Court reiterated that bank deposits fall within 
the notion of possessions. In fact, in Gayduk v Ukraine, ECtHR stipulated that bank 
deposits “undoubtedly constitute “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of 
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Protocol No. 1.”263  Hence, as deposits have monetary value and are an established 
medium of safekeeping of monetary property, deposits in the two banks in Cyprus 
constituted possessions. 
Having considered that the bank deposits in Bank of Cyprus and Cyprus 
Popular Bank do constitute “possessions”, it needs to be examined if the Cyprus 
banking haircut falls within any of the rules contained in Article 1. As discussed, each 
rule refers to a separate form of interference with possessions. Given that the first rule 
refers to any interference, the second rule, relating to deprivation of property, and the 
third rule that regulates the control on the use of property, are entailed thereat.264 
Hence, in most likelihood ECtHR will first examine whether a deprivation or a 
control on the use of property has taken place.265 As per the caselaw of ECtHR 
deprivation refers to the state in which the legal rights of the owner are extinguished, 
usually though transfer of ownership.266 In essence, ECtHR will examine if the 
measure resulted to a direct or de facto expropriation, looking into the actual effects 
and implications of the measure.267 However, in case the measure aims to regulate and 
not expropriate, ECtHR is reluctant to accept an expropriation has taken place, despite 
the fact that it might have significant implications.268 The distinction between 
expropriation and regulation will determine the range of compensation, as in case of 
the former, full compensation is awarded, while in the latter only partial. 269  That 
stated, distinction between deprivation and regulation is not clearly defined.270 
Following the establishment that a form of interference has occurred, ECtHR 
will examine if such interference can be justified in the sense that it serves “a 
legitimate objective in the public or general interest”.271 As to what contributes a 
legitimate objective in the public or general interest, unlike articles 8 to 11 of the 
ECHR, that contain a catalogue of objectives which may justify interferences, Article 
1 does not contain a similar list and instead each case is examined separately.272 To 
this end, ECtHR has many times upheld that States and their respective authorities 
enjoy a wide discretionary power in determining if the public or general interest is 
served. Indicatively, in the AGOSI v. the United Kingdom case the Court noted, “The 
State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation with regard both to choosing the means of 
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enforcement and to ascertaining whether the consequences of enforcement are 
justified in the general interest for the purpose of achieving the object of the law in 
question.”273 Similarly, in the Belgian Linguistic Case,274  ECtHR noted that “the 
national authorities remain free to choose the measures which they consider 
appropriate in those matters which are governed by the Convention”.275 ECtHR will 
usually not interfere with such determination, unless same is profoundly unjustifiable. 
This is understandable, if one takes into account the principle of subsidiarity, which is 
implied in the ECHR.276 Indeed, as it was stipulated in the case of Handyside v. 
United Kingdom277 “the machinery of protection established by the Convention is 
subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights ...”.278 Hence, “it is for 
national authorities to make initial assessment” if a particular action or law complies 
with ECHR and in so doing  States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation.279 
In addition to serving the public or general interest, the interference needs to 
also be proportional, in the sense that it must strike a “fair balance” between the 
demands of the general interest of the community and the protection of property 
rights.280 In other words, the interference should not impose an excessive or 
disproportionate burden on the affected rights of the individual.281 To determine if a 
fair balance was reached, ECtHR will not limit its examination to the public interest 
grounds, but will also examine the extent of the interference with the owner’s right, as 
well as the amount of compensation awarded to the owner, to ensure that the disputed 
measure does not impose a “disproportionate burden” on the owner. In relation to the 
aspect of compensation, generally a “taking of property without payment of an 
amount reasonably related to its value will normally constitute a disproportionate 
interference”.282 On the contrary, payment of compensation equal to the fair market 
value of the property should normally be proportionate, although, in certain 
circumstances, the amount of compensation can be less if so justified by public 
interest considerations, which may include measures designed to achieve greater 
social justice283. Notably, even a complete lack of compensation may be justified in 
certain circumstances, but only if they are exceptional.284 It is therefore evident that 
ECtHR critically examines state measures and evaluates them based on their 
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significance to pursue the common good and achieve greater social justice.285 
Measures that achieve such goals to a greater extent, can be pursued by states at a 
lesser cost, in the sense that no or at least not full compensation would need to be 
paid. Hence, one can see that the ECtHR is in this manner specifying the normative 
weight between the interests at stake, namely individual rights and the common 
good.286 
B. The Right to Property in case of the Cyprus Haircut 
Following the above, we need to examine if the Cyprus haircut constitutes a 
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ECHR. To this end, we shall examine first the 
case of Bank of Cyprus and thereafter the facts of Cyprus Popular Bank. 
In relation to the measures taken in Bank of Cyprus, there are two aspects that 
need to be examined primarily the obligatory conversion of deposits into shares, and 
the restrictions posed on the depositors to access their monies deposited. Both these 
acts can be deemed to constitute an interference with the right to property and must 
therefore meet the criteria described above to be deemed legal.  
It is here worth referring to the case of Trajkovski v. the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia,287 which referred to similar facts. In the said case, the 
applicant was a citizen of FYROM, which was at the time part of Yugoslavia. The 
applicant had deposited various funds in foreign currencies in a state-owned bank. In 
1991, the Government passed a law by virtue of which withdrawals of funds in 
foreign currency were restricted for a specific period of time. This situation continued 
even after FYROM gained its independence in 1991 and only in 2000, was a new law 
regarding foreign currency deposits enacted. According to new law, the applicant’s 
deposits in foreign currency were partly converted into Euros, while he obtained 
Government bonds for the remainder. The ECtHR took into account that despite the 
restrictions, the Applicant continued to have partial access to his account. 
Additionally, ECtHR considered that the funds remained in the Applicant’s account, 
as well as the fact the Government’s bonds yielded interest. Based on these facts, 
ECtHR concluded that the freezing of the account and the conversion did not 
constitute a deprivation of property and it proceeded to examine the case on the basis 
of the first sentence of Article 1. Although ECtHR recognised that there was an 
interference with possessions, nonetheless it concluded this was justified. ECtHR 
came to this conclusion, as there was a legitimate purpose, while also a fair balance 
was struck as, inter alia, the measure did not place a disproportionate burden on the 
applicant. ECtHR noted that the applicant had the possibility to withdraw funds for 
specific purposes, that the restrictions on foreign currency were already in place in 
Yugoslavia and that the applicant had accrued interest on his balance. These facts in 
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conjunction with the difficult economic situation that FYROM was at the time, 
rendered the freezing of foreign currency accounts reasonable.  
The same result was reached in other similar cases.288 Indicatively, the case of 
Merzhoyev v. Russia289, the applicant was temporarily unable to withdraw his savings 
deposited in the with the Grozny branch of the Chechen Savings Bank, which 
constituted a part of the USSR Savings Bank. During the period when the applicant’s 
funds were unavailable, his savings had significantly depreciated because of inflation. 
The ECtHR accepted the Russian’s Government argument that in light of the 
difficulties encountered by the Russian Government because of the hostilities in the 
Chechen Republic, the limitations imposed on access to deposits was in the general 
interest. It therefore proceeded to examine if the principle of proportionality (fair 
balance) was met. In this note, ECtHR noted that the applicant's inability to make use 
of his deposits was of a temporary nature, having lasted just over two years,290 while 
the applicant could also be reimbursed for the losses incurred due to inflation. Given 
those factors, ECtHR found a fair balance had been struck between the general 
interest of the community and the applicant's property interests. Thus, it concluded 
that the interference was justified and proportional.  
On the contrary, a violation of the right to property was found to exist in the 
case of Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.291 The facts of the said case are similar 
with the Trajkovski v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia case. In 
particular, the applicants, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, maintained foreign 
currency bank deposits with Banks in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Following the fragmentation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, foreign-
currency deposits, deposited before the fragmentation, were frozen, until the 
successor States could come to an understanding as to which State would be liable to 
repay them to domestic banks and to what percentage. Regretfully the negotiations 
between the successor states failed in 2001 while the applicants’ deposits remained 
frozen. ECtHR recognised that there was an interference with applicants’ possession 
and, although it recognised that the freezing of the deposits occurred for the general 
interest, nonetheless it concluded that there was a breach of Article 1 of Protocol 1, as 
a fair balance was not struck. Indeed, ECtHR noted that the fact that the applicants 
could not access and freely dispose their deposits for more than 20 years was a 
disproportionate burden on the applicants. 
Similarly, in Zolotas v Greece case,292 ECtHR concluded that there was a 
breach of Article 1 of Protocol 1 of ECHR in a slightly different set of facts, which 
however, related to bank deposits’ retention. In particular, the said case referred to a 
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Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, (2014) 
292 ECtHR, Zolotas v Greece, 2 (2013) 
78 | P a g e  
 
depositor with the General Bank of Greece, whose claims in relation to his account, 
including the claim to withdraw his deposits, was time-barred, due to a statute of 
limitation established by the Greek civil code for all civil claims. ECtHR noted that 
the time-barring of the applicant’s claims vis a vis his own account was an 
interference with the applicant’s possessions under the first sentence of the first 
paragraph of Article 1 and proceeded to examine if it served the general or public 
interest. Agreeing with the Greek Government’s argument, ECtHR noted that the 
twenty-year limitation period for civil claims was justified on public interest, namely 
to maintain certainty in the interests of the community, by terminating legal 
relationships that were created so long before that their existence was now 
uncertain.293 However, given the special trust relation between a bank and the holder 
of a bank account, ECtHR maintained that Greece had a positive duty to require banks 
to notify account holders of dormant accounts prior to the expiration of the limitation 
period and hence allow them to stop the completion of the limitation period. Thus, 
failure to uphold such duty placed an excessive and disproportionate burden on the 
applicant not reaching a fair balance between the general interest and the interference 
with the applicant’s possessions. 
It therefore becomes clear from the examination of the above caselaw that 
ECtHR primarily examines the effect and the burden imposed on individuals by the 
measure in question, by taking into account factors such as the extent of the 
interference and its duration, as well the availability and the extent of any 
compensatory measure. Additionally, ECtHR examines the objective pursued by the 
measure and examines whether in its application the measure is grossly 
disproportionate to the measure’s aim.294 
In light of the above case law, in examining whether the Cyprus haircut 
constituted a violation of Art.1 of Protocol No. 1, ECtHR would first examine which 
of the three rules of Article 1 to apply.295 As evidenced, in the majority of the cases 
mentioned above the Court proceeded to apply the first rule. This is also likely for 
depositors in Bank of Cyprus, where depositors received a form of compensation in 
the form of shares in the Bank, while further the retention of funds accrues interest 
and is for a specific period. In the case of Cyprus Popular Bank where there was a 
forced sale of the Banks’ assets, it is more likely that ECtHR will use the second rule, 
although as advised the burden of proof of expropriation is high.  
Following its determination that there was an interference with or deprivation 
of possessions, ECtHR will first examine if the measures taken were in the public or 
general interest. As explained above, states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation to 
determine what constitutes public or general interest and ECtHR will challenge such 
determination only if it is “manifestly without reasonable foundation”.296 In the case 
                                                          
293 ECtHR, Zolotas v Greece, (2013) 2 para 48 
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of Cyprus, considering that the sudden collapse of the two biggest banks in Cyprus 
would have had devastating implications on the entire banking sector in Cyprus, as 
well as the Cypriot economy, an aim in the public interest is likely to succeed. This 
was also found in the case of Ledra Advertising v Commission and ECB,297 where the 
CJEU examined this issue under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
The question therefore arises if a fair balance was stuck between the public 
interest to safeguard the economy and the banking system, and the interference 
sustained by depositors in Bank of Cyprus and Cyprus Popular Bank.  
In relation to Bank of Cyprus, ECtHR will examine the restriction, whether it 
was absolute or not, the duration of the restriction, and the possibility for full 
compensation of the investors. As stipulated above, the restrictions were not absolute, 
they lasted for approximately one year and, as the deposits were converted into 
shares, investors may in time get full compensation plus interest. All this considered, 
it is the author’s view that the haircut does not constitute a disproportionate burden on 
depositors in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.  
This might also be the case for the shareholders of Bank of Cyprus and CPB 
who saw the majority of their shares be eradicated. Indeed, in Grainger and other v. 
the UK298, ECtHR dealt with a similar case, i.e. the nationalization of Northern Rock 
bank following its collapse and default. Following the nationalization, England 
introduced a compensation scheme for investors, which took into account the actual 
situation of the said Bank and more specifically the fact that the Bank could only 
sustain its operations on account of the very extensive financing by public institutions. 
On this basis, the independent valuer arrived at the conclusion the value of the shares 
of the investors in the said Bank was zero and that therefore no compensation would 
be awarded to the shareholders. ECtHR endorsed the approach and rulings of the 
English Courts, dismissing the case. As per the ECtHR, states, in the context of 
banking and financial crises enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in setting macro-
economic policy and in the resolution of Banks.299 To this end, the ECtHR concluded 
that the parameters for compensation of investors fell within the state’s margin of 
appreciation. 
For uninsured depositors in Cyprus Popular Bank on the other side, the case is 
more complicated. What is clear is that the case will be decided based on whether a 
fair balance was struck between the public interest objective to safeguard the banking 
system and ultimately the economy, and the losses sustained by uninsured depositors 
that in certain cases reached 80%.300 It is difficult to assess how the ECtHR will rule, 
                                                          
297 C-8/15 (Ledra Advertising v Commission and ECB), [2016], CJEU 
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but, to the author’s view, that ECtHR will not limit its analysis to the extent of the 
loses sustained by depositors and the limited compensation warded to them by means 
of shares in Bank of Cyprus, but it will also examine the inherent risk assumed by all 
depositors in case of insolvency of the banking institution301 and the imminent and 
detrimental implications of the unregulated collapse of Cyprus Popular Bank. ECtHR 
will, as in the case of Northern Rock Bank, examine the position of depositors had the 
state not intervened. In such case, as Cyprus Popular Bank was insolvent already 
before the State’s intervention and there was no specific regime for insolvency of 
banking institutions, had the State not intervened, the Cyprus Company Law, Cap. 
113 would apply. Under the latter, the order for distribution of the assets in a winding 
up is the following: 1) the costs of the winding up; 2) preferential debts, such as ELA 
and government debts; 3) any amount secured by a floating charge; 4) the unsecured 
ordinary creditors; and 5) any deferred debts.302 Hence, depositors, as unsecured 
creditors, would, in all likelihood, still sustain a very significant haircut in their 
deposits this way. Hence, it is the author’s view that ECtHR would not find a breach 
of Article 1 of Protocol 1 even in the case of Cyprus Popular Bank. 
C. Right of Due Process (Art.6 and Art.13 ECHR) 
Another potential legal argument that could be raised by depositors affected 
by the Cyprus haircut stems from the right of due process. The said right relates to 
depositors’ legitimate expectations, it the sense that, prior to any interference with 
their rights, the properly established and sanctioned rules, and procedures should be 
followed. The concept of due process includes two distinct rights, namely the right to 
a “fair trial” and the right to an “effective remedy”,303 which although are regulated 
by two different articles of the ECHR, nonetheless they are closely related. These are 
discussed here successively. 
C.1 Fair Trial 
 
The right to a fair trial under Art.6 (1) ECHR, provides that: “In the 
determination of his civil rights and obligations […] everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law […]”. Article 6 therefore aims to create a procedural guarantee in 
relation to the determination of civil and criminal rights, by setting a framework of 
procedural safeguards during the judicial process.  
As evident from its wording, the said Article applies to everyone, namely both 
individuals and legal persons.304 It, however, applies only in cases pertaining to 
                                                          
301 See mutatis mutandis ECtHR Mamatas and Others v Greece, (2016) 
302 A. Neocleous in the chapter “Cyprus” in Bruce Leonard, Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP Getting the 
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criminal or civil rights. The latter term is autonomously defined by the ECtHR, which 
although will consider the classification of rights in national law, nonetheless it will 
not be bound by it. Indicatively, under ECtHR’s caselaw, proceedings, which would 
come under “public law” in national law, could still fall within the scope of Article 
6(1) provided they have a decisive impact on private rights.305 This is the case for the 
retention and haircut on deposits that have an important impact on property rights. 
Hence, depositors’ rights affected by the Cyprus haircut would be deemed as “civil 
rights” for the purposes of Art. 6.306 Thus, depositors should be granted access to be 
heard by an independent, impartial tribunal, in public, and within a reasonable amount 
of time.307   
Reviewing whether the above safeguards were met in the Cyprus haircut we 
should take into account that, despite the assurances by the Cypriot Government for 
the formation of a special judicial body/tribunal comprised of financial law experts 
that would deal with the depositors’ claims in a comprehensive and time efficient 
manner, no such tribunal has been formed. Furthermore, as indicated above, the 
Supreme Court of Cyprus had, on July 7th, 2013, rejected the judicial review petitions 
of depositors ruling that the judicial review proceedings are outside the scope of its 
provisional jurisdiction, as the said decrees do not fall in the ambit of public law, but 
that of private law. Thus, according to the Supreme Court depositors could only 
pursue their rights by means of civil lawsuits before the District Courts, turning 
against Cyprus Popular Bank, Bank of Cyprus and/or the Central Bank of Cyprus 
and/or other authorities of the Republic of Cyprus for breach of contract and/or 
tortuous acts.  
However, even before the Cyprus haircut, Cypriot District Courts were 
notoriously known for the delay in hearing the cases and issuing judgements.308  In 
fact, Cyprus has several times been found to have violated Articles 6 and 13 of the 
ECHR due to the long delays in the award of its justice system309 and was due to this 
placed under the supervision of the ministerial Committee of the Council of Europe. 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that, on account of the large number of suits filed in 
conjunction with the Cyprus haircut, along with the fact that Cyprus Courts are 
understaffed, depositors’ claims filed in 2013 have still not been heard, although more 
than 4 years have passed since the filing of such claims. It is therefore questionable if 
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available at <http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/documents/humanrights 
308 Corina Demetriou, The impact of the crisis on fundamental rights across Member States of the EU, 
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such timeframe can be deemed “reasonable”, as there aren’t any set timeframes laid 
down by the ECtHR. Instead, each case is evaluated separately based on several 
criteria, as follows: (i) the complexity of the case; (ii) the behaviour of the applicant; 
(iii) the behaviour of the national (judicial) authorities; and (iv) whether there is a 
reason for special diligence.310  Notably, each factor should be examined separately, 
but the cumulative effect of such factors should also be taken into account.311 
Generally, however, as it was stipulated in the case of Dumanovski v the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia “the workload in the national Courts cannot 
be considered as a factor that can excuse the protracted length of the proceedings’.312 
In addition, in cases where the subject matter of the case is of particular importance to 
the applicant, as is the case here, where the accounts of many depositors entailed their 
lifetime savings, the Courts are required to act more promptly to avoid being in 
violation with Art.6.313 Hence, it is questionable if a timeframe of more than 4 years 
for the issuance of a judgement in first instance and  possibly 8 years until the 
issuance of the appeal judgement could be deemed reasonable, but depositors must 
wait until the exhaustion of  all legal remedies before they can make such a claim..314 
It is here worth noting that in February 2010 the Cypriot Parliament adopted 
Law on Effective Remedies for violation of rights in civil rights and duties’ 
proceedings within reasonable time, No. 2(1)/2010, which provides that aggrieved 
parties whose civil or administrative claims have been delayed beyond a reasonable 
time at any level of jurisdiction, may institute a complaint for such delay before the 
Supreme Court, regardless if the proceedings are still pending. Although the law has 
not been widely used to date, nonetheless the Supreme Court in the case of Maria 
Prokopiou v. General Attorney of Cyprus315 found that 7 years for the completion of 
the proceedings in question was reasonable time. Clearly, this would not be binding 
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C.2 Effective Remedy under Article 13 ECHR 
 
  Article 13 ECHR aims to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the ECtHR by 
ensuring that there are available remedies, at national level, that can enforce the 
substance of such rights at the domestic legal order.316 As evident, Article 13 aims to 
increase protection offered to nationals in case of violation of the rights protected 
under ECHR in the sense that, in case an individual has an arguable claim as the 
victim of a violation of the rights set forth in ECHR, he should have access before a 
national authority in order to have his claim decided and, if appropriate, to obtain 
effective redress.317 The said Article embodies the principle of subsidiarity, as it 
provides that states should be the ones that should initially protect ECHR’s rights 
through their national authorities.318 Such authority need not be a judicial authority, 
but should the said authority not be judicial then the powers and the guarantees, which 
are afforded to it would be considered in determining whether the remedy before it is 
effective.319  
To determine if an available remedy is in fact effective, several factors should 
be taken into account, including the nature of the right,320 the availability of other 
rights and the level of compensation.321 However, as per ECtHR’s caselaw a civil 
action for monetary actions against the State will be deemed effective remedy, 
provided that such action is not restrictive due to high cost, low speed, lack of 
reasoning and difficulties in execution.322 
In the case of the Cyprus Haircut, depositors could once again refer to the long 
duration of the proceedings, especially in light of the subject matter of the cases being 
an interference with deposits, that is the most immediate form of property and for 
some depositors, such deposits were their lives’ savings. As stated, the determination 
of such claim, will vary on numerous factors, including the complexity of the case, so 
the findings of ECtHR vis a vis Art. 6 will have a bearing on this claim as well. 
Additionally, depositors in Cyprus Popular Bank could also argue lack of 
effective remedy based on the fact that following the aforementioned judgement of 
the Supreme Court, depositors could only resort to civil proceedings which, however, 
can only award pecuniary damages and not lead to the cancellation of the haircut. 
Given than Cyprus Popular Bank, no longer has any assets (as same were sold via the 
Decrees, whose legality cannot be challenged) any order by the national court for 
restitution would have little opportunities for enforcement (provided the Court rules 
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that only Cyprus Popular bank breached its contractual obligations). Similarly, in the 
case of Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,323 ECtHR decided there was a breach 
of Art. 13, inter alia, due to the fact that the old Ljubljanska Banka no longer had any 
assets in Croatia to satisfy depositors’ claims. Still however the latter case was 
substantially more complicated, while at present, as per the Supreme Court’s 
judgment, depositors may also turn against the Republic of Cyprus, as the latter has, 
through the issuance of the Decrees, led to the potential violation of the contractual 
terms.  
Based on the above, perhaps depositors’ strongest argument would before 
breach of the right of equality. This is the right we now turn to. 
D. Right of Equality 
The right of equality is set at Art.14 ECHR which provides that there 
shouldn’t be any discrimination “on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status” vis a vis “the enjoyment of the 
rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention”. As evident from the above, Art.14 
is directly linked with the rights regulated in ECHR and cannot be raised on its own, 
i.e. for rights and freedoms not protected by the ECHR, but only in conjunction with 
the other substantive rights provided for in the ECHR. In fact, failure to refer to the 
relevant substantive right will lead to the claim being rejected as being manifestly ill 
founded.324 That being said, ECtHR has been willing to extend the ambit where 
Art.14 applies, noting that Article 14 is an “autonomous” provision, which can be 
violated even where the substantive article relied upon to invoke Art. 14 has not been 
violated.325 In the Belgian Linguistic case326 the Commission referred to its opinion of 
24th June 1965, where it was stipulated that, although Article 14 is not at all applicable 
to rights and freedoms not guaranteed by the Convention and Protocol, its 
applicability “is not limited to cases in which there is an accompanying violation of 
another Article”.327  
In the Belgian Linguistic case, ECtHR also noted that discrimination is meant 
as a difference in treatment between persons in comparable positions in the context of 
the exercise of rights set out in ECHR, with “no reasonable and objective 
justification”.328  To this end, the first step in determining if there has been a 
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discrimination is to establish if there is a comparator, i.e. a person in an analogous 
position. This can sometime be obvious, while in other cases it can be less direct. In 
the latter cases, for ECtHR to establish if and who is the comparator, it will examine 
the justification of the measure or treatment in question.329  Secondly, it must be 
examined if there is a less favorable treatment of the claimants vis a vis the 
comparator on grounds of discrimination. ECtHR has also followed an extensive 
approach on the grounds of discrimination, given the Article’s reference to “other 
status”. Based on this wording, the list of grounds referred to in Article 14 are deemed 
only indicative and ECtHR has referred to other grounds for discrimination, such as 
indicatively, fatherhood on rebuttable presumption,330 sexual preferences,331 health332 
etc. 
Such difference in treatment, however, will not always be prohibited. Indeed, 
a difference in treatment can be justified if two conditions are met. Firstly, the state 
demonstrates that the difference in treatment stems from a rational and reasonable 
policy.333 Secondly, the difference in treatment strikes a fair balance between the 
protection of the interests of the community and respect for the rights and freedoms 
safeguarded by ECHR.334 It is here worth noting that the ECtHR has stipulated in 
several occasions that states enjoy a margin of appreciation “in assessing whether 
differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment in law”.335 The 
extent of such margin of appreciation will be examined by ECtHR based on the 
“circumstance, the subject-matter and its background”.336 
Based on the above, in the context of the Cyprus haircut Art. 14 can be 
invoked in relation to the right of property (Art.1 of Protocol No.1) and the right to 
equality of arms and due process (Art.6) even if no violation of these Articles exists. 
In particular, Art.14 reinforces and guarantees the rights set in the ECHR extending 
the states’ obligations for action or inaction. In this case, Article 14 read in 
conjunction with Art.1 of Protocol No. 1 requires each Contracting State not only to 
secure the enjoyment of the right to property, but also to secure such right for 
everyone without discrimination. The same is true for Article 14 read in conjunction 
with Art. 6, which requires that all parties to a dispute, without discrimination, will be 
given equal opportunity to present their views and arguments. 
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D.1. Right of Property in conjunction with the Right of Equality in the context of 
the Cyprus Haircut 
The Cyprus haircut poses significant issues for possible discriminatory treatment 
of investors for two reasons.  
Primarily, in accordance with the Decree No. 103 “Bailing-in of Bank of Cyprus 
Public Company Limited Decree of 2013,” dated March 29, 2013, certain Cypriot 
public facilities would not be subject to the terms of the bailout. Such specifically 
exempted depositors included Credit Institutions, Insurance companies, Public 
Authorities (the Cypriot government, municipalities, municipal councils and other 
public entities), domestic financial auxiliaries; charitable institutions and 
schools/educational institutions.337 Adding to the discriminatory treatment between 
investors, none of the €10 billion in bailout funds from Troika was used to assist the 
recapitalization of the Bank of Cyprus. Instead, the shareholders (many of them 
former Cyprus Popular Bank depositors), bondholders, and depositors exceeding 
€100,000 born the entire burden of recapitalization.338  Additionally, depositors in 
other local banks, but also depositors in the Greek branches of the two affected banks, 
Bank of Cyprus and Cyprus Popular Bank, were not subjected to any haircut. The 
above cases will be separated and presented separately to better examine if 
discrimination has taken place. 
 
a) Exempted Account Holders 
Primarily, we need to examine whether the exempted account holders were in 
analogous situations with depositors whose deposits were subject to the haircut and if 
the latter sustained less favorable treatment. In this respect, it is important to note 
that exempted accounts were similar in nature with the accounts maintained by all 
other affected account holders and were opened with the same standard bank forms 
and under the same terms. Furthermore, the former Governor of the Central Bank has 
declared  
“Possibly, with the inclusion of other groups of depositors who are excluded from 
the conversion process of uninsured deposits to shares in financial, accounting 
terms, this involves the transfer of additional liabilities on the balance sheet of the 
Bank of Cyprus. This creates more financial obligations,"…."For every additional 
exemption, while the contribution of uninsured depositors increases".339  
Therefore, since the accounts’ terms were the same for all account holders, there 
are no reasons to assume the exempted account holders were not in analogous 
                                                          
337'Central Bank of Cyprus' (Centralbank.gov.cy, 2013) 
<http://www.centralbank.gov.cy/media/pdf_gr/BankofCyprus_GR_Diatagma.pdf> accessed 5 
November 2017.See also “Cyprus Bailout Revisited,” The Wall Street Journal, May 7, 2013. See also, 
“ECB conflicted by Cyprus bail-in,” Centralbanking.com, August 12, 2013. 
338 “Cyprus Bailout Deal: at a Glance,” The Guardian, March 25, 2013. 
339 http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=356197 
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situations with all other account holders.340 Hence, it appears, that there is a prima 
facie case of discrimination on social or political grounds, especially in light of 
ECtHR’s position not to insist strictly on the formal requirement to demonstrate the 
comparator.341  
Therefore, we should examine if this discrimination can be justified by a rational 
and reasonable policy. It is important to note here that, unlike Articles 8-11 of the 
ECHR where “public interests” are used as a defense/immunity ,“rational and 
reasonable policy” in the context of Article 13 is used as an element in determining 
whether the practice in question constituted discriminatory treatment.342As per the 
Minutes of the Plenary Session of the Cyprus Parliament when adopting Law 
17(I)/2013, the reasoning for these exceptions was none other than the very nature of 
these account holders having a public or a quasi-public function, or being part of 
specific very sensitive groups (like the survivors of the Helios accident).343 Hence, 
the exception was put in place on grounds of social policy, to shield these public 
institutions and minimize any further loss of the Cypriot Government that would 
otherwise have to intervene to financially assist these institutions.  
As per ECtHR in cases involving economic or social strategy, states enjoy a wide 
margin of appreciation.344 Indicatively, in the case Darby v. Sweden,345 ECtHR noted 
that Art. 14 shall not in any way impair a State’s right to enforce such rights as it 
deems necessary to control the use of property for the general interest. In this 
context, state practice will be decisive as to whether there is common state practice 
considering measures as the ones in question as discriminatory. Where there is no 
uniform state practice, ECtHR will rarely consider a particular treatment as being 
“discriminatory” rather than “different” to the extent that some plausible connection 
with a legitimate policy objective can be identified.346 At present, there is little, if 
any, state practice in similar circumstances, especially between the member states of 
the Council of Europe. Of course, in other cases involving different treatment 
between private and public or non-governmental functions, ECtHR has been willing 
                                                          
340 Although the CJEU in the case of T 79-13 (Alessandro Accorinti and Others v European Central 
Bank) [2015] found that ECB served a public purpose and was therefore not in comparable situation 
with private investors that pursued private profit. 
341 Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, “Multidimensional Equality from within, Themes from the European 
Convention on Human Rights” in Dagmar Schiek, Victoria Chege “European Union Non-Discrimination 
Law: Comparative Perspectives on Multidimensional Equality Law” (2009), p. 60 
342 Nicolas F Diebold, 'Standards of Non-Discrimination in International Economic Law' (2011) 60 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly. 
343 See the Minutes of the Parliament’s Plenary Session of 21 and 22 March 2013 available at 
http://www2.parliament.cy/parliamentgr/008_01_01/008_01_IB.htm 
344 See ECtHR, Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom, (2010) as well as Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, 
“Discrimination as a magnifying Lens”, in Eva Brems, Janneke Gerards “Shaping Rights in the ECHR. 
The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Determining the Scope of Human Rights” 
Cambridge University Press (2013), p. 345 
345 ECtHR, Darby v. Sweden, (1988), 
346 Steven Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European 
Convention on Human Rights International, Journal on Minority and Group Rights, (2009), 16, p.13 
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to find there was a rational and reasonable policy justifying the difference in 
treatment.347 Therefore, to the extent that the stability of the banking and financial 
system as well as social policy are legitimate objectives, a rational and reasonable 
policy would most likely be found. 
Lastly, ECtHR will examine if a fair balance was stricken, by examining the 
additional burden sustained by the affected depositors due to the exemption of the 
certain depositors from the haircut. Given the relatively small number of exempted 
depositors and the large number of affected depositors who collectively sustained the 
additional contribution, it is likely that ECtHR will consider a fair balance was 
stricken. Therefore, it is the author’s view that ECtHR will determine that the 
exemption is not discriminatory, but only a different treatment.348  
  
b) Account holders in Greek branches of BOCY and Cyprus Popular Bank 
We shall now examine the difference in treatment between depositors of Cyprus 
Popular Bank and Bank of Cyprus in Cyprus and depositors of the same banks in 
Greece.  
At the time of the Cyprus Banking haircut, the total amount of deposits found in 
the Greek branches of the two affected Banks amounted to €15 billion, while the 
equivalent number of deposits in the two Banks in Cyprus did not exceed €26 billion. 
Hence, approximately 1/3 of the deposits of the two Banks were located in branches 
in Greece, which if included in the haircut could have contributed roughly €3bn.349 
Despite, however this fact and despite that the said Greek branches had more 
liabilities in comparison to the Cyprus branches, deposits in the Greek branches of the 
affected Banks did not participate in the haircut. Instead, the branches were sold to the 
Greek Piraeus Bank free from any liabilities (including ELA).  
Therefore, the question arises if depositors in Greece and depositors in Cyprus are 
in analogous situations. In other words, the question is if depositors from Greece and 
depositors from Cyprus that have deposited their funds in the same banks and under 
similar terms, can be considered to be in comparable positions. The answer would 
appear to be in the positive and given that deposits with the Greek branches of Bank 
of Cyprus and Cyprus Popular Bank were shielded from the bank levy and instead 
depositors in Cyprus had to bear a bigger haircut on their deposits to compensate the 
approximately 3 billion that were lost, depositors in Cyprus sustained a less favorable 
treatment. Thus, once again there is a prima facie case of discrimination. 
                                                          
347 See indicatively Iglesia Bautista 'El Salvador' and Ortega Moratilla v. Spain, App. No. 17522/90 
(1992) 
348 As stated in the Belgian Linguistics case (Case "Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of 
languages in  
education in Belgium" v. Belgium ECtHR (1968)) difference and discrimination are two distinct notions 
and a difference in treatment is not necessarily discriminatory, provided a reasonable and objective 
basis can be found 
349 Louis Christophides, Sofronis Clerides, Alex Michaelides, and Marios Zachariadis, A better deal for 
Cyprus 
(2013) available at 
http://homepages.econ.ucy.ac.cy/~mzachari/A%20better%20deal%20for%20Cyprus.pdf 
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 As stated, ECtHR would now proceed to examine if there is a rational and 
reasonable justification for the difference in treatment. However, this case is different 
than in the case of exempted depositors. At present, affected depositors from Cyprus 
could claim that the discrimination was based on grounds of nationality. 
Discrimination on grounds of nationality is deemed as a suspect reason, in the sense 
very “weighty reasons” would need to be demonstrated to ECtHR for the latter to 
come to the conclusion that the difference in treatment based solely on nationality is 
not a discrimination.350  
The said sale took place to safeguard the fragile Greek Banking Sector, as the 
potential fled of funds from Greek Banks could have systemic consequences for the 
entire Eurozone.351 Hence, Cyprus could in this case demonstrate that there was a 
rationale and reasonable justification that in light of the imminent risk of collapse of 
the Cyprus and Greek financial system with spillover effects to the entire EU. 
Additionally, in light of this catastrophic consequences, fair balance between the 
interests of the community and respect for Cyprus depositors’ property rights appears 
to have been met. The statement of the Cyprus Central Bank is indicative in this 
respect: “the sale of the branches of the three Cypriot banks in Greece had been set by 
the Troika as a condition for the approval of Cyprus’s financial support programme. 
If the Cypriot government had not agreed to this sale, the negotiations with the Troika 
for the finalisation of the Memorandum of Understanding would have been 
terminated, with the consequent disorderly collapse of the financial system and of the 
country itself”.352 Hence, in light of the above it appears there are weighty reasons to 
rule that there was no discrimination.  
The ECtHR would thereafter proceed to explore if a fair balance was struck 
between the protection of the interests of the community by the protection of financial 
stability in the EU and the avoidance of the systemic risk on the one hand, and the 
respect of the affected depositors’ rights to property. As indicated, had the account 
holders of Greek branches participated in the bail-in, the haircut would less by 3 
billion Euros, which amount is significant. Again, however, it is the authors’ view that 
the ECtHR would rule that a fair balance was reached in light of the extreme financial 
situations, as was the ECtHR’s ruling also in the Mamatas v. Greece case, presented 
in Chapter 3. 
V. Conclusion 
 Although four years have passed since the events of the Cyprus Banking Crisis 
in March 2013, depositors are still trying to find restitution. Indeed, several depositors 
                                                          
350 Gaygusuz v. Austria, ECtHR (1996), see also Frans Pennings, “Non-Discrimination on the Ground of 
Nationality in Social Security: What are the Consequences of the Accession of the EU to the ECHR?”, 
Utrecht Law Review, (2013) Vol. 9 (1), p. 121 
351 Andrew Duff, 'Cyprus Débâcle: Commission And ECB Reply To My Questions' (Andrew Duff - On 
Governing Europe, 2013) <https://andrewduff.blogactiv.eu/2013/05/14/replies-to-the-questions-by-
the-members-of-the-econ-commitee/> accessed 1 August 2017. 
352 http://www.centralbank.gov.cy/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=12677&lang=en 
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have during the Cyprus Banking Crisis sustained significant loses reaching up to 80% 
of their deposits and despite these significant loses, depositors have still not been able 
to find compensation. 
 Depositors have to date resorted to several forums. In particular, they have 
resorted to national courts in the Republic of Cyprus, CJEU, arbitration tribunals and 
are getting ready to resort to ECtHR. What is common in all these proceedings 
brought to date is that depositors, in one way or another, have relied to human rights 
considerations as a basis for their claims and have to date been unsuccessful to 
demonstrate a breach has occurred.  
In this Article, I have examined depositors’ main arguments that may be put 
forward before the ECtHR and examined how the latter is likely to rule on these 
arguments, based on its previous caselaw. The main arguments I have recognised, 
pertain to potential violations of the right to property (Article 1 of the 1st Protocol of 
the ECHR), the right to a fair trial (Art. 6 ECHR), the right to an effective remedy 
(Art. 13 ECHR) and the right to non-discrimination (Art.14 ECHR). However, none 
of these Articles awards absolute protection. Instead, protection awarded by such 
rights may be subject to limitations. Such limitations can be justified on grounds of 
general or public interest to the extent that a fair balance is struck between the 
interests of public as a whole and that of the individual. As I have demonstrated in 
this paper, in times of extreme financial crisis, as was the Cyprus Banking Crisis, the 
scale is more likely to weight in favour that a fair balance was reached, despite the 
significant and often catastrophic implications, that a measure as the Banking Haircut, 
can have on the individual depositors. 
To this end, it is the author’s view that neither ECtHR will grant depositors 
affected from the Cyprus haircut the restitution they aspired. Which therefore begs the 
question, are depositors in such cases unsecured, have they no available recourse? 
Regretfully, for depositors in Bank of Cyprus and Cyprus Popular Bank, the 
answer may sadly be yes. That stated, the European Union recognising this vacuum in 
depositors’ protections has started to put into places mechanisms to avert similar cases 
like the one that led to the Cyprus Banking Crisis, like the European Banking Union, 
including the Single Resolution Mechanism and the aspired European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme (EDIS). It is the authors’ view that for such specialised economic 
crisis, specific regulations need to be in place to safeguard depositors’ rights as human 
rights may not be adequate for such occasions. 
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I. ABSTRACT  
International investment law developed separately from and was, for a long 
period, perceived as incompatible with human rights law.353 Despite the tendency to 
distinguish the evolution of these two fields of international law, however, they are 
not completely dissimilar.354 Inter alia, they both aim to safeguard investors’ rights to 
property, to promote respect for due process,355 and to address the undisputed position 
of power of the state against the individual.356 In situations of sovereign default, the 
asymmetry between the powers of the state and the rights of investors is even more 
clearly demonstrated, even within the European Union.357 Indeed, although the 
European Union Primary Law provides several safeguards to avoid sovereign 
default,358 it does not regulate the implications if such a default occurs, leaving 
investors confronted with a regulatory vacuum subject to states’ willingness for 
“collaboration.”359 Protection awarded by Investment Treaties is not always sufficient. 
                                                          
353 Shannon Lindsey Blanton & Robert G. Blanton, What Attracts Foreign Investors? An Examination of 
Human Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 69 THE J. OF POL. 143, 143–55 (2007). 
354 Id. at 148.  
355 Ursula Kriebaum, Foreign Investments & Human Rights - The Actors and Their Different Roles, TDM 
1 TRANSNAT’L. DISP. MGMT (2013).  
356 Moshe Hirsch, Investment Tribunals and Human Rights: Divergent Paths, HUM. RTS. IN INT’L INV. L. 
AND ARB. 98, 114 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Francesco Francioni, & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., Oxford U. 
Press 2009). 
357 Id. 
358 See HELMUT SIEKMANN, LIFE IN THE EUROZONE WITH OR WITHOUT SOVEREIGN DEFAULT? 13, 18–23 (Franklin 
Allen, Elena Carletti, & Giancarlo Corsetti eds., FIC Press 2011). 
359 Id. at 23. 
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There is considerable variation in the terms of the various Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) negotiated by different countries, where investors are often not 
covered by the applicable investment treaty.360  
This paper explores the developments brought about by the Financial Crisis of 
2007, the actions taken by Greece affecting foreign investors, and the study of human 
rights implications of such actions as examined in cases of debt structuring, both in 
human rights venues as well as in international investment tribunals.361 This paper 
additionally explores how such developments can arise through the interpretation of 
human rights treaties, such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in the 
context of investment law.362 This article demonstrates the need for human rights law 
to complement investment treaties and to effectively safeguard investors’ rights.363 
II. Sovereign Debt Default and International Investment 
Treaties 
Sovereign default, i.e., the situation where a sovereign state can no longer 
satisfy its financial obligations, may lead to situations where investors’ rights are 
violated with very little or no effective remedies.364 This has been the case for 
centuries, and despite several legal developments, the position of investors remains 
troublesome.365  
Initially, defaulting states addressed sovereign defaults in a minimal or 
negligible manner, with creditors having few, if any, options for negotiations.366 It 
was not long ago that states dealt with sovereign defaults as a game of “bras de 
fer,”367 where states avoided paying their debts by resorting to opportunistic 
defaults.368 Meanwhile, more powerful states occasionally resorted to exercising 
severe political pressure, even using force, to protect their citizens’ interests 
jeopardized by the default.369 Such was the case in Venezuelan Preferential Treatment 
                                                          
360 Id. 
361 See infra Parts II–VIII. 
362 Id. 
363 Id. 
364 See Siekmann, supra note 358, at 14–15. 
365 See id. at 26. 
366 See id. 14. 
367 Michael Waibel, Sovereign Defaults Before International Courts and Tribunals, CAMBRIDGE 
STUDIES IN INT’L AND COMP. L. (Cambridge U. Press 2011) at 22. 
368 See Siekmann, supra note 358, at 16. 
369 See id.  
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of Claims of Blockading Powers where, following several failed attempts to settle the 
dispute by diplomatic negotiations, the British, German, and Italian governments 
declared a blockade of Venezuelan ports.370 Similarly, in 1902, the Argentine Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Luis María Drago, in a diplomatic note to the United States, 
argued that the public debt of Latin American states should not give rise to a right of 
armed intervention.371  
The lack of adjudication, exercise of political influence, and broad immunities, 
both from adjudication and from enforcement enjoyed by state actors in sovereign 
default scenarios, act as deterrents to investment in foreign countries.372 
 Indeed, customary investment law appeared insufficient to protect and 
therefore attract foreign investors.373 Thus, many states, recognizing that foreign 
investment could assist their economic development and growth, began adopting 
investment treaties to provide additional protection.374 This led international 
investment law to develop into treaty law.375 As referenced below in discussions of 
particular BIT provisions, the treaties in some respects appear to codify public 
international law.376 One view, however, holds that there are so many BITs precisely 
because they derogate from otherwise prevailing standards of customary international 
law.377 Ultimately, there is room for debate on the issue of whether BIT provisions 
strengthen customary law standards or merely codify them.378 What is abundantly 
clear is that, even those BIT provisions that facially reiterate customary international 
                                                          
370 Germany et al. v. Venezuela (Preferential Claims Case), Tribunal of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (1904). 
371 Luis M. Drago, State Loans in Their Relation to International Policy, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 692 (1907); see 
also Michael Waibel, Sovereign Defaults Before International Courts and Tribunals, CAMBRIDGE STUDIES 
IN INT’L AND COMP. L. (Cambridge U. Press 2011). 
372 See Siekmann, supra note 358, at 23. 
373 Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity Of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 660 (1998). 
374 Id. at 639–88 (discussing reasons why especially developing States began adopting BITs). 
375 Id. at 652. 
376 Patrick Dumberry, Are BITs Representing The 'New' Customary International Law In International 
Investment Law? 28 PA. ST. INT’L L. REV. 675, 675–701 (2010). 
377 Paul Peters, Investment Risk and Trust: The Role Of International Law, INT’L L. & DEV., 131, 153 
(1988).  
378 Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law 161–63 (UC Berkeley Public Law Research 
Paper 2005); see also Bernard Kishoiyian, Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties In The Formulation Of 
Customary International Law 14 NY J. INT’L L. & BUS. 327 (1993). 
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law have a greater impact on state capacity to enforce human rights, in practice, than 
customary law doctrines.379  
III. Sovereign Debt Default and Human Rights 
Around the same time as the rapid development of BITs, international human 
rights law began to grow significantly and obtained international recognition. This 
significant metamorphosis primarily manifested itself in the recognition of negative 
rights that awarded protection against abuses of state power impacting individual and 
group rights. The development of negative rights can be viewed as analogous to the 
way investment treaties set certain substantial and procedural guarantees limiting state 
interference with investment.380 Of course, the scope of protection of human rights 
law is much broader than that of investment law; still, however, these fields of law 
can intertwine.381 
 While the clear majority of International Investment Agreements (IIAs) are 
silent on the way human rights and investment rights may be functionally intertwined, 
there are some examples in which human rights issues are raised in investment 
treaties.382 In particular, we can broadly divide existing IIAs into two eras: pre-1990 
and post-1990.383 Pre-1990 IIAs, which comprise about one-third of the total IIAs, are 
solely focused on investor rights, while the majority of the post-1990 IIAs make some 
                                                          
379 See generally Stephen M. Schwebel, Investor-State Disputes and the Development of International 
Law: the Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Customary International Law, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L 
L. PROC. 27 (2004); Steffen Hindelang, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Custom and a Healthy Investment 
Climate: The Question of Whether BITs Influence Customary International Law Revisited, 5 J. WORLD 
INV. & TRADE 789 (2004); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 123 (2003). 
380 Kathryn Gordon, Joachim Pohl & Marie Bouchard, Investment and human rights – Investors rights 
and human rights – interactions under investment treaty law Blogs.lse.ac.uk (2014), 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/investment-and-human-rights/portfolio-items/investors-rights-and-human-
rights-interactions-under-investment-treaty-law-by-kathryn-gordon-joachim-pohl-and-marie-
bouchard/ (last visited Dec 1, 2017). 
381 Marc Jacob, International Investment Agreements and Human Rights, INEF Research Paper Series 
on Human Rights - Corporate Responsibility and Sustainable Development 10 (Mar. 2010) 
http://humanrights-business.org/files/international_investment_agreements_and_human_rights.pdf. 
382 See generally Marc Jacob, International Investment Agreements and Human Rights, in INEF 
Research Paper Series: Human Rights, Corporate Responsibility And Sustainable Development 9 
(2010) (discussing how IIAs can address the issue of human rights in two ways: (1) by providing 
express provisions outlining the state’s duty to protect and promote human rights, which is 
accomplished through the policy provisions or regulatory and enforcement clauses; or (2) by including 
specific provisions mandating the observance of human rights standards commonly found in other 
international human rights instruments).  
383 Id. 
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reference to human rights.384 Of course, other multilateral investment treaties, like the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT), make no reference to human rights at all.385 This raises the question of 
whether it is possible to regulate, directly or indirectly, the human rights aspects of 
foreign investors’ conduct under human rights treaties. 
This article explores the ways in which human rights considerations can be 
used by, and against, investors within the framework of the Greek Default.386 This 
article further demonstrates how, given the lack of binding international rules on debt 
restructuring and the wide discretion enjoyed by states in this framework, a consistent 
interpretation of human rights norms may prove to be a sustainable protection tool for 
private investors in sovereign debt restructuring workouts.387  
IV. The Factual Background of the Greek Default  
IV(A). The Greek Financial Crisis 
IV(A)(1). The Economic Situation in Greece 
The Greek government has a long history of problems with its public debt.388 
However, in 2009, the Greek debt increased by an additional EUR 34 billion, 
delivering the final blow to the Greek economy.389 By the end of 2009, the Greek 
economy faced the second highest deficit in percentage of GDP in the EU with an 
astonishing -13.6%, just behind Ireland, whose relevant rate was a dismal -14.3%.390 
These existing and rising debt levels led to elevated borrowing costs, resulting in a 
severe economic crisis.391 Undoubtedly, the situation was exacerbated by individual 
institutions and other speculators that profited from the economically turbid 
                                                          
384 Howard Mann, International Investment Agreements, Business and Human Rights: Key Issues and 
Opportunities, INT’L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV., 11 (2008). 
385 C. Reiner, C. Schreuer, 'Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration', Human 
Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford Publishing 2009), p. 83 
386 See infra Parts I–III, and supra Parts IV–VII. 
387 Id. 
388 Matthew Lynn, Bust (Bloomberg Press 2013). 
389 Nicos Christodoulakis, 'Crisis, Threats And Ways Out For The Greek Economy' (2010) 4, Cyprus 
Economic Policy Review, p.90 
390 See Provision of Deficit and Debt Data for 2009 - First Notification, EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/5046142/2-22042010-BP-EN.PDF/0ff48307-d545-
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climate.392 The case of the Greek Government Bonds (GGBs) is indicative of this 
challenging environment. In late 2009, GGBs faced continuous rating downgrades by 
the three major credit rating agencies, namely Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, and 
Fitch.393 Greece’s rating suffered an unprecedented downgrade to “junk status,” the 
lowest rating possible.394 
 
 
Source: Greek Public Debt Management Agency 
It bears mentioning that before the crisis, the ten-year GGB yields were ten to 
forty basis points above German ten-year bonds; during the crisis, in January 2010, 
the spread increased to 400 basis points.395 The graph below further demonstrates the 
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GGB’s Spreads, 1993-2011 
Spreads on ten-year GGBs relative to ten-year German Bonds (%) 
 
Source: Global Financial Data, http://www.globalfinancialdata.com/index.html 
Greece’s total debt as of the end of April 2010 was approximately EUR 319 
billion.396 During that same year, Greece consequently turned to both the EU and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for financial assistance.397 The EU delayed 
making any commitment because there was an unwillingness by individual member 
states to support such an extraordinary undertaking.398 Also, at the time, the 
Maastricht Treaty did not provide for any crisis management mechanism, and 
thereafter, it did not predict the possibility of bailing out a member state that was 
saddled with high external debt.399  
Finally, the EU and IMF constructed a bailout package, and on May 2, 2010, 
the Eurogroup agreed to provide Greece with bilateral guarantees pooled by the 
European Commission totaling EUR 80 billion to be disbursed over the period May 
2010 to June 2013.400 The financial assistance provided by the European Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) member states was part of a joint package, with the IMF 
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financing an additional EUR 30 billion under a standby arrangement.401 Furthermore, 
in an attempt to prevent the spread of the financial crisis to other member states, in 
June 2010, EU leaders created a new European mechanism and fund, the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), to provide financial assistance for EMU member 
states with severe financial problems.402 The EFSF consisted of two temporary, three-
year lending facilities capable of loaning a total of EUR 500 billion.403 EU leaders 
also suggested that the IMF could provide additional support.404  
The Greek economy has since been almost exclusively supported by the 
bailout mechanism; primarily on account of the fear that a possible Greek default 
could contaminate the banking and financial system of other EU member states.405 As 
time has passed, however, the situation in Greece has remained largely unaltered, 
despite the measures taken by the Greek government, and the Greek deficit has 
remained perilously high.406 This ongoing problem precipitated decisions in relation 
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IV(A)(2). The Way to the Haircuts 
In mid-2011, Greek debt reached approximately 150% of its GDP, an 
unsustainable figure.408 At this debt level, even if Greece succeeded in fully cutting its 
public sector deficit resulting in public sector surpluses, its then current debt level 
could not be wholly financed from the surplus, even at a relatively low interest rate of 
5%.409 This implied that the yearly interest could not be fully paid from the surplus 
and would result in increases of the accumulated debt.410 As such, it was necessary for 
Greece to continue with severe measures in consideration of being granted loans to 
satisfy its current needs and pay off its debts.411 Therefore, Greece could no longer 
remain at its fiscal status quo. 
It became increasingly apparent that the solution for Greece was to restructure 
its debt; preferably through a voluntary exchange of old debt with new debt—
otherwise known as a “haircut.”412 Previously considered to be a taboo, echoes of the 
word “haircut” began to be heard more loudly in connection with Greek debt.413 A 
haircut, i.e. a debt restructuring, is a renegotiation between a state and its creditors 
whereby the creditors agree to accept less than what they would be entitled on the fear 
of default.414 A haircut may often involve a reduction of interest rates and/or principal 
and the extension of a repayment period.415 In relation to the reduction of principal 
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and interest rates, a review of recent haircuts revealed on balance a post-default 
recovery rate of between 50% and 70%.416 Greece was no exception to the rule. 
Indeed, although it was initially announced that there would be a 21% haircut, an 
additional 50% haircut followed soon thereafter.417  
4(A)(2)(1). The First Haircut 
Despite the initial bailout package and the many revenue-raising measures 
adopted in Greece, the Greek debt was simply too sizeable to be satisfied.418 By the 
end of June 2011, Greece’s total debt was approximately EUR 353,693 billion out of 
which approximately EUR 283,000 billion was in the form of bonds while the 
remaining EUR 70,693 billion corresponded to debt on account of loans.419 It is 
important to note that up to Greece’s entrance in the bailout mechanism, the largest 
share of Greek public debt (about 75% of the total stock) had been held by foreign 
banks.420 These banks were mostly German and French and were combined with 
mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds, and other categories of investors who also 
owned GGBs.421 However, thereafter the allocation of Greek debt changed 
significantly.422 The EU, IMF, and the European Central Bank (ECB) currently hold a 
significant proportion of Greek Government bonds, but European banks continue to 
be major holders of non-Greek bonds while a few GGBs have fallen into the hands of 
individual, non-institutional, investors; though this number is relatively small.423 The 
largest holders of GGBs up to December 2011 are presented in Appendix 2.424 
Given the conditions above, the risk of financial contagion to other EU 
countries and the implications of a possible unregulated Greek insolvency led to the 
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Agreement of July 2011 (the Agreement), when the second Greek bailout package of 
up to 109 billion was concluded between the heads of state or governments of the 
Eurozone and the EU institutions.425 The Agreement was presented as the final 
solution to the Greek financial crisis and consequently Europe’s financial crisis.426 It 
provided for the lengthening of the maturity of future European Financial Stability 
Facility’s (EFSF) loans to Greece to the maximum extent possible—from the current 
7.5 years to a minimum of fifteen years and up to thirty years with a grace period of 
ten years—and at the same time for the substantial extension of the maturities of the 
existing Greek facility.427  
In addition, GGB bondholders were also called upon to accept partial 
repayment of their owed sums and to calculate a 21% Net Present Value (NPV) loss 
for all products based on an assumed discount rate of 9%.428 The net contribution of 
the private sector was estimated at EUR 37 billion.429 Although the banks ultimately 
agreed to the haircut voluntarily, they stated that they would not be willing to accept a 
further reduction.430 However, this haircut was too small to effectively assist in 
accommodating Greece’s debt and/or solving Greece’s credit problems.431 As such, 
little time passed before the Agreement was questioned and subsequently revised.432  
4(A)(2)(2). The Second Haircut 
Because all previous measures had essentially failed, Eurozone leaders finally 
agreed on a structured Greek default wherein bonds would lose 50% of their value 
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and short and medium-term debt would be converted into a long-term debt 
obligation.433 The decision was adopted on October 27, 2011, and it contained 
specific provisions.434 
The Agreement called for wider Private Sector Involvement (PSI) and 
participation in establishing the sustainability of the Greek debt.435 In this regard, it 
invited Greece, private investors, and all other parties concerned to develop a 
voluntary bond exchange with a minimum discount of 50% (plus 29% to the already 
agreed 21% haircut) on national Greek debt held by private investors.436 As an 
incentive to attract private investors and especially banks, Eurozone Member States 
would contribute to PSI a package of up to EUR 30 billion, while the public sector 
would grant an additional EUR 100 billion until 2014 for bank recapitalization.437  
The exchange required a wide PSI of approximately 85%-90% or a write-off 
in the order of EUR 100 billion.438 This PSI, together with an ambitious reform 
program, was expected to assist Greece in reaching a debt level of 120% by 2020.439 
The Greek coalition government finally released its official proposal on February 25, 
2012, asking investors to accept a haircut of approximately 53.5%.440  
To achieve this goal, the Greek government passed the Bondholders’ Law 
4050/2012 (“Bondholders’ Law”) that introduced collective action clauses (CACs), 
which allowed the restructuring of the GGBs with the consent of a qualified majority 
of bondholders.441 This was based on a quorum of votes representing at least 50% of 
bond’s face value and a consent threshold of two-thirds of the face-value holders 
taking part in the vote,442 i.e. a majority of more than 66.7% of the bondholders. In 
particular, in March 2012, the participation of bondholders in the bond exchange 
reached 152 billion worth of Greek law governed GGBs out of the approximately 177 
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billion,443 approximately 85.9%. It allowed Greece to trigger the collective action 
clauses—which required a two-thirds majority of bondholders—and to compel all 
Greek law GGB holders to consent to the terms of the bond exchange. In addition, 
foreign law governed GGB holders also participated in the bond exchange in a 
percentage of 69%.444 As such, more than 95% of the issued GGBs participated in the 
bond exchange; EUR 196.7 billion worth of GGBs out of EUR 205.5 billion GGBs.445 
The remaining GGBs bondholders, approximately EUR 6.4 billion, were given until 
April 2012 to accept the Greek government’s offer to exchange their GGBs.446 
Finally, another EUR 2,4 billion worth of GGBs were exchanged manifesting a 
participation percentage rate of 96.9%.447  
Out of the total EUR 205.5 billion in eligible paper, holders of EUR 199 
billion worth of bonds participated in the PSI and exchanged for:  
(i) New bonds issued by the Hellenic Republic with an aggregate face 
value of EUR 62.4 billion—31.5% of the principal amount of the 
Bonds tendered for exchange;  
(ii) PSI Payment Notes issued by the EFSF in two series maturing on 
March 12, 2013 and March 12, 2014, respectively, with an aggregate 
face amount of EUR 29.7 billion—15% of the principal amount of the 
bonds exchanged; and  
(iii) Detachable GDP-linked securities of the Hellenic Republic with an 
amount equal to the principal amount of the new Bonds issued.448 
Following the PSI, Greece’s sovereign debt was reduced by 
approximately EUR 107 billion or 52% of the eligible debt.449 
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However, holders of EUR 6.4 billion in face value debt held out and 
are now being repaid in full to reduce the chances of litigation.450  
V. Human Rights Considerations in the Case of Sovereign 
Defaults 
5(A). Expropriation and its Impact on Foreign Investors 
The act of expropriation—where a government takes a privately-owned 
property for public benefit—is inherently tied to property rights and is regulated both 
under Investment Treaties as well as Human Rights Law.451  
Investment tribunals, when exploring the concept of expropriation, have 
followed a broad approach to cover interference with various economic rights.452 
Indicatively, the partial award of Amoco International Finance v. Iran stated, 
“[e]xpropriation, which can be defined as a compulsory transfer of property rights, 
may extend to any rights which can be the object of a commercial transaction, i.e., 
freely sold and bought, and thus has a monetary value.”453 The same approach was 
adopted in the Iran–U.S. Court Tribunal in the interlocutory award of Starrett 
Housing, where it was declared that “[i]t is a well-settled rule of customary 
international law that a taking of one property right may also involve a taking of a 
closely connected ancillary right.”454 However, IIAs do not offer absolute protection 
against expropriation, but they allow states to interfere with foreign investors’ 
property rights provided that certain conditions are met.455 Namely, the expropriation 
must be for a public purpose, it should be according to domestic law, and it cannot be 
discriminatory.456 Additionally, prompt and adequate compensation should be paid to 
the investor in exchange for the interference with the rights.457  
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The same principle is reiterated in human rights’ conventions at both the international 
level as well as the EU level.458 However, unlike BITs that usually award protection 
only against expropriation, EU Law provides wider protection against any type of 
interference with investments.459 Indicatively, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the 
European Human Rights Convention (ECHR) provides: 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of 
his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in 
the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law 
and the general principles of international law. The preceding 
provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws, as it deems necessary to control the use of property 
in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of 
taxes or other contributions or penalties.460 
This similarity between IIAs and human rights treaties in the field of 
expropriation is why the decisions of the ECtHR, as well as the decisions of other 
regional human rights courts, are important and should be considered by investment 
tribunals in determining the customary international law of expropriation.461 To this 
end, examining the right to property in accordance with the ECHR’s Article 1 of 
Protocol Number 1, can assist investors both before Investment Tribunals, but can 
also award them an additional remedy before human rights courts such as the 
ECtHR.462 We shall now turn to examine the application of Article 1 of Protocol 
Number 1 of the ECHR in the context of sovereign default.463 
5(B) Expropriation in Human Rights Law  
As analysed in the second Article, ECHR’s Article 1, Protocol Number 1 (“Article 
1”) is generally interpreted to entail three rules.464 Primarily, the first sentence of the 
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first paragraph is more general and it provides the right to peaceful enjoyment of one's 
possessions and free from the state’s intervention.465 In addition, Article 1 has been 
interpreted to include two more rules, namely the right not to be deprived of one’s 
property—subject to certain conditions set out in the second sentence of the first 
paragraph—but also the authority of a State to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest.466 As evident from the latter rule, not every state 
interference with property rights will constitute an illegal interference of the rights to 
peaceful enjoyment of possessions; states are free, however, to take administrative 
measures that may affect such peaceful enjoyment.467  
To determine if a state measure is an unlawful interference or a lawful regulation 
of the right to property, the ECtHR’s case law has set certain conditions.468 Such 
conditions primarily require that the measure is lawful. Indeed, for any state measure 
interfering with property rights to be justified, the latter must be, primarily, prescribed 
by internal law, which is “compatible with the rule of law”.469 Although, the said 
requirement is expressly stated only in the second rule of Article 1 (which mentions 
“subject to conditions provided for by law”), the requirement is perceived as being 
applicable on all 3 rules, as it is based on the principle of legal certainty, one of the 
fundamental principles of a democratic society which is inherent in the entirety of the 
ECHR.470 Additionally, for there to be a lawful interference, the measure must also be 
justified on grounds of “public interest.”471 Indeed, under ECtHR case law, 
interference is justified if it serves “a legitimate objective in the public or general 
interest.”472 As to what constitutes “public interest,” as indicated in Article 2, states 
have wide discretion to determine such grounds.473 Indicatively, in James v. United 
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Kingdom, the ECtHR argued that such determination will be challenged only in the 
case that it is “manifestly without reasonable foundation.”474  
Public or general interest alone, however, will not suffice. The ECtHR has many 
times reiterated that when a state’s administrative powers interfere with the peaceful 
enjoyment of one’s possessions, a fair balance must be struck between the demands of 
the general interest of the community and the protection of property rights.475 Indeed, 
in addition to serving the public or general interest, the interference needs to also be 
proportional in the sense that there needs to be “a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized.”476 
Hence, the interference will not be proportional when the individual property owner is 
made to bear “an individual and excessive burden”.477 
5 (B) (1) Greek Government Bonds as Possessions 
Before examining whether takings of resources and property in times of sovereign 
default, especially in the Greek Haircut, constitute a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 
Number 1 ECHR (Article 1), we need first to establish what constitutes possessions 
under Article 1. The concept of possessions has been broadly interpreted within the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence, so as to include not only the right of ownership, but also a 
whole range of pecuniary rights, including all acquired rights.478 These include rights 
arising from shares,479 patents,480 arbitration awards, established entitlements to a 
pension, entitlements to rent, and even rights resulting from running a business,481 
provided the object of possession may be precisely defined. In Pine Valley 
Developments Ltd v. Ireland,482 the ECtHR held that even a “legitimate expectation” 
that a certain state of affairs will occur constituted a component of the property and 
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was, therefore, eligible for protection under Article 1. A “legitimate expectation”, 
however, should be interpreted narrowly, must have a more concrete nature than a 
mere hope, and must be based on a legal provision or a legal act.483  
In the recent case of Mamatas,484 the ECtHR examined how the application of 
Collection Action Clauses (CACs) can interfere with an applicant’s property right by 
converting bonds into instruments of lesser value without consent. The applicants 
argued that the Bondholders’ Law unilaterally introduced CACs and that the CACs’ 
forcible conversion of their bonds to notes of lesser nominal value constituted a 
violation of Article 1 taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14 of the ECHR. 
To determine the applicability of Article 1 of Protocol 1, the ECtHR first 
examined whether GGBs constitute “possessions,” although the parties did not 
dispute this. The legal nature of GGBs is that of contractual loan agreements where 
investors pay the state the nominal value of a bond in exchange of repayment of that 
nominal value plus interest at a specified date in the future. Under this construction, 
bondholders may legitimately expect payment of the bonds on the repayment date, at 
which time unpaid dates would constitute enforceable debts. In this regard, although 
many GGBs were not due at the time of the Greek Haircut, GBBs would fall under 
the concept of “possessions,” as contemplated under Protocol Number 1 of the ECHR, 
since bondholders had a legitimate expectation to receive payment of the bond value 
plus interest.485  
Indeed, in Mamatas, the ECtHR noted that bonds “are tradeable in stock 
markets, they can be transferred from one bearer to the other, [and] their value 
depends on various factors,” but at the end of the day, “upon maturity, bonds are 
expected to return their nominal value.”486 Based on this reasoning, the ECtHR 
concluded that GGBs are in fact possessions. This view was also upheld in the former 
ECtHR case of Fomin and Others v. Russia in 2013.487 It should be noted, however, 
that one could argue that at the time of the Greek Haircut, Greece was already in a 
default, and as such, investors’ claims against Greece could hardly give rise to 
legitimate expectations that the debt would be repaid considering insolvency is one of 
                                                          
483 Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. v. Belgium, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 301 (1996). 
484 Mamatas v. Greece, App. No. 63066/14, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016). 
485 ECtHR, Stran Greek Refineries v. Greece, (1994).  
486 ECtHR, Mamatas v. Greece, (2016). 
487 ECtHR, Fomin v. Russia, (2013); see also Malysh v. Russia (2010); Tronin v. Russia, (2010); Lobanov 
v. Russia, (2010); Andreyeva v. Russia, (2012). 
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the risks inherent in any investment.”488 Based on this reasoning, as there were no 
legitimate expectations to be protected, it could be argued that there were no 
possessions. 
5 (B) (2) Greek Haircut Interfering with Possessions? 
Having determined that GGBs do constitute “possessions,” we turn to whether 
the Greek Haircut constitutes arbitrary interference with such possessions. To this end 
we first examine the ECtHR’s findings in Mamatas. 
 
5 (B) (2a) The Court’s Reasoning in Mamatas v. Greece  
The applicants in the Mamatas v. Greece case claimed that the unilateral 
amendment of the terms regulating their GGBs via law the Bondholders’ Law 
4050/2012, and the subsequent forcible conversion of their bonds based on CCAs, 
was tantamount to expropriation.489 The ECtHR agreed that the conversion was 
imposed without their consent, and was, therefore, an interference with their right of 
peaceful enjoyment of their property under the first rule.490 The ECtHR, however, 
held that this, in and of itself, was not necessarily an illegal interference in breach of 
Article 1,491 nor did it automatically amount to expropriation. Indeed, ECtHR rejected 
the applicants’ argument that the conversions were tantamount to expropriation under 
the second rule, noting that the unilateral amendment of the GGBs’ terms did not 
constitute a deprivation of bondholders’ property, as investments in sovereign bonds 
are inherently risky investments whose value fluctuates per market’s risks.492  
Thereafter, the ECtHR proceeded to examine whether the above measures 
were justified on grounds of public interest. In line with the margin of appreciation 
doctrine, the ECtHR concluded that the PSI aimed to maintain economic stability and 
restructure Greece’s sovereign debt in a time of great economic recession, therefore, 
acting in the general interests of the public.493  
                                                          
488 Matthias Goldmann, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOVEREIGN DEBT WORKOUTS (Apr. 9, 2014), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2330997 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.23309977. 
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Lastly, the ECtHR examined the conversion considering the principle of 
proportionality and concluded that the “haircut” sustained by the applicants was not 
large enough to amount to a legislative “termination of or an insignificant return” on 
their investment.494 It was noted that the value of the bonds after the conversion 
should not be compared to their previous nominal value, since it does not represent 
the bond’s real monetary value on the date of the introduction of Law 4050/2012.495 
Instead, the ECtHR ruled that there was no violation of Article 1 because the 
significantly reduced monetary value of the bonds on such date should be taken into 
account as means of comparison.496  
 
5 (B) (2a) Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning in Mamatas v. Greece  
 Now we examine whether the ECtHR’s aforementioned reasoning was well 
founded.  
We shall primarily examine if the ECtHR’s finding that there was no 
expropriation, was in line with ECtHR’s previous caselaw. Under Article 1, for an 
expropriation of property to have occurred, a total deprivation of property is 
needed.497 In other words, expropriation involves the direct transfer of a property title 
from the owner to a public body or another private individual.498 Alternatively, 
ECtHR has also recognized the possibility of de facto expropriation,499 that may take 
place when the owner is not formally expropriated, but his ability to exercise his 
property rights is limited in such a grave way that he factually does not have 
ownership anymore.500 In the case of the Greek Haircut, there wasn’t any direct 
transfer of ownership of GGBs to the State, hence no direct expropriation had 
occurred. As to whether, the introduction of CACs could be interpreted as indirect 
expropriation, there should not remain any possible use or economic value to the 
                                                          
494 See ECtHR, Mamatas v. Greece (2016). 
495 Id. 
496 Id. 
497 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Francesco Francioni, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration, Oxford University Press, (2009), 238 
498 Laurent Sermet, The European Convention on Human Rights and property rights, Human rights 
files, No. 11 rev, Council of Europe Publishing (1999) 
499 ECtHR, Sporrong v. Sweden, (1982) 
500 'Deprivation of Property and Control of Use' (Echr-online.info, 2018) <http://echr-online.info/right-
to-property-article-1-of-protocol-1-to-the-echr/control-of-use-and-deprivation-of-property/> 
accessed 6 January 2018. 
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bondholders of Greek law governed GGBs.501 In the present case, the GGBs 
maintained an economic value that still entitled investors to partial repayment of the 
value of the GGBs at the specified period. Hence, it seems that ECtHR was correct to 
determine that no expropriation had taken place. 
  Moving on, we shall examine if the ECtHR was correct to find that there was a 
justifiable interference with the property rights of bondholders. To this end, we shall 
examine if the introduction of CACs by the Greek Government to all Greek-law 
governed GGBs was lawful, in the public interest and whether a fair balance was 
struck.  
In relation to whether the introduction of CACs was lawful, primarily we must 
examine if the measure was prescribed by internal law. At present, the introduction of 
CACs was prescribed by the Bondholders’ Law, which was adopted by the Parliament 
and published in the Government’s Gazette. However, the existence of an internal law 
is not sufficient to conclude the measure was lawful, but it must also be examined 
whether the Bondholders’ Law and its provisions were stipulated with sufficient 
precision to enable the persons concerned to foresee, to a reasonable degree vis a vis 
the circumstances, the consequences which a given action might entail.502 In the 
Mamatas v. Greece, ECtHR held that the Bondholders’ Act, as well as all other legal 
texts relating to the debt restructuring, were known to the bondholders prior to the 
debt restructuring.503 Additionally, ECtHR noted that the consequences of the refusal 
of the bond exchange were also predictable in advance and to this end ECtHR 
concluded that introduction of CACs and the subsequent bond exchange was lawful.  
However, one must note that ECtHR did not examine the fact that the Bondholders’ 
Law was introduced only a few days before the sovereign bond exchange. 
Additionally, the ECtHR did not refer to the arbitral and unilateral amendment of the 
bond terms, that, in essence, constitute a contractual instrument, whose amendment 
was not foreseeable by the investors.  
                                                          
501 See ECtHR, Papamichalopoulos v. Greece (1993) as well as ECtHR, Popov v. Moldavia (2005) and 
ECtHR, Karagiannis and others v. Greece (1993) 
502 Aida Grgiæ, Zvonimir Mataga, Matija Longar and Ana Vilfan, A guide to the implementation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and its protocols, European Council, Human rights handbooks, 
No. 10, European Council (2007), p.13 
503 Aida Grgiæ, Zvonimir Mataga, Matija Longar and Ana Vilfan, A guide to the implementation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and its protocols, European Council, Human rights handbooks, 
No. 10, European Council (2007), p.13 
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We proceed to explore if the ECtHR was right to find that the introduction of 
CACs served a legitimate aim in the general (public) interest. As already indicated, 
this is a field where States enjoy a margin of appreciation, as the definition of general 
and public interest may vary from country to country over time.504 This is in line with 
the ECtHR’s previous case law awarding broad discretion to states in determining 
what constitutes public interest.505 In a similar case,506 the ECtHR referred to the 
difficult financial state of the Russian Federation and noted, “[d]efining budgetary 
priorities in terms of favoring expenditures on pressing social issues to the detriment 
of claims with purely pecuniary nature was a legitimate aim in the public interest.”507  
This was reiterated also in the case of Koufaki and Adedy v. Greece508 that related to 
the Greek financial crises and the ECtHR stated that unless the State measure is 
manifestly devoid of any reasonable foundation, ECtHR will not interfere with the 
State’s determination that it serves the public interest.   
Lastly, we shall examine ECtHR’s reasoning in relation to whether a “fair 
balance” was struck, i.e. whether the measure was proportionate. The principle of 
proportionality requires that there is a reasonable relationship between a particular 
objective to be achieved and the means used to achieve that objective.509 As 
previously stated, the ECHR has many times reiterated the need for a “fair balance” 
between the demands of the general interest of the community and the protection of 
individual property rights, when a state’s administrative powers interfere with the 
peaceful enjoyment of property.510 
Unlike the Court of Justice of the European Union, where the principle of 
proportionality can be broken down in three rules: i) the principle of suitability, ii) the 
                                                          
504 Laurent Sermet, The European Convention on Human Rights and property rights, Human rights 
files, No. 11 rev, Council of Europe Publishing (1999), p.33 
505 Indicatively, see ECtHR Lithgow and others v. the United Kingdom, (1986) para. 102 where the 
Court noted that in light of States’ direct knowledge of the society and due to the fact that decisions 
re nationalisation legislation usually involved issues where there was a range of opinions within any 
democratic society, the national authorities were in a better position to establish what was 
appropriate in the circumstances and had therefore a wide margin of appreciation. 
506 See ECtHR, Malysh v. Russia, (2010) 
507 Id. 
508 ECtHR, Koufaki and Adedy (2013) 
509 Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2009). 
p.278 
510 See, e.g., ECtHR Sporrong v. Sweden, (1982), para. 35 
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principle of necessity, and iii) the principle of stricto sensu proportionality511, in 
determining whether a balance has been struck, the ECtHR’s case law seems to 
examine whether a measure is “both appropriate for achieving its aim and not 
disproportionate thereto”.512  Indeed, the principle of stricto sensu proportionality, is 
rarely examined by the ECtHR.513 Instead, in examining the test described above, 
ECtHR takes into account several factors, including, inter alia, “the character of the 
interference, the aim pursued, the nature of property rights interfered with and the 
behavior of the Applicant and the interfering State authorities”.514 These elements are 
important in examining whether a fair balance has indeed been reached.515 Therefore, 
it is important to examine whether the retroactive introduction of CACs into GGBs 
via Law 4050/2012 meets the above proportionality test.  
  Primarily, we must examine if the measure is appropriate for achieving its 
aim. This principle is satisfied when the measure introduced to the state is causally 
linked with the legitimate aim pursed by it.516 Thus, we should examine if the 
introduction of CACs is relevant to maintaining economic stability, as was found in 
the Mamatas case. As already indicated in the presentation of the factual background 
of the Greek Default, the introduction of CACs, at the very least, facilitated the 
achievement of a wide debt restructuring in line with the decision of October 27, 
2011.517 It therefore directly contributed to Greece receiving financial aid and in 
reducing its debt by about 107 billion euros. In light of the previously indicated 
factual background of the Greek Default and the pressing financial circumstances, the 
introduction of CACs and subsequent bond exchange was justifiably found 
appropriate. 
                                                          
511 See Olivier Corten, L’UTILISATION DU “RAISONNABLE” PAR LE JUGE INTERNATIONAL - DISCOURS JURIDIQUE, RAISON 
ET CONTRACIDTIONS 571 (1997); Jan H. Jans, Proportionality Revisited, 3 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 
239 (2000). 
512 ECtHR, James v. United Kingdom (1994) 
513 Sybe A. de Vries, Balancing Fundamental Rights with Economic Freedoms according to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, 9 UTRECHT L. REV. 1 (2013).  
514 ECtHR, Forminster Enterprises Limited v. the Czech Republic, (2009), para.75 
515 See Jonas Christoffersen, Straight Human Rights Talk — Why Proportionality does (not) Matter?, 55 
SCANDINAVIAN STUD. IN L. 17 (2010). 
516 Thomas Kleinlein, Judicial Lawmaking by Judicial Restraint? The Potential of Balancing in 
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Notably, however, ECtHR did not take into account the availability of alternative 
solutions, in the sense that there were no alternative, less onerous measures 
available.518 Although, this test is not strictly interpreted, as it was indicated in James 
v. United Kingdom,519 “the availability of alternative solutions . . . constitutes one 
factor, along with others, relevant for determining whether the means chosen could be 
regarded as reasonable and suited to achieving the legitimate aim being pursued, 
having regard to the need to strike a ‘fair balance”.520 The fact that the ECtHR did not 
however take this test into account is, however, understandable in this instance, that 
relates to complex financial measures related to Greece’s economy. After all, to 
satisfy the above test, the State needs only to demonstrate that there are sufficient 
relevant reasons to justify the measure as reasonable.521  
We therefore proceed to examine if the unilateral introduction of CACs and 
the subsequent bond exchange introduced in order to achieve financial stability stroke 
a fair balance vis a vis the losses sustained by bondholders. The principle requires 
courts to “scale” the objective pursued against the interference sustained by the 
prejudiced investors.522 Here as well, the States enjoy a margin of appreciation, in 
light that State authorities are better placed to assess both the existence of the general 
interest and of the necessity of the restriction of the rights, in light of their direct 
contact with the social process of their country.523 Still, however, such margin of 
appreciation is not unlimited, as this would render the protection awarded under 
Article 1 of the Protocol 1 illusive.524 Hence, the essence of the rights should be 
guaranteed, during the exercise of the State’s margin of appreciation.525  
 It would be interesting to examine how the ECtHR has dealt with large scale 
interference with property rights in other cases relating to extreme situations and 
fundamental changes. Indicatively, we may refer to the case of Broniowski v. 
                                                          
518 See Kleinlein, supra note 516. 
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Poland526 that took place in the aftermath of the re-establishment of local self-
government in Poland.  The case related to an alleged failure by the Polish authorities 
to satisfy the applicant’s compensatory claim in relation to property in Lwów (now 
Lviv, in Ukraine).527 This property previously belonged to his grandmother, who was 
the owner at the time the area was still part of Poland, prior to the Second World War. 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, when Poland’s eastern border had been 
redrawn, the applicant’s grandmother, along with many other residents of the eastern 
provinces of Poland, was repatriated. To this end, already in 1946, Poland enacted a 
law providing for compensation in kind for those that had been repatriated. However, 
44 years later the applicant had not yet received compensation, as due to various 
transfers of state owned land to local authorities, the State Treasury had insufficient 
land to offer such compensation.528 ECtHR accepted that in complex political and 
economic situations, stringent limitations on compensation may be justified, but noted 
that the stringer the limitations, the more persuasive the reasons for the imposition of 
such limitations must be.529 To this end, ECtHR found that the Polish State had failed 
to provide satisfactory justifications as to the extensive and continuous failure to 
implement the compensatory payments to the applicant and other eligible claimants. 
By the time of the hearing of the case, the applicant had received approximately 2% 
of the compensation’s value. Hence, as the relation between the value of the property 
taken and the compensation paid was manifestly disproportionate, the Court found a 
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 
 The same result was also reached in the case of Maria Atanasiu and Others v. 
Romania,530 that related to the issue of restitution or compensation in respect of 
properties nationalised or confiscated by the Romanian State following the 
establishment of the communist regime in Romania in 1947. ECtHR found that the 
fact that the applicants had obtained no compensation for the nationalization of their 
property and it was uncertain when they might receive same, placed a 
disproportionate burden on them, in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 
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Similarly, in the case of Yuriy Lobanov v. Russia involving depreciated bond 
values impairing full bond redemption, ECtHR found that, while the interference was 
lawful and was conducted pursuant to a legitimate aim, a fair balance was not struck 
between the interests of the bondholders and those of the state. 531 The claim in 
question related to the action taken by the government of the Russian Federation to 
suspend payments under the 1982 state premium bonds.532 The claim was brought 
after the federation enacted a series of legislative and regulatory Acts,533 which 
provided for the conversion of Soviet securities, including 1982 state premium bonds, 
into special Russian promissory notes. Despite, however, the enactment of the said 
legislation already from several years, by the hearing of the case the framework had 
not still been established to enable the conversion.534 ECtHR once again found that, 
although the radical reform of Russia's political and economic system, as well as the 
state of the troubled Russian economy at the time, may have justified stringent 
financial limitations on rights of a purely pecuniary nature, nonetheless it found that 
that the Russian Government had failed to adduce satisfactory justifications for non-
implementing the conversion and thus not allowing applicants to get compensation.535  
This was also the finding of the ECtHR in Malysh and Others v. Russia,536 that related 
to the absence of implementing regulations for redemption of a different type of 
Russian bonds, namely Urozhay-90, as well as in the case of  Tronin v. Russia537 and 
SPK Dimskiy v. Russia538, that were also founded on the same facts.  
As evident from the above cases, although ECtHR acknowledged the radical 
political and economic situations in the relevant states, nonetheless to examine if a 
fair balance was struck, the ECtHR considered if the applicants had received 
compensation and if the latter was satisfactory (although it was recognized that such 
compensation need not correspond to full market price). If no compensation was paid, 
the ECtHR examined whether the State had produced justifying grounds for the non-
payment of satisfactory compensation. This is an important distinction between 
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human rights law and investment law, as in the latter the measure of compensation is 
not taken into account to establish if an expropriation has taken place, but, instead 
once an expropriation has been found, the payment of compensation determines if the 
expropriation is legal.539  
 In the case of Mamatas v. Greece however, ECtHR did not follow those steps. 
Instead, ECtHR stated that bondholders could not rely on the previous caselaw and 
claim they received no or only nominal compensation, as one need not take into 
account the repayment value of the bonds at maturity, but the market value of the 
bonds at the time of the bond exchange, when already their market value was very 
low. To support this, ECtHR referred to the inherent risky nature of the bond market, 
due to the relatively long maturity date that may be affected by unpredictable events 
that can have a bearing on the State’s creditworthiness. In fact, ECtHR referred to the 
case of the European Court of Justice, Accorinti v. ECB,540only to denote that 
bondholders were aware of the increased risks associated with GGBs during the 
financial crisis.  
This is not surprising, if one takes into account ECtHR’s caselaw throughout 
the financial crisis in the EU. As indicated in the second Article, ECtHR had taken an 
approach similar to that in Mamatas case, in the case of Dennis Grainger and others v. 
UK.541 In such case, ECtHR took note that the two largest claimants were hedge funds 
incorporated in the Cayman Islands, that had bought their shares when the financial 
difficulties of Northern Rock were widely apparent. In this regard, ECtHR had 
resolved that the decision taken in the legislation that the former shareholders of 
Northern Rock should not be entitled to take the value which had been created by the 
Bank of England’s loan was justified as “had the Northern Rock shareholders been 
permitted to benefit from the value which had been created and maintained only 
through the provision of State support, this would encourage the managers and 
                                                          
539 Moshe Hirsch, Investment Tribunals and Human Rights: Divergent Paths, HUM. RTS. IN INT’L INV. L. 
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shareholders of other banks to seek and rely on similar  support, to the detriment of 
the United Kingdom economy”.542 
 However, in the Mamatas case ECtHR does not specify why the repayment 
value of the bonds should not be taken into account, when bondholders’ legitimate 
expectations related to that repayment price upon maturity. Similarly, it is unclear 
why in the previous caselaw related to bonds’ depreciation, this factor was not taken 
into account. It is the authors’ view that this is a normative determination. To support, 
such determination, the ECtHR denoted that Greece was in the brick of insolvency, 
implying the measures were taken due to economic necessity.543 Thus, unlike 
previous cases, where the ECtHR did take into account the radical financial 
conditions, only to grant wide margin of appreciation to the state authorities, noting at 
the same time that the state authorities must provide solid justifications for any 
interference with property rights, in the case of Mamatas v. Greece, ECtHR viewed 
the financial crisis as justification. 
Of course, one should take in to account, that the aforementioned cases against 
Russia (Lobanov, Maylysh, Tronin etc), were however characteristically different 
because the claims in question were brought several years after the events of radical 
political and economic transform. Clearly, the financial situation of the Russian 
Federation in 2000 was substantially different than the financial situation of Greece in 
2012, when Greece was on the verge of disorderly insolvency and the measure of a 
bond exchange to reduce Greece’s debt at that period of imminent insolvency can be 
more easily justified.  Hence, the ECtHR’s judgment in Mamatas would probably 
have been the same if the court had applied the aforementioned test. 
Lastly, it is interesting to compare the Mamatas judgment with other cases 
decided by the ECtHR pertaining to the financial crisis. The case of Koufaki and 
Adedy v. Greece544 is indicative in this instance. Although, the facts of that case were 
different relating to austerity measures adopted by the Greek Government including 
cuts in pensions and public servants’ salaries, what is important is to review ECtHR’s 
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stance over the financial crisis in the EU.  ECtHR noted that measures taken in this 
context will commonly involve considerations of political, economic and social 
issues. Thus, State authorities enjoy a “wide margin of appreciation” in such matters. 
Invoking the principle of subsidiarity, the ECtHR self-limited its powers stipulating 
that it is not its role to make economic policy and it will, thus, not interfere with or 
second-guess the State’s decisions, unless these are arbitrary or unreasonable.545 This 
decision has been cited several times in other cases relating to austerity measures with 
the EU,546 and it is the author’s view that it is indicative of the ECtHR’s treatment of 
all cases relating to the financial crisis in the EU. This is rather disappointing, if one 
takes into account that in times of “exceptional crisis without precedent”547, the 
interferences with property rights are more common and more extreme and wide-scale 
and it would be in such cases where ECtHR’s role would be more integral.  
VI. Non-Discriminatory Treatment - Investment Law 
In sovereign debt restructuring, a differentiated treatment of creditors of the 
same class may be necessary to achieve an optimum result during reorganization. As 
such, when examining cases involving breach of the treaty standard for non-
discriminatory treatment, investment tribunals often find that difference in treatment 
is not discrimination.548 This is so only if the discrimination is not justified by a 
rational policy.549 Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. Ecuador 
(Occidental) provides an illustration of the process followed by investment tribunals. 
There, Ecuador was held by the tribunal to have breached a National Treatment clause 
because the claimant oil company was denied the refund for value‐added tax, which 
domestic seafood and flower producers were receiving.550 In reaching its conclusion, 
the tribunal held that because each company was an exporter, they were 
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comparable.551 The second step was to determine how the subjects had been treated 
comparatively.552 If there was a divergence in treatment, the tribunal would then 
decide whether the challenged governmental action could be justified or whether the 
governmental action had a reasonable connection with its rational policy.553  
VI.(A). Right of Equality - Human Rights Law 
Discrimination between equally ranked creditors can also be highly 
contentious from a human rights perspective. The applicants in Mamatas v. Greece 
also invoked Article 14 of the ECHR (Article 14).554 Article 14 imposes a positive 
duty on the state when it discriminates on grounds set forth by the ECHR or on “other 
status” unless the discrimination can be justified.555 Discrimination exists when 
persons in relatively comparable situations are treated differently, or where 
individuals in incomparable situations are treated alike.556 Indeed, in the leading case 
Thlimenos v. Greece,557 ECtHR recognized indirect discrimination and inflicted a 
positive duty upon States to accommodate different situations. Such duty is breached, 
when alike treatment on persons in non-comparable situations leads to discrimination. 
Protection under Article 14 cannot be raised on its own, but only within the 
ambit of the rights and freedoms protected by the ECHR.558 That being said, the 
ECtHR has been willing to extend the reach of Article 14 and has noted that Article 
14 is an “autonomous” provision which can be violated even where the substantive 
article relied upon to invoke Article 14 has not been violated.559  
                                                          
551 Id. 
552 Id. 
553 Marc Jacob, International Investment Agreements and Human Rights, INEF Research Paper Series 
on Human Rights - Corporate Responsibility and Sustainable Development (Mar. 2010) 
http://humanrights-business.org/files/international_investment_agreements_and_human_rights.pdf.  
554 Rory O'Connell, Cinderella Comes to the Ball: Art 14 and the Right to Non-Discrimination in the 
ECHR, 29 LEGAL STUD. 211 (2009).  
555 Id. 
556 See Adami v. Malta, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (2006); Coster v. United Kingdom, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20 (2001) 
(“The right under Article 14 not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed 
under the Convention is violated when States without an objective and reasonable justification fail to 
treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different.”). Id. 
557 Thlimmenos v Greece, Eur. CT. H.R (2000) 
558 See Janneke Gerards, The Discrimination Grounds of Article 14 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 99 (2013). 
559 See O’Connell, supra note 555; see also Belgian Linguistic case (No. 2) (1968)1 EHRR 252, Eur. Ct. 
H.R  
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Evaluating an Article 14 claim is particularly difficult, as illustrated in 
Stübing,560 and they are judged on a case-by-case basis. For a violation of Article 14 
to exist, the key element is that of a difference in treatment of persons in analogous or 
relevantly similar situations or similar treatment of persons in non-comparable 
situations.561 It must be shown that the treatment in question was less favorable than 
that received by other groups in “analogous situations,” the identity of which will 
usually be determined objectively on the face of the complaint itself.562 However, not 
every different treatment will be discriminatory.563 Indeed, the State bears the burden 
to demonstrate that its practice was reasonable and rational in light of its policy 
goals.564 The state also bears the burden of proving that the treatment was 
proportionate regarding the pursuit of the policy objective by striking “a fair balance 
between the protection of the interests of the community and respect for the rights and 
freedoms safeguarded by the Convention.”565  
Accordingly, as private investors were obliged to accept the PSI (as opposed 
to certain public investors who were excluded from CACs and whose rights remained 
untouched), Article 14 may be applicable to investors in analogous situations who 
were treated unequally or to investors in dissimilar situations who were treated alike. 
The list of grounds for discrimination enumerated in Article 14 is more inclusive than 
it is exclusive. Article 14 has been successfully invoked in cases based on sexual 
orientation566 and wedlock.567 The ECtHR proclaimed in Rasmussen v. Denmark, 
“[t]here is no call to determine on what ground this difference was based, the list of 
grounds appearing in Article 14 not being exhaustive,”568 therefore, any 
differentiation may fall under Article 14 ECHR, despite not being listed in the 
Article.569 
                                                          
560 See, e.g., Stübing v. Germany, App. No. 43547/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012).  
561 See Gerards, supra note 558. 
562 Abdulaziz v. the United Kingdom, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 471 (1985). 
563 See Belgian Linguistic Case, supra note 559 (stating in the case that the “difference and 
discrimination are two distinct notions and a difference in treatment is not necessarily discriminatory, 
provided a reasonable and objective basis can be found.”). Id. 
564 See Abdulaziz, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 471, at ¶¶ 74–83.  
565 Id. at ¶¶ 83–86. 
566 See, e.g., Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, App. No. 33290/96, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at § 11, 28. 
567 See, e.g., Marckx v. Belgium, (No. 31), Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979); Inze v. Austria, (No. 126), Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) at § 41 (1987); Eur. Ct. H.R. (sec. 3). 
568 Rasmussen v. Denmark, App. No. 8777/79, 87 Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1984). 
569 Rasmussen v. Denmark, App. No. 8777/79, 87 Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1984 
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6(A)(1). The Right of Property in Conjunction with the Right of Equality in the 
Context of the Greek Haircut 
We now turn to examine the application of the right of equality in the context 
of the Greek Default. To this end, we shall first examine the ruling of the ECtHR in 
Mamatas. 
 
6(A)(1a). The ECtHR’s Reasoning in Mamatas with Respect to Article 14 
In Mamatas, the applicants contended that the same treatment toward 
individual investors and professional investors breached Article 14 as they were not in 
analogous circumstances, given individual investors’ lack of detailed professional 
insights.570 The ECtHR noted that, in light of the high volatility of the bond market, it 
was very difficult to differentiate between the various investors and to examine each 
investor separately.571 This would require significant time, which was not available to 
Greece at the time, because of the country’s urgent financial needs.572 Secondly, the 
ECtHR noted that laying down criteria to differentiate between bond holders would be 
problematic in light of the “pari passu” principle entailed in GGBs and accepted by all 
investors contractually.573 This principle requires equal treatment between investors 
and would, therefore preclude investors from being treated differently.574 Lastly, the 
ECtHR noted that distinguishing between investors would have also been practically 
difficult, given the volatility of investors.575 The ECtHR also considered that any 
exemption of specific categories of bond holders from the PSI would have devastating 
consequences for the Greek economy and the PSI itself, and might have even led to 
                                                          
570 Mamatas and Others v. Greece, App. No. 63066/14, 64297/14 and 66106/14, Eur. Ct. H.R (2016) at 
§ 124 
571 Mamatas and Others v. Greece, App. No. 63066/14, 64297/14 and 66106/14, Eur. Ct. H.R (2016) at 
§ 130 
572 Mamatas and Others v. Greece, App. No. 63066/14, 64297/14 and 66106/14, Eur. Ct. H.R (2016) at 
§ 137 
573 Mamatas and Others v. Greece, App. No. 63066/14, 64297/14 and 66106/14, Eur. Ct. H.R (2016) at 
§ 134 
574 Mamatas and Others v. Greece, App. No. 63066/14, 64297/14 and 66106/14, Eur. Ct. H.R (2016) at 
§ 130 
575 Mamatas and Others v. Greece, App. No. 63066/14, 64297/14 and 66106/14, Eur. Ct. H.R (2016) at 
§ 137 
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Greece’s bankruptcy.576 Consequently, the ECtHR found that there had been no 
violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 1.577 
The above one-size-fits-all approach adopted by the ECtHR has two main 
shortcomings. Primarily, the ECtHR did not consider the differences between 
investors.578 Indeed, the haircut sustained by investors was largely diversified as the 
bonds differed greatly in the maturity and yield.579 According to Jeromin 
Zettelmeyer,580 the Greek Haircut contained the greatest variation between investor 
losses of all haircuts, with some investors holding bonds with extremely long maturity 
dates (e.g. in 2057) who sustained a haircut close to zero, or even negative.581 Given 
the radical difference in the level of interference to their property, investors subject to 
the Greek Haircut were not in analogous situations. 
Additionally, the ECtHR referred to the fact that several investors acted in a 
reckless, speculative fashion by purchasing their bonds at a significant discount when 
Greece was already facing financial distress.582 Nonetheless, it did not take this into 
account when determining whether to differentiate between investors.583 Previous 
case law of the ECtHR took into account investors’ speculative nature of an 
investment.584 In De Dreux-Breze v. France, for example, the court stated that the 
investor bought the bonds randomly without considering the profits and risks.585 
ECtHR’s omission to take into account is of particular importance, as speculators are 
protected under the ECHR and therefore extending non-protection even to investors 
that invested prudently and had legitimate expectations to receive payment is a breach 
of the obligation not to treat persons in non-comparable situations alike. 
                                                          
576 Mamatas and Others v. Greece, App. No. 63066/14, 64297/14 and 66106/14, Eur. Ct. H.R (2016) at 
§ 138 
577 Mamatas and Others v. Greece, App. No. 63066/14, 64297/14 and 66106/14, Eur. Ct. H.R (2016) at 
§ 142 
578 See Mamatas and Others v. Greece, App. No. 63066/14, 64297/14 and 66106/14, Eur. Ct. H.R 
(2016) at § 137 
579 Christoph Trebesch et al., The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy, 28 ECON. POL’Y. 16 (2013). 
580 Christoph Trebesch et al., The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy, 28 ECON. POL’Y. 16 (2013).  
581 Christoph Trebesch et al., The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy, 28 ECON. POL’Y. 16 (2013). 
582 Mamatas and Others v. Greece, App. No. 63066/14, 64297/14 and 66106/14, Eur. Ct. H.R (2016) at 
§ 118 
583 Mamatas and Others v. Greece, App. No. 63066/14, 64297/14 and 66106/14, Eur. Ct. H.R (2016) at 
§ 130-142 
584 See Maya Sigron, Legitimate Expectations Under Article 1 Of Protocol No. 1 To The European 
Convention On Human Rights (Intersentia 2014). 
585 De Dreux-Breze v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 9. 
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The Mamatas court should have taken into account the above elements in 
determining whether investors with such different backgrounds and losses should be 
treated alike. It should be noted that Mamatas has not been appealed, and therefore 
the Grant Chamber will not have the opportunity to correct these shortcomings. 
 
6(A)(1b). Different Treatment of Private and Institutional Investors 
The context of this discussion spurs an examination of the issue of whether 
official creditors, such as the European Central Bank (ECB), the largest holder of 
GGBs, and private investors are in “analogous situations” and should, therefore, have 
been treated alike under Article 14. For there to be direct discrimination, there must 
be a “difference in the treatment of persons in analogous, or relevantly similar 
situations,” which is “based on an identifiable characteristic.”586 Although this 
argument was not raised in the Mamatas case, nonetheless it was raised by 
bondholders in a recent case before the Human Rights Committee of the UN, namely 
case S.A. et Al. v. Greece, which however was held inadmissible for non-exhaustion 
of domestic remedies. 
In the Greek Haircut, only private investors were affected, as opposed to 
certain public investors holding GGBs who were not included in the PSI.587 In 
particular, the ECB announced, on February 17, 2012, a swap of its GGBs for new 
bonds exempted from the collective action clauses (which essentially meant that ECB 
was senior to private-sector bondholders).588 In the context of Article 14, reference to 
the announcement of the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program is 
illuminating. It expressly stipulates that: 
 [t]he Eurosystem intends to clarify in the legal act concerning Outright 
Monetary Transactions that it accepts the same (pari passu) treatment as private or 
other creditors with respect to bonds issued by [E]uro area countries, and purchased 
                                                          
586 Carson v. United Kingdom (2010), Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 61. See also D.H. v. the Czech Republic (2007), 
Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 175; Burden v. The United Kingdom (2008) Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 60. 
587 'Asmussen: ECB Not Part Of Greek PSI Debt Deal' (U.K., 2012) 
<https://uk.reuters.com/article/eurozone-greece-ecb/asmussen-ecb-not-part-of-greek-psi-debt-deal-
idUKB4E7HT01S20120127> accessed 2 December 2017. 
588 Patrick R. Wautelet, The Greek Debt Restructuring And Property Rights. A Greek Tragedy For 
Investors?, SSRN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL (2014). 
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by the Eurosystem through Outright Monetary Transactions, in accordance with the 
terms of such bonds.589  
Thus, when the ECB obtained GGBs, it perceived itself, and was perceived as, 
an equal-ranking creditor with other private GGBs holders with the same rights and 
obligations as private investors.590 One must, therefore, examine if the difference in 
treatment is discriminatory, i.e. if it “has no objective and reasonable justification” 
and is without a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means 
employed and the aim sought to be reali[z]ed.”591 “States enjoy a certain margin of 
appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar 
situations justify a different treatment.”592 The margin varies according to the 
circumstances, subject matter, and background of each case.593 However, it is 
generally acknowledged that, due to the state’s direct knowledge of society and its 
needs, the state is well positioned to define the exact nature of a legitimate aim in 
matters of economic or social strategy.594  
Thus, to comply with Article 14, Greece would have to demonstrate legitimate 
reasons to treat the ECB differently and that such special treatment was proportionate 
to the policy goal sought to be realized. It is difficult to foresee what such reasons 
would be, but one may refer to the statement made by the ECB’s President regarding 
the participation of the ECB in Greek debt restructuring. He stated that “any voluntary 
restructuring of our [the ECB’s] holdings would be monetary financing” and would, 
therefore, interfere with the ECB’s independence and impartiality.595 Such 
restructuring would de facto constitute financing of an EU Member State’s 
government.596  
                                                          
589 European Central Bank, Technical Features of Outright Monetary Transactions (2012) 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html (last visited Mar. 19, 
2017). 
590 See id.  
591 See Marckx v. Belgium (1982) Eur. Comm’n. H.R., ¶ 33. 
592 Van Raalte v. Netherlands Eur. Ct. H.R. (1997) ¶ 39; Larkos v. Cyprus (1999) Eur. Ct. H.R.; see also 
Stec v. United Kingdom (2006) Eur. Ct. H.R..  
593 See Petrovic v. Austria (2001) 33 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 307. 
594 See Handyside v. The United Kingdom, (1976) Eur. Ct. H.R, ¶ 48-49. 
595 See European Central Bank, Introductory Statement to the Press Conference (With Q&A) (2012) 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2012/html/is121004.en.html. (last visited Mar. 19, 
2017). 
596 See id. 
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This argument was tested in Accorinti v. ECB by 200 Italian investors who 
claimed that the ECB received preferential treatment over all GGB holders.597 The 
General Court of the EU rejected the general principle of equal treatment that could 
apply between private investors and the ECB.598 The court held the two investor 
groups to be distinguishable (not in comparable situations), because the ECB was 
working in the public’s interest while private investors were in the pursuit of profit.599 
Accorinti was examined by the General Court of the EU based on liability of EU 
institutions, so the findings of the ECtHR may not match the Greek Haircut.600 To 
date, this issue has not been examined by the ECtHR.  
VII. The Right of Due Process - Article 6 and Article 13 
ECHR 
The investors in Mamatas could have raised additional arguments, which are 
addressed herein. In the context of sovereign default and debt restructuring, it is often 
the case that due process is not followed. In this context, due process relates to the 
investors’ legitimate expectations, which dictate that properly established and 
sanctioned rules and procedures must be followed prior to interference with investors’ 
rights.601 Due process includes the right to a fair trial as well as the right to an 
adequate remedy, as these rights are intimately related.602 Those rights are discussed 
here successively. 
VII.(A)(1). Fair Trial - Investment Tribunals 
The right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR is an essential component 
of investor rights, and has been analyzed by investment tribunals outside the ECHR 
framework. In Mondev v. United States, the tribunal considered the concept of a fair 
trial without making specific reference as to why the application of Article 6 was 
                                                          
597 2015 E.C.R. 756 (Ct. of First Instance). 
598 Id. 
599 Id. 
600 See id. 
601 See Giacinto Della Cananea, Due Process Of Law Beyond The State (Oxford University Press 2016). 
602 The Right to Due Process, ICELANDIC HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE, http://www.humanrights.is/en/human-
rights-education-project/human-rights-concepts-ideas-and-fora/substantive-human-rights/the-right-
to-due-process (last visited July 11, 2017). 
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necessary.603 This prompts a discussion of how Article 6 is relevant to investors in 
cases of sovereign default, and specifically in the case of the Greek Default.604  
VII.(A)(2). Review of Article 6 of ECHR 
Primarily, it should be noted that Article 6 of the ECHR applies to both 
physical persons as well as legal entities605 and establishes a legal framework of 
procedural safeguards during the judicial process.606 Article 6 refers only to the 
judicial process relating to “civil rights and obligations” as well as criminal cases.607 
In relation to what constitutes “civil rights” in the context of this Article, it will 
suffice to say that according to the ECHR, civil rights are defined as proceedings 
which, in domestic law, come under “public law,” and whose result is decisive for 
private rights and obligations.608 Hence, given the nature of GGBs as a form of loan 
agreements, the unilateral amendment of the terms of such agreements through the 
introduction of CACs via Law 4050/2012 would affect investors’ “civil rights” for the 
purposes of Article 6(1).609 The European Court of Justice (“CJEU”) in Stefan 
Fahnenbrock v. Hellenische Republik examined a similar question—namely, whether 
the losses sustained by investors through the introduction of CACs in GGBs fall 
within the meaning of “civil or commercial matters” in Regulation No 1393/2007.610 
In Fahenenbrock, the CJEU noted that the Regulation was applicable because judicial 
proceedings brought by private persons holding state bonds against the issuing state 
for compensation for disturbance of ownership and property rights, contractual 
performance, and damages do not appear not to fall within the meaning of “civil or 
commercial matters” in Regulation No 1393/2007.611 
                                                          
603 Mondev International Ltd. v. United States (2002) ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2. 
604 See infra Part VII(A)(2). 
605 Marius Emberland, The Usefulness of Applying Human Rights Arguments in International 
Commercial  
Arbitration – A Comment on Arbitration and Human Rights by Alexander Jaksic, 20 J. OF INT. ARB. 355, 
361 (2003).  
606 Dr hab. Jacek Chlebny, 'Standards Of The Provisional Protection Against Expulsion' (Echr.coe.int, 
2013) <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20130611_Chlebny_ENG.pdf> accessed 2 
December 2017. 
607 See 'Guide On Article 6 Of The European Convention On Human Rights' (Echr.coe.int, 2017) 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_ENG.pdf> accessed 2 December 2017, p.6 
608 See Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, ECHR (Apr. 30, 2013), 
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_ENG.pdf. 
609  
610 Fahnenbrock v. Hellenische Republik [2015], 2014 E.C.R. 2424. 
611 Id. 
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One of the most fundamental principles and procedural safeguards contained 
in Article 6 is one’s right to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal in 
public within a reasonable amount of time before a litigant’s rights are jeopardized.612 
This principle has been broadly interpreted by ECtHR caselaw to include all stages of 
the judicial process from the pre-trial phase through the execution of judgment.613 
Indeed, as it was stated in Delcourt v. Belgium:614 “In a democratic society within the 
meaning of the Convention, the right to a fair administration of justice holds such a 
prominent place that a restrictive interpretation of Article 6(1) would not correspond 
to the aim and the purpose of that provision.”615  
Thus, the question arises whether the unilateral imposition of CACs just 
thirteen days before the close of offers for participation in the PSI raises the question 
if investors had the opportunity to be heard by an independent tribunal before their 
rights were jeopardized. The ECtHR examined a similar question in Adorisio v. the 
Netherlands.616 In Adorisio, bondholders complained they were denied the right to a 
fair trial when the Dutch government granted them only ten days to challenge the 
expropriation of assets investors held in SNS Reaal, a banking and insurance 
conglomerate.617 The ECtHR ruled that the investors’ case was inadmissible because 
the short window granted to investors to challenge the government’s expropriation 
measures did not place investors at an unfair disadvantage.618 The ECtHR noted that 
investors could still bring an effective appeal within such time window, which was 
justifiably short in light of the urgent need for the Dutch government to intervene in 
SNS Reaal to prevent serious harm to the national economy.619  
In light of the above, judgment investors’ claim of an Article 6 breach due to 
the introduction of CACs is unlikely to succeed given that the introduction of CACs 
did not change the payment terms of the GGBs and investors had the opportunity both 
to appeal and to participate voluntarily at the PSI.  
                                                          
612 See Article 6: The Right To a Fair Trial - Equality and Human Rights, EQUALITY AND HUM. RTS. 
COMMISSION (Aug. 9, 2014) https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/strategic_plan_-
_web_accessible.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2017). 
613 F. Kuitenbrouwer, Eerlijkheid alleen in toga?, DD 334–36 (1972); E.A. Alkema, Telt de 'voorfase' 
mee voor de redelijke termijn?, NJB, 604 (1994). 
614 Delcourt v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 355 (1979-1980). 
615 Id. at ¶ 25.  
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VIII. Human Rights Arguments to Defend Investors’ 
Claims  
As discussed above, human rights laws can be used in defense of investors’ 
rights in a case of sovereign default; however, human rights laws also impose 
obligations on states that may very well require them to take actions which infringe on 
investors’ rights.620 In such cases, the state maintains conflicting obligations under 
international law: 1) its human rights obligations on the one hand, whether derived 
from treaties or customary international law, and 2) its BIT obligations on the other 
hand.  
Indicatively, in Suez v. Argentina,621 Argentina invoked the public’s access to 
water against the investors’ wish to modify tariff rates under the economic 
equilibrium clause in a concession agreement.622 Argentina argued that imposing a 
price freeze on the water was legitimate, and in fact necessary, because of the basic 
human rights obligations imposed on Argentina under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (and General Comment 15 thereto), the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women.623 Thus, possible breach was justified on 
the grounds of necessity.624 The tribunal recognized that the circumstances of the 
dispute, namely Argentina’s default, were likely to “raise a variety of complex public 
and international law questions, including human rights considerations.”625  
But it also stated that Argentina could use other means to protect the people’s 
right to water without infringing on investors’ rights. Indeed, the tribunal noted: 
Argentina is subject to both international obligations i.e. human rights 
and treaty obligations [sic], and must equally respect both of them. 
Under the circumstances of these cases, Argentina's human rights 
obligations and its investment treaty obligations are not inconsistent, 
                                                          
620  





625 Suez v. Argentine Republic, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as 
amicus curiae, ¶ 19 (May 19, 2005), 21 ICSID Rev. – FILJ 351 (2006). 
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contradictory, or mutually exclusive. Thus, as discussed above, 
Argentina could have respected both types of obligations.626  
The same result was also reached by the tribunal in Impreglio v. Argentina,627 where, 
although the tribunal acknowledged the people’s right to water and the imminent peril 
posed to that right by the financial crisis, it noted that because Argentina had 
contributed to the financial crisis, it could not invoke the necessity defense.628 
Notably, the Suez and Impreglio have been criticized as falling short of 
addressing human rights considerations and protecting human rights.629 However, 
they are nonetheless indicators of how investment tribunals address human rights 
issues.630 The cases are important in the sense that they indirectly introduce a method 
of addressing human rights when they appear to conflict with investors’ rights, the 
proportionality analysis,631 a concept “borrowed” from human rights law. The 
analysis in question, although sometimes problematic because of the somewhat 
incomparable nature of conflicting rights, can be used to resolve conflicts between 
BIT standards and human rights obligations.632  
This proportionality analysis comprises three elements: first, the measure 
taken must have been suitable for the goals sought; second, the measure must have 
been necessary, in the sense that it was the least restrictive and burdensome to achieve 
                                                          
626 Suez v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Liability, ¶ 262 (July 30, 2010), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0826.pdf. 
627 Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17 (2011), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C109/DC2171_En.pdf. 
628 Id. 
629 See Edward Guntrip, International Human Rights Law, Investment Arbitration And Proportionality 
Analysis: Panacea Or Pandora’s Box? EJIL: Talk! (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/international-
human-rights-law-investment-arbitration-and-proportionality-analysis-panacea-or-pandoras-box/. 
630 See, e.g., Biloune v. Ghana, 95 I.L.R. 183, UNCITRAL (1989) (one of the few cases where the tribunal 
explicitly declined to deal with human rights issues); Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic 
of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award (2008) (Where although the tribunal did not award any 
compensation to the consortium on account of causation issues, it did rule that Tanzania was liable 
for breach of BIT). The conjoined cases, Border Timbers Ltd. v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/25, Award (2012), and Bernhard von Pezold v. Republic of Zimbabwe ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/15, Award (2012) (Where the tribunal noted that the proceedings may have a bearing upon 
the rights of the affected indigenous communities, but concluded that international human rights 
have no relevance to the dispute) (ECCHR 2012).  
631 See Stephen W. Schill, Cross-Regime Harmonization Through Proportionality Analysis: The Case Of 
International Investment Law, The Law Of State Immunity And Human Rights, 27 ICSID REV. 1, 87 
(2012).  
632 Benedict Kingsbury & Stephen W. Schill, Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with 
State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest – the Concept of Proportionality, INT’L. INV. L. AND COMP. 
PUB. L. (Stephen W. Schill ed., Oxford University Press 2010). 
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the targeted goals; third, the measure must have been stricto sensu proportional.633 
This structured approach allows tribunals to assess public and private interests, which 
may be simultaneously at issue. For investors, it may involve protecting themselves 
by constraining the state’s police powers as a justification for measures taken. For the 
state, it provides room to take measures in good faith with genuine and legitimate 
objectives.634  
For instance, in SD Myers, Inc. v. The Government of Canada,635 the tribunal 
was of the view that the concept of expropriation takes into account, among other 
factors, the impact of a regulation, its purpose, the legitimate investor expectations, 
the degree and intensity of interference, the importance of the interests at stake, and 
the even‐handedness exhibited in the application of state measures.636 It recognized 
that these elements need to be balanced and thus it implicitly assessed within the 
notion of proportionality.637 The first case where the structured proportionality 
analysis was used was Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. Mexico,638 where the 
tribunal noted that to establish whether the measure in question constituted an 
expropriation, the proportionality of the measure vis a vis public interest should be 
taken into account.639  
Although Tecnicas was the only case where the proportionality test was 
directly invoked, other tribunals have decided investor disputes mainly based on the 
above principle, thus allowing states to invoke human rights considerations to 
demonstrate that a state act was legitimate and fair. Continental Casualty v. 
Argentina640 was such a case. Continental Casualty involved a claim for expropriation 
due to emergency measures taken by the Argentinean government during the 2001 
financial crisis.641 The Continental Casualty tribunal did not explicitly refer to the 
                                                          
633 For further analysis, see ROBERT ALEXY, THEORIE DER GRUNDRECHTE (Suhrkamp, 5.A. ed. 1995).  
634 Jasper Krommendijk & John Morijn, ‘Proportional’ by What Measure(s)? Balancing Investor 
Interests and Human Rights by Way of Applying the Proportionality Principle in Investor-State 
Arbitration (Sept. 30, 2009). HUM. RTS. IN INT’L INV. L. AND ARB. 421–55 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 
Oxford University Press 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2333550. 
635 SD Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada (Myers), Partial Award, 13 November 2000, 40 ILM 1408, 
¶¶ 282–83, (2001).  
636 Id. 
637 Id. 
638 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. Mexico, 638, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2 (2004), 
Award, ¶ 122 (2003). 
639 Id. 
640 Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, (2008). 
641 Id. 
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concept of proportionality.642 Instead, it followed a similarly structured balancing 
approach and concluded that the measures in question were proportionate as they 
“were in part inevitable, or unavoidable, in part indispensable and in any case material 
or decisive in order to react positively to the crisis’ and hence there undoubtedly 
existed ‘a genuine relationship of end and means in this regard.’”643  
As such, in the case of Greece, the government could invoke human rights as a 
defense to the possible breach of BITs. However, it is difficult to predict the result, as 
the majority of tribunals have not favored the use of human rights to escape liability 
for breach of the BIT.644 Nonetheless, Continental Casualty is an example of how 
measures to protect human rights can be successfully used as a defense for possible 
BIT breaches when such actions meet the proportionality test.645  
In the absence of explicit human rights provisions in a BIT, a direct invocation 
of international human rights appears problematic. However, such invocation has 
been made through choice of law provisions. For instance, Article 40 of the Canadian 
Model BIT provides that tribunals shall decide matters “in accordance with this 
agreement and the applicable rules of international law.”646 It bears noting that most 
BITs concluded by Greece refer disputes with investors to the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),647 whose rules, Article 42(1) in particular, 
proclaim that, besides the law of the contracting state party to the dispute, “such rules 
of international law as may be applicable” shall govern the dispute.648 
With the exception of only three Greek BITs (with Germany, Zaire, and 
Morocco), all BITs concluded by Greece provide for the application of obligations 
under international law existing at present or established between the contracting 
                                                          
642 Id. 
643 Id. at ¶¶ 197, 232. 
644 See MAKING SOVEREIGN FINANCING AND HUMAN RIGHTS WORK 90 (Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky and Jernej 
Letnar Cernic eds., 2014). 
645 Cont’l Cas. Co., supra note 640. 
646 Canadian 2004 Model BIT art. 40 (2004). 
647 See Nicholas Moussas & Stratos Voulgaridis, Greece Investment Treaty Report, (2013), 
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/jurisdiction/1004661/greece. However, there are certain BITs 
concluded by Greece that provide for: a) an ad hoc tribunal constituted in accordance with the 
arbitration rules of UNCITRAL, (e.g., BITs with Argentina, Croatia, Russia, Latvia, Serbia, etc., where 
international law is taken into account), b) the Arbitration Institute of the Arbitral Tribunal of the 
Chamber of Commerce in Stockholm (Hungary, where international law is taken into account on 
account of the BIT), c) the Arbitral Tribunal of the ICC in Paris (Hungary and Turkey where again 
international law is only taken into account if agreed by the contracting States) or d) the ICSID 
Additional Facility. 
648 Jacob, supra note 382, at 27. 
136 | P a g e  
 
parties.649 This is not the only available mechanism by which human rights can be 
invoked in an investor-state dispute. Provided the above procedural requirement is 
met, tribunals have, on their own initiative, referred to case law relied upon within the 
jurisprudence of human rights courts, such as the ECtHR in determining whether the 
rights of an investor have been breached.650 For instance, in Tecnicas, the tribunal 
referred to ECtHR case law in assessing whether an expropriation took place.651 
Similarly, the UNCITRAL tribunal in Lauder v. Czech Republic noted that “[BITs] 
generally do not define the term of expropriation and nationalization, or any of the 
other terms denoting similar measures of forced dispossession (‘dispossession’, 
‘taking’, ‘deprivation’, or ‘privation’).”652 On the other hand, in his separate opinion 
in Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Thomas Wälde noted 
that the ECtHR creates “the judicial practice, most comparable to treaty-based 
investor-state arbitration.”653 
As such, the human rights of a larger population can be used as a defense 
against individual human rights cases brought by investors against the state within the 
context of public interests.654 In De Dreux-Brézé v. France, a case involving debt 
restructuring between France and Russia for a debt incurred by the Tsarist regime, the 
ECtHR emphasized that Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol did not give a right 
to full repayment.655 It further stated that the public interest might require a reduction 
of the repayments or even their complete suspension, noting that Russia was under an 
obligation to fulfil its citizens’ economic and social rights.656 What is more, in the 
case of Malysh v. Russia, the ECtHR for the first time moved ahead to recognize 
“people’s rights” as a legitimate defense for a potential breach of investors rights, 
                                                          
649 Moussas, supra note 647. 
650 Eric De Brabandere, “Human Rights Considerations in International Investment Arbitration” in M 
Fitzmaurice and Panos Merkouris, The Interpretation And Application Of The European Convention Of 
Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013), p. 7-8 
651 Tecnicas, supra note 638. 
652 Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, 2001 WL 34786000, ¶ 200 (UNCITRAL Final Award Sept. 3, 
2001). 
653 Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 2006 WL 247692, ¶ 141 
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654 See Tamar Meshel, 'Human Rights In Investor-State Arbitration: The Human Right To Water And 
Beyond' (2015) 6 Journal of International Dispute Settlement. 
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ruling that it was legitimate to temporarily put off debt repayment for the purpose of 
paying urgent expenditures to address social issues.657  
These cases are of particular importance to the case of Greece, as the 
alternative to the Haircut was the disorderly default of Greece, which could severely 
threaten several economic and social rights of the public.  
IX. Conclusion 
Sovereign defaults can have significant implications on investors’ rights. The 
lack of an international mandatory legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring 
has demonstrated that investors are often left without effective remedy when their 
rights are prejudiced. To this end, human rights law can provide additional tools for 
the protection of investors, to the extent that human rights norms are uniformly 
applied.  
The ECtHR recently dealt with investors’ rights in the case of a sovereign 
default in Mamatas which revolved around the Greek Haircut. Although the ECtHR’s 
judgment in Mamatas has several deficiencies, it nonetheless demonstrated the 
applicability of human rights norms in investors disputes. This article reviewed the 
arguments made by the Mamatas investors, and explored additional human rights 
considerations that may be invoked by investors in similar occasions. Such notions 
are also taken into account by investment tribunals, and to this end, the study of 
human rights implications in cases of sovereign defaults is important for investors, not 
only in the context of cases before human rights courts, but also to support cases 
before investment tribunals. 
 In this context, human rights law can be invoked both to support the claim of 
an investor asserting that the restructuring violated his human rights, or to bolster the 
state’s position as a defense to any possible breach of protection owed to the investors 
that could have an adverse effect upon human rights in that country. In this context, it 
is evident that human rights and investment law are not mutually exclusive, but 
instead they can be viewed and addressed concurrently to establish a more secure and 
balanced environment for investments and to provide guidelines for the fair treatment 
of investors in cases of sovereign default. 
 
                                                          
657 See Malysh v. Russia, App. No. 30280/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010). 
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I. ABSTRACT 
The Greek Debt Restructuring of 2012 has had a significant impact on 
bondholders that have sustained onerous losses. Despite, however, having resorted to 
the justice system to find reparation for such losses, to date, neither the European 
Court of Human Rights nor the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) have awarded investors the desired compensation. This Article 
explores the reasons that led to the failure of bondholders’ cases against Greece and 
explores whether there is room for a different result for bondholders before 
investment tribunals. This Article evaluates and analyses the possible outcome of 
bondholders’ claims under investment treaty law for breach of standards of treatment 
(including Most Favored Nation, Fair and Equitable Treatment, Expropriation and 
Umbrella Clauses) and investigates potential defenses that could be raised by Greece 
to such claims. Lastly, this Article suggests alternative ways bondholders may obtain 
reparation, including Credit Default Swaps.  
II. INTRODUCTION 
Greece has been facing financial difficulties for the greater part of its latest 
history.658 Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the Greek economy was not 
prepared to face the great financial crisis of 2009. Spending more than it could afford, 
                                                          
658 See Carmen M. Reinhart, Christoph Trebesch, The Pitfalls of External Dependence: Greece, 1829-
2015, NBER Working Paper No. 21664 (2015), where it is stipulated that “Since its independence in 
1829, the Greek government has defaulted four times on its external creditors, and it was bailed out 
in each crisis” p.1 
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it quickly faced growing budgetary deficits that led a sky-rocketing public debt.659 
Hence, in 2012, Greece shocked the global financial markets by announcing the 
largest sovereign bond haircut in history.660 The term “haircut” refers to the 
restructuring of the terms of sovereign debt instruments, by way that there is a 
reduction in the recovery value of such instruments.661 To date, there have been two 
cases brought by investors against Greece for the events of the Greek Haircut of 2012 
and, in particular, for the forcible introduction of collective action clauses (CACs) 
through the Greek Bondholder Law, No. 4050/2012. Both cases are founded on the 
similar facts. 
Claimants, in both cases, were holders of Greek sovereign bonds which, at the 
time of purchase, did not include CACs. Instead, the Greek State unilaterally 
introduced CACs, through Law 4050/2012, just a few days before the “haircut” of the 
bonds’ value.662 As per the CACs, a restructuring of the bonds could be approved by a 
qualified majority of more than 66.7% of the bondholders.663 In both cases, the 
claimants did not approve the restructuring of their bonds but were nonetheless bound 
by the restructure due to collective action clauses. Indeed, as the participation of 
bondholders in the bond exchange reached 152 billion Euros’ worth of sovereign 
bonds governed by Greek law out of the approximately 177 billion Euros,664 this 
percentage (85.9%) allowed Greece to trigger the collective action clauses and compel 
all holders of sovereign bonds governed by Greek law to consent to the terms of the 
bond exchange.665 As a result, in both cases, the claimants’ bonds were exchanged for 
new bonds of a lesser face value equal to only 31.5% of the principal amount of the 
face amount of the old bonds.666  
However, the two cases were filed and heard by two different judicial bodies and 
on different legal bases. In particular, the first case, Mamatas and Others v. Greece, 
                                                          
659 R. M. Nelson, P. Belkin, D. E. Mix, Greece’s Debt Crisis: Overview, Policy Responses, and 
Implications, CRS Report for Congress (2011) 
660 Miranda Xafa, Lessons from the 2012 Greek debt restructuring (2014) available at 
http://voxeu.org/article/greek-debt-restructuring-lessons-learned 
661 Federico Sturzenegger, Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Debt Defaults and Lessons from a Decade of Crises, 
(MIT Press, 2006) p. 324 
662 Arturo C. Porzecanski, 'Behind The Greek Default And Restructuring Of 2012', Sovereign Debt and 
Debt Restructuring (Globe Business Publishing, 2013). 
663Based on a quorum of votes representing at least 50 per cent of bond’s face value and a consent 
threshold of two-thirds of the face-value holders taking part in the vote, see Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 
Christoph Trebesch and Mitu Gulati, 'The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy' (2013) 28 Economic 
Policy.p.11. 
664Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Finance Press Release, (March 09, 2012), available at 
http://av.r.ftdata.co.uk/files/2012/03/9-MARCH-2012.pdf. 
665 Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch and Mitu Gulati, 'The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy' 
(2013) 28 Economic Policy.p.11. 
666 Bank of Greece, Report on the Recapitalisation and Restructuring of the Greek Banking Sector, 
December 2012, at 
http://www.bankofgreece.gr/BogEkdoseis/Report_on_the_recapitalisation_and_restructuring.pdf. 
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was filed before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) by 6,320 Greek 
investors claiming that the above introduction of CACs and subsequent haircut of 
their bonds constituted a violation of their human rights.667 The second case, 
POŠTOVÁ BANKA, A.S. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. the Hellenic Republic, was filed 
before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) on the 
grounds that the unilateral introduction of CACs and subsequent haircut constituted a 
breach of a standard of protection awarded by the Bilateral Investment Treaty 
between Greece and Slovakia, and Greece and Cyprus.668 
Despite appealing to two different judiciary bodies under different legal 
frameworks, in both cases, the judgment issued was in favor of Greece, leaving both 
group of investors in a worse position than before. This brought up the question: what 
is the optimum venue and framework for distressed investors to bring sovereign 
default claims? This Article will examine the reasons that led to the dismissal of the 
investors’ claims while addressing whether investment tribunals could still prove a 
suitable venue for Greek investors under different circumstances. 
III. The Case of Mamatas and Others v. Greece 
 Mamatas and Others v. Greece originated from three applications, namely 
application Nos. 63066/14, 64297/14, and 66106/14, which were all addressed against 
the Hellenic Republic.669 These applications were filed by 6,320 Greek nationals 
between September 17th and October 1st, 2014.670 The applications were all founded 
on the aforementioned facts, namely the unilateral introduction of CACs in the bonds 
held by the applicants and their forcible participation in the Greek bond exchange 
whereby their bonds were exchanged for other debt instruments of lesser value.671 
The ECtHR rejected the Greek Government’s objection that local remedies had 
not been exhausted. Thus, the ECtHR declared the applicant’s complaint admissible 
and proceeded to examine the merits of the complaint. 
The applicants had invoked two rights recognized by the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR), namely the right to property (Article 1 of Protocol 1 of 
ECHR) and the right to non-discrimination (Article 14 ECHR).672 As per the 
applicants, the forcible exchange of their bonds by virtue of the Bondholders’ Law, 
                                                          
 
 
668 See Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8 
669 'European Court Of Human Rights Information Note 198' (Echr.coe.int, 2016) p. 21 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CLIN_2016_07_198_ENG.pdf> accessed 25 November 2017. 
670 'European Court Of Human Rights Information Note 198' (Echr.coe.int, 2016) 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CLIN_2016_07_198_ENG.pdf> accessed 25 November 2017, 
p.21 
671 Mamatas and Others v. Greece [2016] ECHR, 694, para 25 
672 'European Court Of Human Rights Information Note 198' (Echr.coe.int, 2016) 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CLIN_2016_07_198_ENG.pdf> accessed 25 November 2017, 
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No. 4050/2012, amounted to a de facto expropriation of their bonds and, therefore, of 
their property or, alternatively, an interference with their possessions in contravention 
of Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR (Article 1).673 Additionally, the applicants contended 
that they had sustained discrimination vis-a-vis other major corporate creditors,674 as 
despite the vast differences between the experience and resources available between 
the two categories of investors, the investors were treated alike.675  
The ECtHR concluded that there was no de facto expropriation that would, in and 
of itself, suffice to establish a breach of the right to property.676 Instead, the ECtHR 
proceeded to examine the case under the first rule of Article 1.677 The first rule refers 
to the peaceful enjoyment of possession and, given its generic wording, is applied by 
the ECtHR to cases where the other two rules of Article 1, namely the second rule 
relating to deprivation of property and the third rule relating to regulation of the use of 
property, do not apply.678  
As per the first rule, contained in the first sentence of Article 1, an interference 
with a person’s possessions is prohibited when such interference cannot be justified 
via the public or general interest. What’s more, such interference needs to also strike a 
fair balance between the interests of the community and those of the affected person. 
Indeed, an interference with possessions, in and of itself, does not constitute a 
violation of Article 1, but the ECtHR will examine whether such interference is 
founded on a law serving the public interest.679 If there is a law that serves the public 
interest, the ECtHR will consider whether a fair balance between public interest and 
the right of property is reached. 
The ECtHR applied this analysis in the Mamatas case. After it established a 
prima facie interference with the applicants’ possessions, the ECtHR proceeded to 
examine whether such interference was imposed by law.680 The ECtHR then 
established that the forcible haircut was imposed by the Bondholders Law, No. 
4050/2012.681 Thereafter, the ECtHR considered whether the Bondholders Law was 
serving the public interest.682 Related to this requirement, states also enjoy a wide 
margin of appreciation “because of their direct knowledge of their society and its 
needs, national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to 
                                                          
673 Mamatas and Others v. Greece [2016] ECHR, 694, para 73 
674 Mamatas and Others v. Greece [2016] ECHR, 694, para 125 
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677 Mamatas and Others v. Greece [2016] ECHR, 694, paras 84-85 
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appreciate what is in the “public interest.””683 Especially in cases relating to complex 
economic or social policies, the ECtHR will question the legislature’s determination 
that a measure serves the public interest only when such determination is “manifestly 
without reasonable foundation.”684 Hence, the ECtHR easily concluded that the 
Bondholders Law, No. 4050/2012 was, in fact, pursuing a goal in the public interest, 
namely the preservation of economic stability at a time when Greece was 
overwhelmed by a serious economic crisis.685 
Thereafter, the ECtHR proceeded to examine the last, but most pivotal criterion 
to establish whether there was a violation of the right to property. The ECtHR 
examined whether a fair balance was struck between the law’s public interest goal and 
the investors’ right to property.686 As per ECtHR case law, for a fair balance to be 
struck, there must exist a proportional relation between the means used and the aim 
sought to be achieved.687 Such proportionality is absent when the affected individual 
sustains an excessive burden.688 To consider the extent of such burden, the ECtHR 
takes into account the duration of the interference, the severity of the interference, and 
the terms of the compensation.689 However, per ECtHR case law, the threshold for 
establishing that the individual sustained an “excessive burden” is difficult to 
prove.690 In the Mamatas case, the ECtHR noted the extreme financial distress that 
faced Greece at the time while noting that, unless a Memorandum of Understanding 
was signed, Greece would be unable to pay any debts since it would likely enter into 
unregulated bankruptcy.691 To this end, in evaluating the burden sustained by 
investors, one should consider that the market value of such bonds at the time before 
the exchange was very low, rather than the then current nominal value of the bonds. 
Hence, the ECtHR concluded that the losses incurred by the applicants were not 
excessive, especially considering the nature of the bonds as inherently risky 
transactions, the same risks which should have been known by the applicants.692 
Similarly, the ECtHR concluded there was no breach of Article 14 of the ECHR, 
which prohibits discrimination, despite the prima facie case of discrimination.693 
Nonetheless, the equal treatment of all investors during the bond exchange was 
justified by the difficulties in locating all of the affected investors: the difficulty 
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involved in setting precise criteria for differentiating between bondholders in a very 
volatile market; the possibility of endangering the effectiveness of the bond exchange; 
and the need to swiftly address the difficult financial situation in Greece at the time. 
This Article articulates certain shortcomings in the judgment, being that of 
interference with the applicant’s property rights and the non-existence of 
discrimination. The ECtHR did not fully examine whether a fair balance was actually 
reached by conducting a proportionality analysis and reviewing the burden sustained 
by the specific applicants.694 Instead, the ECtHR referred solely to economic necessity 
and quickly concluded that any interference was justified.695 In contrast, in the case of 
Malysh and Others v. Russia696 that pertained to Russia’s inability to repay sovereign 
bonds’ nominal value and interest, the ECtHR noted that an appropriate balancing 
exercise was required, while taking into account the amount owed by the State to 
bondholders vis-a-vis other pressing budgetary expenses of priority.697 Similarly, 
ECtHR, although it did in fact found that there was great volatility and difference 
between bondholders that would require a different treatment amongst them, 
nonetheless it found this was justified due to the urgent situation Greece was in, even 
making reference to the “pari passu” clause that is indifferent for human rights 
considerations. 
This judgement has not been appealed to the Grand Chamber. That stated, it is 
the author’s view that, even if the judgement had been appealed before the Grand 
Chamber, although the latter might have corrected such shortcomings, nonetheless, be 
unlikely to come to a different conclusion. This is because it has become evident 
through the ECtHR’s case law that when dealing with issues of financial crisis, the 
ECtHR will refrain from challenging state decisions that reflect major political 
choices relating to economic matters by resorting to the subsidiarity principle.698 
Hence, the ECtHR will not challenge state decisions that are closely related to the 
sovereign power of a state, such as decisions relating to economic policy and 
sovereign default. This, in conjunction with the ECtHR’s prior case law stating that 
legitimate objectives of 'public interest' may justify a compensation below the full 
market value,699 demonstrates that in light of the extreme circumstances of a 
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sovereign default, a bond exchange would most likely be upheld despite the severe 
haircut it might impose.700 
Thus, it is worth exploring whether investors would have a better chance of succeeding 
in their claims if they were to resort to investment tribunals by invoking investment treaty 
standards. 
IV. Claiming Protection under Bilateral Investment Treaties 
A. Definition: General Discussion 
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are legally binding international 
agreements between two states establishing the terms and conditions mutually 
applicable for investments made by natural or legal persons.701 
Most BITs include guarantees and other provisions that regulate the terms and 
extent of the standard treatment to be awarded to foreign investors.702 Those 
guarantees are both general – referring to the standard treatment the investor would 
receive in the host State, and specific – particularly granting protection against 
specific types of danger that might occur in the host State.703 From a legal perspective, 
the treatment of the investor and his investment by the host State is evaluated based 
on the guarantee made by the host State to investors vis-a-vis a specific standard of 
treatment.704 The most common standards of treatment provided for under 
international investment treaties and investment codes are: (i) the most favored nation 
treatment, (ii) fair and equitable treatment, and (iii) treatment in accordance with the 
rules of international law.705  
B. Conditions for Claiming Protection under BITs 
For an investor to be able to claim protection under a BIT, the following 
conditions have to be cumulatively met: (i) the entrepreneur must qualify as a foreign 
investor under the BIT; (ii) the investment must qualify as an investment under the 
BIT; and (iii) a breach of the standard of treatment provided for by the BIT must have 
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occurred.706 While the first two conditions are mainly of a procedural nature, the third 
one is a substantive issue. 
At this point, it is important to note that, despite significant differences among 
various BITs, there is a very strong trend towards their harmonization. If one takes 
into consideration that developed States – usually acting as the investors’ state – have 
the power to, and do, impose their terms on host states, one can begin to see that there 
are clear patterns evident in almost all BITs. 
 C. Foreign Investor under the BIT 
To bring a claim under a BIT, a natural or legal person must qualify as a 
foreign investor from a country, which is party to a BIT with the host state. For 
natural persons, the decisive factor to determine whether they are a foreign investor is 
their nationality,707 while for legal persons both their place of incorporation and the 
place of effective management and control are taken into account.708 Hence, the 
investors in the Mamatas case, who were nationals of Greece, would not qualify as 
foreign investors and thus could not claim protection under any investment treaty. 
D. Protected Investment under the BIT 
Here, I believe, the scope of the term “investment” requires further 
explanation as it relates to BITs. Most BITs contain broad definitions of protected 
investments and often include language such as “every kind of asset,” or “every kind 
of investment in the territory.”709 Such broad definitions usually include investments 
in real estate, stocks and bonds, monetary claims, intellectual property, etc.710 It is 
questionable, however, whether portfolio investments are included in this definition. 
Indeed, portfolio investors assume commercial risks and are, consequently, not 
usually protected by the host state.711 
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Including portfolio investments in the definition of investments under BITs 
would allow investors with a small percentage in a company who do not have an 
interest or stake in the company’s management but only aspire to receive a return on 
their investment, to claim protection under a BIT.  
Until recently, tribunals had not offered a definitive answer as to whether 
portfolio investments could be included in the definition of investments under 
BITs.712 That, however, changed with the ICSID tribunal’s (Tribunal) award in CMS 
v. Argentina in which the old criterion of the exercise of effective management and 
control was set aside, and the language of the US-Argentina BIT was analyzed with 
great attention. As the latter did not entail an exhaustive definition of what constituted 
an investment, both portfolio and FDI investments were deemed to be included in the 
definition of investment.713 This decision is indicative of the trend to broadly interpret 
the definition of investments under BITs so that they include portfolio investments. 
Under such trend, the notion of investment does not connect the essence of 
investment with the exercise of effective management and control.714 Indeed, “many 
ICSID and other arbitral decisions . . . have progressively given a broader meaning to 
the concept of investment,”715 while in Abaclat et al. v. the Argentine Republic,716 the 
Tribunal specifically found that portfolio investments were included within the scope 
of protection of the BIT.717 This, however, was questioned in the recent case of 
POŠTOVÁ BANKA, A.S. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. the Hellenic Republic.718 This is 
the case we now turn to. 
E. POŠTOVÁ BANKA, A.S. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. the Hellenic Republic 
Poštová Banka A.S., a banking institution registered in Slovakia and owned by 
Istrokapital S.E., a Cypriot entity, filed a claim against Greece in May 2013 before the 
ICSID.719 In early 2010, Poštová Banka purchased Greek bonds equal to €504 million 
from the secondary market and deposited such bonds in an account with the 
depository Clearstream Banking of Luxembourg, without retaining rights in any 
specific instrument but to a pool of fungible interests.720 At the time of purchase, these 
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bonds did not contain CACs; CACs were forcibly introduced by the Bondholders Law 
No. 4050/2012. As a result, Poštová Banka was required to participate in the bond 
exchange, despite having expressed a dissenting opinion.721 
Before examining the merits of the case, the ICSID proceeded to examine the 
jurisdictional objections that the Greek government had raised.722 Greece argued that 
the ICSID’s tribunal lacked subject matter, personal, and temporal jurisdiction;723 
Greece also maintained that the claimants had abused the tribunal’s process.724 In 
particular, Greece presented two arguments to contest the tribunal’s ratione materiae 
jurisdiction: (i) first, it claimed that Istrokapital’s shareholding in Poštová Banka was 
not an investment under the Cyprus-Greece BIT,725 and (ii) that Poštová Banka’s 
interests in Greek bonds did not fall within the scope of protected investments under 
the Slovakia-Greece BIT.726 ICSID examined these arguments in turn. 
E(1). Istorkapital’s Investment Under the Cyprus- Greece BIT 
Istrokapital countered Greece’s objection and argued that it had, in fact, made 
an investment within the definition of the Cyprus-Greece BIT, which was not the 
shareholding in Poštová banka, but the Greek bonds obtained by Poštová Banka.727 
Indeed, Istorkapital claimed it had indirectly invested in Greek bonds through Poštová 
Banka.728 As per Istorkapital, such investment fell within the scope of Art. 1.1. (c) of 
the Cyprus-Greece BIT as assets comprising monetary claims and contractual claims 
with an economic value.729 
The tribunal examined previous case law on whether shareholders may raise 
claims for rights in assets held by companies whose share capital they own.730 From 
such examination, the tribunal noted that there was no available case law to support 
such an argument.731 In fact, in previous cases, arbitral tribunals had adopted a rather 
different view, namely that a company should be distinct from its shareholders.732 
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Indicatively, in BG. v. Argentina,733 the tribunal found that BG had no direct claims 
stemming from the license agreements entered into by one of its subsidiaries.734 The 
same conclusion was also reached by the tribunal in El Paso v. Argentina735 and 
Urbaser v. Argentina.736 
Based on this case law, the tribunal noted that while Istorkapital could pursue 
claims against “measures taken against such company’s assets that impair the value of 
the claimant’s shares impairment of its shareholding in Poštová banka,”737 
nonetheless it did not have standing to claim damages for the assets held by Poštová 
Banka.738 Consequently, as Istorkapital had based its claim for jurisdiction solely on 
the basis of its indirect investment in Greek bonds, the tribunal dismissed all of 
Istrokapital’s claims for lack of jurisdiction, noting that the sole investor of Greek 
bonds was Poštová Banka.739  
E(2). Poštová Banka Investment Under the Greece-Slovakia BIT 
In examining whether Poštová Banka’s interests in the Greek bonds fell within 
the meaning of investment, the tribunal primarily took note of the process by which 
Poštová Banka acquired the Greek bonds, noting that it was in the secondary 
market.740 Thereafter, the tribunal examined the wording of Art. 1 of the Greece-
Slovakia BIT and, in particular, they examined the definition of the term “investment” 
provided in the BIT: 
“Investment” means every kind of asset and in particular, though not exclusively 
includes: 
a) movable and immovable property and any other property rights such as 
mortgages, liens or pledges, 
b) shares in and stock and debentures of a company and any other form of 
participation in a company, 
c) loans, claims to money or to any performance under contract having a financial 
value, 
d) intellectual property rights, goodwill, technical processes and know-how,  
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e) business concessions conferred by law or under contract, including concessions 
to search for, cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources.741 
The claimants contended that their interest in the Greek bonds was included in the 
above definition of investment, which referred to “every kind of asset,” and in 
particular, referred to “loans” or “claims to money.”742 Claimants noted that 
international law did not ascribe any particular meaning to the term “investment” and 
as such, the tribunal should refer solely to the wording of Art. 1 of the BIT.743 Greece, 
on the other hand, argued that the term had an ascribed meaning under international 
law, and that the tribunal should not search for a special definition under the BIT.744 
The Tribunal primarily acknowledged that, as per the claimant’s argument, the 
definition of the term “investment” is broad, noting however, that this should not be 
interpreted so that any and all categories of assets fall within such definition 
automatically.745 The fact that the list of assets is non-exhaustive did not allow the 
Tribunal to indefinitely expand the types of protected assets intended by the 
contracting states. Therefore, to discover whether the claimants’ rights in the Greek 
Bonds were in fact included within the meaning of investment, as per the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), the tribunal was required to interpret the 
term in good faith, taking into account the text, context, and the object and purpose of 
the Greece-Slovakia BIT.746 The non-exhaustive list of protected assets contained in 
the definition, therefore, should be considered within the context of the BIT. 
Otherwise, such indicative list would be meaningless and useless, and to this end, the 
different wording of the protected assets found in the various Greek and non-Greek 
investments would be redundant.747 
The tribunal noted that this indicative list of assets was the distinctive factor vis-a-
vis Abaclat et al. v. the Argentine Republic.748 In this case, the tribunal founded its 
judgement that portfolio investments constitute protected investments by reviewing 
the wording of a similar indicative list in the Italy-Argentina BIT.749 Such wording 
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was significantly different from the Greece-Slovakia BIT as the list in the Italy-
Argentina BIT was construed in a much more generic and broad manner.750 As the 
tribunal noted in Abaclat in reference to the indicative list in Art. 1 of the Italy-
Argentina BIT: 
Firstly, this list covers an extremely wide range of investments, using a broad 
wording and referring to formulas such as ‘independent of the legal form adopted,’ or 
‘any other’ kind of similar investment. It even contains a residual clause in lit. (f), 
encompassing ‘any right of economic nature conferred under law or contract.’ In 
other words, the definition provided for in Article 1(1) is not drafted in a restrictive 
way.751  
In fact, the Italy-Argentina BIT made specific reference to “obligations, private or 
public titles,” which was invoked by the claimants in Abaclat.752 As no such reference 
was made in the Greece-Slovakia BIT, which only refers to debentures issued by 
companies and not by the state, the claimants in the current case categorized their 
claim as “loans” and “claims to money.”753 To this end, the tribunal in Poštová Banka 
AS and Istrokapital SE v. The Hellenic Republic asked whether Greek bonds were 
equivalent to loans.754 The tribunal answered in the negative as, unlike loan 
agreements where the parties are identified in the loan agreement, bonds are held by 
several investors anonymously and often exchange hands several times.755 The 
tribunal also declined the claimants’ assertion that their interests in Greek bonds could 
be considered “claims to money.”756 The tribunal noted that according to Art.1(1)(c) 
of the BIT, for a claim to money to arise, it must stem from a contract between the 
parties.757 In the present case, Poštová Banka had not entered into a contract with 
Greece because it acquired the Greek bonds from the secondary market.758 
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Hence, the tribunal concluded that Poštová Banka’s interests in Greek bonds were 
not an investment under the Greece-Slovakia BIT.759 Therefore, the tribunal did not 
have jurisdiction to hear the merits of the application.760 
In 2015, Poštová Banka filed an application requesting the partial annulment 
of the Award rendered by the ICSID on April 9, 2015 by virtue of Articles 48(3) and 
52(1)(e) of the ICSID Convention.761 Poštová Banka claimed that the tribunal had not 
stated the reasons on which the award was based because it had not explained why the 
proprietary rights acknowledged by the tribunal did not fall within the wide definition 
of “investment.”762 In particular, Poštová Banka put forth three main arguments: (i) 
that the reasoning of the tribunal did not allow the reader to follow how the tribunal 
proceeded from point A to point B, (ii) that the tribunal’s reasoning was so 
contradictory so as to amount to no reasoning at all and (iii) that the tribunal’s errors 
were outcome-determinative.763 
On September 29, 2016, the ICSID ad hoc Committee delivered its decision 
on Poštová Banka AS’s application for partial annulment of the Award, dismissing 
the application.764 
As is evident from the above, the wording of a BIT is decisive as to whether 
sovereign bonds fall within the protective scope of investments under the given BIT 
and allow the bondholder to claim compensation on these premises. The tribunal’s 
findings in Poštová Banka, AS and Istrokapital, SE v. the Hellenic Republic are in line 
with the ICSID’s previous ruling in Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine765 
where the tribunal (although it stipulated that tribunals should refrain from a 
restrictive reading of the jurisdictional provisions of the ICSID Convention, when 
such reading cannot be founded on the Convention itself) noted that a restrictive 
reading is required, “if the consent given by a state indicates that certain types of 
investment should be excluded from the protection of the ICSID arbitration 
mechanism to tackle difficulties relating to the substantive side of a case.”766 
Although such decision is not binding on other Tribunals, as the doctrine of precedent 
                                                          
759 Poštova Banka SA and Istrokapital SE v Hellenic Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8, (2015), para 
350 
760 Poštova Banka SA and Istrokapital SE v Hellenic Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8, (2015), para 
350 
761 Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. The Hellenic Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8) – 
Annulment Proceeding 
762 Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. The Hellenic Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8) –
Award on Annulment Proceeding, para 86 
763 Poštová Banka, A.S. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. The Hellenic Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8 – 
Annulment Proceeding (2016) para.88 
764 Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. The Hellenic Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8) –
Award on Annulment Proceeding, para 160 
765 Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9 (2013) 
766 Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9 (2013), para. 
461 
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does not exist under international investment law, nonetheless this award is expected 
to affect tribunal’s decisions on the said topic.767  
This award has received criticism for it’s very restrictive interpretation, 
especially in relation to its finding that bonds are not loan agreements. As 
demonstrated in Chapter 5, sovereign bonds constitute a form of financing for the 
States and, in particular, a form of loan agreements. Hence, the award’s reasoning 
appears to be overly restrictive unjustifiably.768 
 
F. Greece’s Main Types of BITs 
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
database, Greece is comparatively advanced in its use of various categories of 
investment treaties.769 Indeed, Greece has signed forty-seven BITs, one of which was 
terminated and replaced (Romania) and four of which have been signed but are not 
yet in force (Argentina, Kongo, Kuwait, and Kazakstan).770 Most of the BITs are 
either with countries outside the EU or with Central and East European countries, 
which became EU members after 2000 (there are eleven such BITs, the majority of 
which were pre-existing, but renegotiated in line with EU requirements). As an EU 
member state, Greece is party to some seventy-five other International Investment 
Agreements (IIAs), entered into by the EU in keeping with association and free trade 
agreements, as well as with (or in the framework of) various international 
organizations and agencies.771 
Out of the forty-seven BITs that Greece has signed and are currently in force, 
none contain as extensive of wording as the Italy-Argentine BIT. Twenty-one of 
Greece’s BITs772 have wording similar to the Greece-Slovakia BIT. Two of Greece’s 
BITs make absolutely no reference to loans or claims in money,773 sixteen BITs774 
refer to “loans connected to an investment,” and two BITs entail specific exclusions 
from claims to money and loans.775 In light of the ICSID’s award in Poštová Banka 
                                                          
767 Anna O. Mitsou, 'Greek Debt Restructuring and Investment Treaty Arbitration: Jurisdictional 
Stumbling Blocks for Bondholders' (2016) 33 Journal of International Arbitration, Issue 6, pp. 687–721 
768 For a deeper analysis see Anna O. Mitsou, 'Greek Debt Restructuring and Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: Jurisdictional Stumbling Blocks for Bondholders' (2016) 33 Journal of International 
Arbitration, Issue 6, pp. 687–721 
769 See the list of the respective IIAs at www.investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/  
770 http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/81 
771 Ibidem. 
772 BITS with Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Germany, Hungary, Korea, Serbia, Russia, Poland, Morocco, Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tunisia, 
Turkey 
773 Egypt-Greece BIT and Iran-Greece BIT 
774 BITs with Azerbaijan, Croatia, Cuba, Estonia, Georgia, India, Syria, South Africa, Moldova, Lithuania, 
Lebanon, Latvia, Jordan, Uzbekistan, United Arab Emirates (although the BIT also refers to Rights 
Granted under Public Law or Contract) and Romania (although this BIT refers to long term Loans 
775 Mexico and Vietnam 
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AS and Istrokapital SE v Hellenic Republic, investors will have difficulty 
demonstrating that bonds acquired from the secondary market fall within the 
protective scope of BITs, although the reference to loans connected to an investment 
is very closely linked to sovereign debt,776 which makes it more likely that a tribunal 
will accept such reference as a protected investment. However, if investors manage to 
overcome this hurdle, will they be able to finally gain compensation? This is the 
question we now turn to. 
G. BIT’s Standard of Treatment 
As explained above, the third condition for an investor to be able to effectively 
claim protection under a BIT is that he must demonstrate there was a breach of a 
treaty standard that has negatively affected his investment. In practical terms, a 
standard of treatment consists of a set of principles to be observed in their letter and 
spirit by the host state in its relations with foreign investors.777 In other words, 
standards of treatment are meant to govern the contracting parties’ behavior and, more 
specifically, to preserve and protect investors’ rights. However, this is not always the 
case; quite a number of breaches of the respective principles occur, leading to disputes 
among parties to investment treaties. 
The standard of treatment provided for by BITs mainly consists of:778  
- national treatment (non-discrimination between domestic and 
foreign investors in light of the fiscal regime and other related 
measures); 
- most favoured nation treatment – MFN (equal treatment of all 
foreign investors acting in same or similar conditions; no less 
favourable treatment on the basis of investors’ nationality); 
- fair and equitable treatment for all parties concerned; 
- full protection and security for the foreign investment. 
Most BITs also stipulate the need for: 
- not allowing any direct or indirect expropriation without 
providing adequate and effective compensation;  
- allowing the repatriation and general transfer of investors’ 
capital out of the host country;  
- not imposing conditions based on performance requirements; 
for example, employment and training requirements; and  
- allow for neutral arbitration as the main means for the 
settlement of disputes, if and when treaty standards of protected 
is not upheld.779 
                                                          
776 Rachel D. Thrasher, Kevin P. Gallagher, Mission Creep: The Emerging Role of International 
Investment Agreements in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Boston, CFLP WORKING PAPER 003, 2/2016 
(2016) 
777 See Dispute Settlement: State-State, United Nations Conference On Trade and Development, 
UNCTAD Series on issues in international investment agreements (2003) p.13 
778 See, for a more detailed analysis, Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah., op.cit. pp. 201-205. 
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H. Salient Features of Greece BITs780 
As previously stated, Greece has signed over forty BITs that contain both 
similar as well as differing language. Some of the common standards of treatment 
found in BITs entered into by Greece, include the following: 
Non-discrimination 
All BITs explicitly limit the application of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
principle, insofar as the benefits resulting from Greece’s EU membership are 
concerned.781 Also, some BITs, entered into mostly with developing countries, 
stipulate the non-application of MFN to preferences or privileges extended to 
developing countries in line with the international agreements in the field.782 
While the large majority of the BITs provide that non-discrimination is 
applicable only to “investments,” several of them have a larger scope, this principle 
covering the “returns on investment,” too.783 
Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Most Greek BITs broadly describe the fair and equitable treatment standard 
(FET) as being applicable to the investments made by investors of each party to the 
treaty. It is interesting to note, however, that in the German-Greek BIT, there is no 
explicit reference to the FET. 
Expropriation 
Out of all of Greece’s BITs which expressly provide for protection against 
direct expropriation, only four of them contain similar protective provisions for 
indirect expropriation. While the large majority of Greek BITs require that any 
expropriation be subject to the “due process of law,” three of them (including the one 
with Germany) do not contain such a requirement, stipulating only that expropriation 
may be done in the public interest.784 As to the right of compensation, in general, it 
                                                                                                                                                                      
779  
780 See for a detailed presentation, Nicholas Moussas, Stratos Voulgaridis and Charalampos Kondis, 
Investment Treaty Arbitration 2016, Greece, Overview of investment treaty programme (2016) 
available at http://globalarbitrationreview.com/jurisdiction/2000114/greece 
781 In particular, the wording provided in the MFN clause of BITs signed by Greece reads as “Such 
treatment shall not relate to privileges which either Contracting Party accords to investors of third 
States on account of its membership of, or association with, a customs or economic union, a common 
market, a free trade area or similar institutions.” 
782 See e.g. Art. 3(4) of the Greece-South Africa BIT as well as 4(3) of the Greece-Cuba BIT 
783 See e.g, Art. 2(4) of the Greece-Russia BIT, as well as 2(b) of the Greece-Turkey BIT 
784 See Art.3(2) of the Greece-Germany BIT, as well as Art 4(1) of the Greece-Morroco BIT, see also 
Nicholas Moussas, Stratos Voulgaridis and Charalampos Kondis, Investment Treaty Arbitration 2016, 
Greece, Overview of investment treaty programme (2016) available at 
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/jurisdiction/2000114/greece, where they make reference also to 
the Greece-Albania BIT, that however does make reference in Art. 4(2) that “The legality of any such 
expropriation. 
163 | P a g e  
 
must be equivalent to the market value of the tangible or intangible object of 
expropriation and must be “prompt, adequate and effective.”785 
Other Substantive Protections 
Greek BITs also contain other provisions related to investor protection. One 
such provision deals with the free transfer of payments: all BITs provide for 
unrestricted and immediate transfer of investments, including their returns, in freely 
convertible currencies.  
It should also be noted that according to most Greek BITs, the contracting 
parties have the obligation not to unjustifiably intervene in the management, use, 
disposal, etc. of investments made by investors from the other state.786 
We shall now briefly examine, below, the contents of the aforementioned 
standards of treatment found in the majority of BITs signed by Greece, as well as their 
potential infringement. 
I. Potential Breaches of the Standards of Treatment 
Non-discrimination 
The non-discrimination principle has two components meant primarily to 
ensure full and fair competition among all investors, be they domestic or foreign, 
namely: (i) national treatment (regime), and (ii) the most-favored-nation clause. 
 
National Treatment 
According to the national treatment (NT) principle, foreign investors shall be 
treated no less favorably than domestic ones.787 A key element in examining the 
difference of treatment awarded to investors of the defaulting state versus those 
awarded to foreign investors is the terms of the restructuring. Consequently, in cases 
of sovereign debt default and restructuring, an NT breach may occur when domestic 
bondholders receive better terms than those offered to foreign bondholders (e.g., they 
sustain a smaller haircut).  
There are various policy reasons for a state to award preferential treatment to 
domestic investors, including reviving the domestic financial system, providing 
liquidity, and managing financial and monetary risk during a subsequent economic 
recovery.788 These policy measures exist because their absence may trigger a banking 
crisis which can entail significant foreign exchange outflows and deposit flight, as we 
have seen in the case of Greece. Evidence of this can be seen in the cases relating to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
nationalization or comparable measure and the amount of compensation shall be subject to review 
by due process of law.” 
785 See e,g.  Art. 4(1) of Greece-Croatia BIT as well as Art 6 (1c) of Greece-Chile BIT 
786 See e.g.  Art. 3(2) and 4(2) of Greece-United Arab Emirates,  Art. 3(2) of Greece-Korea BIT 
787 Nicolas F Diebold, Standards Of Non-Discrimination In International Economic Law, The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly,Vol. 60, No. 4 (OCTOBER 2011), pp. 831-865 
788 Ann Gelpern and Brad Setser, ‘Domestic and External Debt: The Doomed Quest for Equal 
Treatment’, Georgetown Journal of International Law, (2004), Vol. 35(4), p. 796. 
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the Russian and Argentinean financial crisis, where domestic investors were treated 
more favorably than foreign investors.789 
Such was also the case when, during the 1997 financial and monetary crisis of 
the peso in Mexico, Mexico facilitated the purchase of financial instruments 
denominated in Mexican pesos and not similar financial instruments denominated in 
U.S. dollars. Notably, instruments denominated in Mexican pesos were owned by 
Mexican investors alone, and thus, foreign investors were indirectly excluded from 
the purchase.790 Although, the ICSID Tribunal did not examine the merits of such 
arguments in the case Fireman's Fund Insurance Company v. The United Mexican 
States,791 it did note that “such claim might have given rise to a claim by an investor 
under Articles 1102 (National Treatment) . . .  or Article 1405 (National Treatment) of 
the NAFTA.”792 
However, concluding that a national investor is awarded preferential treatment 
within the context of sovereign restructuring is easier said than done given the wide 
diversity between the terms of the various bonds.793 For example, in the case of the 
Greek Haircut, as was demonstrated in the case of Mamatas and Others v. Greece, 
Greek creditors did not receive any different or preferential treatment.794 In this case, 
it can be said that Greek creditors in fact received less favorable treatment than 
foreign investors,795 as they were subjected to a ‘double-adjustment.’ A double 
adjustment occurred in that, not only were Greek Creditors affected by the Bond 
Exchange and the reduction in the face value of their bonds, but they were also 
affected by the negative repercussions of the financial crisis, including, among other 
things, slow growth, growing unemployment, and high interest rates.796 
 
Most-Favored-Nation 
The MFN clause, which can be found in virtually all BITs and most other 
international investment treaties (IITs), requires that all foreign investors be treated 
                                                          
789 Ann Gelpern and Brad Setser, op.cit. p. 788. 
790 Fireman's Fund Insurance Company v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/1, 
(2002), para. 56. 
791 Fireman's Fund Insurance Company v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/1, 
(2002) 
792 Fireman's Fund Insurance Company v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/1, 
(2002) para. 203 
793 Michael Waibel, ‘Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals’ , Cambridge 
University Press, 2011, p. 274 
794 Supra at FN 4 
795 Julian Schumacher, Marcos Chamon, Christoph Trebesch, Foreign Law Bonds: Can They Reduce 
Sovereign Borrowing Costs?, Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik (2015), 
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796 Aldo Caliari, ‘Risk Associated with Trends in the Treatment of Sovereign Debt in Bilateral Trade and 
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alike in the same or similar circumstances, and that no less favorable treatment is 
awarded to any foreign investor on the basis of their nationality.797 
In the case of Greece, for instance, the European Central Bank (ECB), its 
largest creditor at the time of the bond exchange, holding 16.3% of Greece’s debt, 
was exempted from the bond exchange.798 The same applies for the IMF and EU 
member states’ central banks which did not take analogous haircuts on their Greek 
bonds, as all other bondholders did.799 
Indeed, the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program 
announcement stipulated, “The Eurosystem intends to clarify in the legal act 
concerning Outright Monetary Transactions that it accepts the same (pari passu) 
treatment as private or other creditors, with respect to bonds issued by Euro area 
countries, and purchased by the Eurosystem through Outright Monetary Transactions, 
in accordance with the terms of such bonds.”800 The ECB exchanged its previous 
GGBs with new ones, with the same nominal value and terms, and without any 
Collective Action Clauses (CACs), as opposed to all other bondholders that 
participated in the haircut which received a steep reduction on the face value of their 
bonds.801 
This discrimination between institutional investors and other investors holding 
the same instruments may amount to a breach of the MFN standard.802 Although, it is 
questionable whether Greece actually had a choice or the power not to accept such 
discrimination. 
 
Fair and Equitable Treatment 
An alternative basis of claim for investors is the well-established treaty 
standard of fair and equitable treatment (FET). Despite the long and general 
application of FET, the content of such a standard is not clearly defined.803 The FET 
clause, which is included in most of the more recent IIAs, typically grants investors 
protection of their reasonable expectations that they have relied upon to make the 
                                                          
797 Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, Christoph Schreuer, The Oxford Handbook of International 
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798 The Economist. (2017). Ready for the ruck?. [online] Available at: 
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investment, freedom from interference and coercion, transparency, due process, and 
good faith conduct.804 
With respect to bond exchanges, a concern has been expressed that, although 
such bond exchanges are now common practice in debt restructurings they may, 
nonetheless, violate the FET. There are a number of justifications for such concern. 
Significantly, bond exchanges could face allegations of lack of transparency and that 
they are coercive. Most scholars, in addition, consider the ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ 
approach followed in restructuring proceedings as being in breach of the good faith 
and due process principle in the absence of serious restructuring negotiations.805  
In other words, the FET aims to create a stable and secure environment for 
investments. The above standard has been reiterated many times by various tribunals 
and courts.806 Indicatively, the UNICITRAL (United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law) in its case of OEPC v. Ecuador807 stated that there is “an 
obligation not to alter the legal business environment in which the investment has 
been made.”808 In addition, in the cases relating to Argentina’s sovereign default, the 
tribunals expressly stated the importance of a stable and transparent economic 
environment and the need for the reasonable expectations of investors to be upheld. 
Specifically, in LG&E v. Argentina,809 the tribunal referred to the time element of 
those expectations and noted that investor expectations are founded on the 
circumstances present in the host state at the time the investment was made.810  
It is important to mention here that before the beginning of the Greek crisis, 
the yields of the ten-year Greek bonds were 10 to 40 basis points above the ten-year 
German bonds, only to explode to 400 basis points in January 2010.811 Indicatively, in 
2007, the interest spreads of the ten-year Greek bonds were at approximately 0.2 
percentage points, while they rose to 1.5 percentage points in late 2008, and to 8.0 
percentage points in the second half of 2010.812 As such, the investors that bought 
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of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/2, para 420 
805 Michael Waibel, op.cit., pp. 711-759. 
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Greek bonds before the crisis reasonably anticipated to be paid the entire face value of 
their bonds plus interest on maturity, and were greatly surprised by the Greek haircut 
that completely annulled their expectations, undermining the legal framework of 
Greek bonds. These bondholders may have a claim against Greece for breach of fair 
and equitable treatment.  
The same cannot be said for bondholders that bought or continued to buy 
Greek bonds after the Greek economic crisis had begun to unfold. Indeed, an investor 
cannot disregard and must take into account that the host state faces significant 
economic problems. Indicatively, in Olguin v. Republic of Paraguay813 the tribunal 
noted that an experienced businessman could and should have conducted thorough 
research prior to investing and that he should have been more conservative in 
investing in a country suffering serious economic problems.814 This principle was 
reiterated in the aforementioned case, CMS v. Argentina,815 where the tribunal held 
that, in order to determine the scope of protection that should be granted to an investor 
by virtue of a BIT, the results of abnormal conditions caused by the financial crisis in 
Argentina should be taken in account.816 The tribunal specifically noted that the 
effects of the financial crisis should, to a certain extent, be taken into account as part 
of the business risk that was assumed by the claimant when he invested in 
Argentina.817 The tribunal also noted that not considering such effects within the 
business risk taken by the investor would lead to an unjustifiably unequivocal result, 
as the investor would not share any of the costs of the crisis, but would instead receive 
immunity from such costs, and that this would be tantamount to an insurance policy 
against business risk.818 
In addition to the disappointment of an investors’ expectations, the unilateral 
and retroactive introduction of the CAC to all Greek-law governed bonds is also 
troubling. Indeed, the imposition of new conditions, placed retroactively through law 
has troubled investment tribunals on several occasions. In the case of Total S.A. v. The 
Argentine Republic, Argentina retroactively eliminated, through the enactment of the 
Emergency Law in early 2002, a tax exemption from applying export customs duties 
to production in Tierra del Fuego.819 This was considered a breach of FET. Similarly, 
in the case of ATA Construction Industrial and Trading Company v. The Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, the tribunal found that the retroactive application of the new 
Jordanian Arbitration Law, which effectively led to the extinguishment of the 
                                                          
813Olguin v. Republic of Paraguay, Case No. ARB/98/5 (2001)  
814 Olguin v. Republic of Paraguay, Case No. ARB/98/5 (2001) para 75 
815 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (2005) 
816CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (2005) para 
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arbitration clause in the contract in question, was in breach of treaty standards.820 
Hence, investors in Greek bonds could effectively claim that the retroactive 
introduction of CACs in their bonds, which forced approximately 20 percent of 
dissenting investors to accept a haircut on their bonds, was a breach of FET821 due to 
the disappointment of investors’ expectations, the lack of due process, and the lack of 
good faith.822  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the standard of FET is also found in 
customary international law.823 Initially, there was much debate as to the level of 
protection secured by customary law as compared to the one provided by BITs, but 
investment treaties often merely restate duties recognized by customary international 
law using slightly different language.824 The doctrine of “fair and equitable treatment” 
established by customary law would however, be of little relevance to the case of the 
Greek haircut, as customary law did not protect portfolio investors that, as mentioned, 
ought to be aware of commercial risks and protect themselves accordingly.825 
 
Expropriation 
Another standard of treatment that may be violated in cases of sovereign debt 
restructuring or default is that of the prohibition of direct or indirect expropriation—
unless appropriate compensation is paid. Although BITs always provide special 
protection against expropriation and codify a lex specialis against expropriation,826 
they nonetheless hardly ever contain a definition of the term, relying on the 
interpretation granted by customary international law or arbitration tribunals.827 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
expropriation is defined as “substantial wealth deprivation.”828 The ICSID considers 
                                                          
820 ATA Construction, Industrial and Trading Company v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/2 (2010) 
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expropriation as a “taking” of any kind, which can be direct in case of nationalization, 
title, or physical seizure, or indirect in such cases where the ownership of the invest-
ment remains with the investor, but the investments value is diminished.829 Indirect 
expropriation can be difficult to recognize; hence, international jurisprudence has set 
out certain criteria that are deemed conclusive to the existence of indirect 
expropriation. One such decisive criterion refers to the impact of a state measure on 
the investor and the rights stemming from the investment.830 Such criterion was used 
by the tribunal in Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican 
States831 to decide whether an indirect expropriation had occurred.832 Similarly, 
Professor G. C. Christie, in analyzing two decisions of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ), Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia833 and 
the Norwegian Shipowners Claims,834 used these criteria to conclude that indirect 
expropriation might exist. In other words, although a state may purport not to interfere 
with property rights when, by the state’s actions or measure, such rights are rendered 
so useless, those rights may be considered expropriated.835 
In light of the above, the consequences of the state measures and the degree of 
interference sustained by investors because of such measures are decisive in 
determining whether a direct expropriation exists. Further, more criteria have been 
adopted in the OECD legal framework, including the character of governmental 
measures, including the purpose and context of the respective measures, as well as, 
the interference of those measures with reasonable investment expectations.836 As 
discussed, Greece has entered into very few BITs which reference indirect 
expropriation, but the standard may still be covered by the protection provided by 
such BITs on the basis of the “tantamount clause.”837  
                                                          
829 Allahyar Mouri, The International Law of Expropriation as Reflected in the Work of the Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribuna, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1994) p. 70 
830 As noted by the Tribunal in the case of Tippets v. Iran indirect expropriation “may occur under 
international law through interference by a State in the use of that property or with the enjoyment of 
its benefits, even where legal title to the property is not affected.” Starrett Housing Corporation, 
Starrett Systems, Inc., Starrett Housing International, Inc., v. Iran, Bank Oman, Bank Mellat, Bank 
Markazi, (1983), Iran–US CTR, vol. 4, p. 225. 
831 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/2 (2003) 
832 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/2 (2003), para 115 
833 Certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Germany v Poland, Merits, Judgment, PCIJ Series 
A no 7, ICGJ 241(1926) 
834 Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims, Norway v United States, Award, PCIJ, I RIAA 307, ICGJ 393(1922), 
835 G.C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking Under International Law, 1962, 38, BYBIL, p.37 
836Apurba Khatiwada Indirect Expropriation of Foreign Investment, 2008 p.18. Retrieved at 
http://www.ksl.edu.np/cpanel/pics/indirect_expropriation_apurba.pdf . Also available as the working 
paper ‘Indirect expropriation”the “right to regulate” in international investment law’, Working Papers 
on International Investment, number 2004/4, p.9 
837 W. Michael Reisman & Robert D. Sloane, op.cit., p.117 
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However, not every measure interfering with an investor’s right will be 
tantamount to expropriation.838 In fact, state measures will, prima facie, be a lawful 
exertion of the government’s powers,839 despite that they might significantly affect 
foreign interests.840 To this end, foreign investments can be subjected to taxation and 
trade restrictions, including quotas, licenses, or devaluation.841 Similarly, the 
American Law Institute noted in the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States, that actions commonly accepted as falling within the police power 
of the states shall not amount to an expropriation and therefore will not allow an 
affected investor to claim compensation to the extent that such measures are not 
discriminatory.”842 The above was fully reiterated in the context of the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal in Too v. Greater Modesto Insurance Associates, which added 
that, apart from not being discriminatory, a state measure should also not be designed 
“to cause the alien to abandon the property to the state or to sell it at a distress 
price..”843 so as not to amount to expropriation.844 
At this point, an important question must be raised: can Greece’s debt haircut 
be considered an indirect expropriation? We shall venture an answer to this question 
by making a parallel presentation of cases involving Greece and Argentina. 
In exploring this question, the first issue to be clarified is whether the Greek 
measure of swapping initial bonds for bonds with a lower face value was indeed a 
sovereign act. In this respect, it is important to refer to the ruling of the ICSID in 
Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Morocco, where it was, inter alia, held that only unilateral 
measures specifically adopted as an expression of public authority could result in 
expropriation and mere breach of contractual obligations by the host state does not 
give rise to a claim for expropriation.845 Indeed, unless it is demonstrated that the state 
has acted beyond its role as contractual party, and has also acted as a sovereign 
exercising authority, any breach on the host state’s part would only result in a breach 
of contract.846  
In this regard, it is worth revisiting the case of the Argentine Restructuring and 
the cases brought under the Italy-Argentina BIT, and more particularly the Abaclat et 
                                                          
838 Ian Brownlie, Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 6th Edition, 2003 p. 509 
839 But see also opposite theory of “Sole Effects Doctrine”, whereby the purpose of the regulatory 
measure is irrelevant and should not be taken into account to establish indirect expropriation, but 
solely whether the measure significantly deprives investors of his rights from the investment. For 
more information on this, see Miguel Solanes Andrei Jouravlev Revisiting privatization, foreign 
investment, international arbitration, and water, United Nations Publications, 2007, p. 60 
840 Ian Brownlie, Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 6th Edition, 2003 p. 509 
841 Ian Brownlie, Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 6th Edition, 2003 p. 509 
842 ReStatement of the Law Third, the Foreign Relations of the United States, American Law Institute, 
Volume 1, 1987, Section 712.  
843 ‘Indirect expropriation and the “right to regulate” in international investment law’, p. 19 
844 Sebastián López Escarcena, Indirect Expropriation in International Law, Leuven Global Governance 
series (2014), p. 95 
845Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6 par.278 
846ImpregiloS.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No.ARB/03/3, par. 261 
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al. v. the Argentine Republic case.847 This case revolved around the Argentine 
financial crisis of 2001- 2005 and in particular, around the bonds restructuring that 
occurred.848 The Tribunal also carefully examined the question of whether the 
Argentine haircut was nothing more than a breach of contract or whether Argentina’s 
acts could constitute breach of certain standards of protection awarded by the BIT.849 
The Tribunal reasoned that BITs are not meant to set aside or correct contractual 
remedies, but rather are meant to further impose general treaty obligations for the 
protection of foreign investors.850 As such, the Tribunal found that the underlying 
dispute did not merely relate to a contractual breach of Argentina’s payment 
obligations from the bonds “but from the fact that it intervened as a sovereign by 
virtue of its state power to modify its payment obligations towards its creditors.”851 
The Tribunal acknowledged that there was no justification for such modifications on 
the basis of the contract. Thus, Argentina’s actions were the expression of sovereignty 
and investors’ claims arising from such were treaty claims.852  
The same conclusion may also be reached in Greece’s case, where not only 
was the second haircut the result of extensive pressure from Greece and the EU 
institutions on major bondholders, but also (and perhaps more importantly) because 
Greece retroactively imposed and triggered CACs, thus compelling all Greek-law 
bondholders to accept and participate in the bond exchange. In this regard, it is 
obvious that Greece exercised its sovereign power, especially when imposing CACs, 
and that there was no contractual justification for the bondholders “being forced” to 
accept the haircut. As such, Greece’s decision will most likely be deemed a sovereign 
act; consequently, there is a need to examine if such an act can be considered as being 
within Greece’s legitimate state powers. The Tribunal will determine if this act so 
falls within legitimate state powers, taking into account the extreme financial crisis 
that Greece was facing and the urgent need to secure funding, which was only 
possible if the bond exchange was successful. That stated, it is still questionable 
whether the retroactive modification of the bond terms through the introduction of 
CACs can be considered to fall within Greece’s legitimate state powers, as this would 
allow states to escape liability for not honoring their assumed obligations. 
As previously stipulated, for arbitral tribunals to conclude there was an 
indirect expropriation, each case is examined ad hoc and several elements are taken 
into account, including and most importantly, the effect and degree of interference 
that the measure had on the investor.  
As discussed above, under the FET, the Greek haircut greatly interfered with 
the reasonable and investment-backed expectations of the bondholders to retrieve the 
                                                          
847 Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5 (formerly Giovanna a Beccara 
and Others v. The Argentine Republic (2011) 
848 Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, para 8. 
849 Abaclat et al. v. the Argentine Republic op.cit. para. 316 etc 
850 Abaclat et al. v. the Argentine Republic op.cit. para. 316 
851Abaclat et al. v. the Argentine Republic op.cit. para. 325 
852Idem, par. 326 
172 | P a g e  
 
entire face value and interest of their bonds. Hence, if the effect the haircut had on 
investors (especially opposing investors) was significant, then bondholders (especially 
opposing bondholders) might have a prima facie case against Greece for 
expropriation.  
The decisive element in determining whether the imposition of CACs and the 
haircut can constitute an indirect expropriation is whether or not the sovereign act 
resulted in substantial economic loss of the value of the investment, even if the state 
did not actually obtain title or right over the investment.853 In order to determine the 
effect a state measure has had on investors, tribunals often conduct a “substantial 
deprivation” test854 to explore the degree of diminished value in a haircut, and would 
thus in this case evaluate the size of the Greek haircut.855 To calculate the losses 
investors would incur as a consequence of the recent Greek debt restructuring, the 
most appropriate formula is the one suggested by Federico Sturzenegger and Jeromin 
Zettelmeyer.856 The formula calculates the actual losses (H) sustained by the investors 
when a country (i) exits default at time (t) and issues new debt in exchange for the old 
debt at an interest rate (rt
i) at the exit from default, the following equation could be 
used:857 
   H= 1- Present value of New Debt (rit) 




The above formula is most suited for restructurings that occur prior to a 
country's default (when no acceleration of payment has taken place) and, therefore, 
there is no reason to take the face value of the old debt into consideration.858 Based on 
such calculations, the losses sustained by investors vary greatly depending on the 
maturity of the bond and how they acquired it. For example, several investors have 
acquired the bond in the secondary market below face value. Generally speaking, the 
losses sustained by investors reached 70%, although, as stipulated by the ECtHR in 
the Mamatas and Others v. Greece case, to calculate the losses sustained by investors, 
the value of the bonds at the date of the bond exchange should have been taken into 
account, a value which, at the time, was below face value.859 This criterion is of 
particular importance, since, if the interference is not significant the Tribunal is 
unlikely to find expropriation has taken place. Indicatively, in the case Waste 
                                                          
853 Ian Brownlie, op. cit., p. 534 
854 Peter D. Isakoff, Defining the Scope of Indirect Expropriation for International Investments, 3 
Global Bus. L. Rev. 189 (2013) available at http://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/gblr/vol3/iss2/4 
855Andrew Newcombe, Lluís Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties – Standards of 
Treatment, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2009 p. 2004 
856 Federico Sturzenegger and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, op. cit. p.6 
857 Federico Sturzenegger and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, op. cit. p.6 
858 Federico Sturzenegger and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, op. cit. p.6 
859 Federico Sturzenegger and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, op. cit. p9 
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Management v. Mexico,860 the Tribunal noted that non-payment of debts was not 
sufficient to constitute expropriation.861 
If an expropriation is indeed found, the Tribunal will examine whether such 
expropriation is lawful under the applicable BIT.862 This question is critical, as it will 
determine the extent of compensation that investors are entitled to.863 In the case of 
unlawful expropriation, the investor is entitled to reparation for all damages sustained, 
as opposed to lawful expropriation where the investor is only entitled to “fair 
compensation.”864 The majority of BITs provide that for an expropriation to be lawful, 
the state measure must serve a public purpose, must not be discriminatory, must 
follow due process, and must grant the investor appropriate compensation.865 At 
present, the measures taken by the Greek government, including both the introduction 
of CACs as well as the bond exchange have already been considered to be for a 
legitimate public purpose by the ECtHR, namely financial stability.866 However, as 
previously discussed, the implementation of the bond exchange can be deemed 
discriminatory and in violation of due process given the lack of actual negotiations for 
the debt restructuring. 
In conclusion, as shown above, bondholders will have difficulty proving that 
an indirect expropriation did, in fact, take place. This will largely depend on the 
effects of the bond exchange on investors. If, however, an indirect expropriation is 
found to have taken place in the case of the Greek haircut or the imposition of CACs, 
then Greece would be obligated to pay compensation to all investors. 
 
“Umbrella” clauses 
Apart from the aforementioned specific protection against expropriation 
awarded under practically all BITs, investors may also be able to invoke BIT 
protection on other bases. One test followed by case law is the existence of a pacta 
sunt servanda, also known as an umbrella clause in BITs.867 Under this clause, a host 
state undertakes to abide by other obligations it has assumed in relation to protected 
                                                          
860 Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award (2004) 
861 Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award (2004) 
para.177 
862 See Suzy H. Nikièma, Compensation for Expropriation, The International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, Best Practise Papers (2013) p.4. See also Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/94/2, para. 94 
863 See Suzy H. Nikièma, Compensation for Expropriation, The International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, Best Practise Papers (2013) p.4. 
864 See Factory At Chorzów, Germany v Poland, Judgment, Claim for Indemnity, Merits, Judgment No 
13, PCIJ Series A No 17(1928) 
865 Expropriation - UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, 
(UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/7). 
866 Mamatas and Others v. Greece, ECtHR, (2016), para, 71 
867 Thomas W. Wälde, The “Umbrella” (or Sanctity of Contract/Pacta sunt Servanda) Clause in 
Investment Arbitration: A Comment on Original Intentions and Recent Cases, Transnational Dispute 
Management, October (2004), p.1  
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investments.868 All commitments undertaken by the host state towards the investors 
must be observed.869 Umbrella clauses are intended to place all contractual terms 
under the “umbrella” of international law, granting investors protection under the BIT 
and not merely under domestic law.870  
The very existence of an umbrella clause elevates any contractual commitment 
to a treaty commitment, allowing a bondholder to bring a fully judicable claim under 
investment arbitration.871 Hence, under such clause, sovereign bond restructuring 
might constitute a wrongful international act ipso facto.872 Indeed, a unilateral 
amendment of the terms of the bonds might be considered as a breach by the host 
state insofar as its contractual obligations for repayment of the bonds’ face value plus 
the due interest is concerned.873 Consequently, in keeping with the umbrella clause, 
such a breach could also be considered a breach of the respective BIT.874 
V. Greece’s Defenses: The Doctrine of Necessity 
The doctrine of necessity stems from customary international investment law.875 
It stipulates that a state cannot be held liable for actions taken in order to avert a State 
of emergency.876 As to what constitutes a State of emergency, Art. 25 of the Articles 
on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, provides that the 
wrongfulness of action by the state will be precluded if two conditions are met.877 
Primarily, the state must have acted in order to secure an essential interest from a 
significant and imminent peril; and secondly, such actions should not have 
significantly prejudiced the interests of the state or the international community 
towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.878 
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Importantly, this doctrine cannot be invoked by a state if the state has contributed to 
the situation that caused the necessity.879  
 The above statutory language was examined by the Tribunal in the Russian 
Claim for Interest on Indemnities case,880 wherein the Tribunal concluded that the 
non-payment of public debt may be justifiable in extreme economic circumstances.881 
The above defense was also used by Argentina in cases brought against it for 
measures taken during the financial crisis of 2001.882 Nevertheless, in 2008, when the 
ICSID tribunals issued their decisions on four cases, the awards did not shed much 
light as to how the doctrine of necessity is to be applied in cases of extreme financial 
crises. These awards have been criticized as being founded on poor legal reasoning 
and having several flaws in the sense that the tribunals interpreted the BIT in a 
questionable manner, while the awards contradict one another although they refer to 
similar facts.883 In fact, three of the four tribunals884 have rejected the necessity 
defense and have held Argentina fully responsible for its course of action during the 
financial crisis, while the fourth tribunal exonerated Argentina of its liability for those 
acts to a great extent.885 
Greece could argue that the haircut was the only way to avoid unregulated 
insolvency and that the rights of investors and their respective states have not been 
disproportionately affected. Moreover, Greece would have to prove the above claim 
because the party invoking the affirmative defense has the burden of proof to evince 
its elements are met.886 It is, however, questionable whether such assertion would be 
sufficient to preclude liability for the retroactive implementation of CACs and the 
haircut in general. Surely, it must be taken into account that the Greek crisis was the 
immediate aftermath of a global financial crisis that was unprecedented in terms of 
proportion and, therefore, unpredictable to a certain extent. However, it should not be 
forgotten that this was also the biggest haircut worldwide, with investors losing 
approximately 75% of their investment.887 It is further worth exploring whether 
investors may counterclaim that Greece contributed to the financial crisis, but such 
                                                          
879 ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries’, 
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argument would be very difficult to prove given that no forum would have the 
authority to judge the merits of such claim that challenge to the fiscal policy of a 
state.888 
VI. General Remarks 
As already mentioned, if GGBs are deemed to fall under the protection of 
BITs, there are various arguments that investors may use in order to invoke a breach 
of the standard of such protection. These arguments have also been used in 
Argentina’s jurisprudence with relative success by the investors.889 Greece might be 
able to escape liability from such arguments and claims by invoking the doctrine of 
necessity, the applicability of which in such cases is not yet definite.  
In addition to bringing a claim on the basis of the BIT, bondholders have the 
opportunity to formulate a claim based upon a breach of contract referring to the 
GGBs. This is due to the fact that treaty violations go hand-in-hand with contract 
claims.890 Of course, whether there has been a breach under a BIT is a different 
question than whether there has been a breach under the contract, and consequently, it 
is to be examined on the basis of different legal frameworks. Thus, in the case of 
breach of BIT, international law will be of relevance, while national law will be 
considered when establishing the existence of a breach of contract.891 In any case, 
even if an investor’s claim is based on a BIT, the Tribunal may still determine that the 
claim is essentially contractual,892 although, there isn’t always a clear distinction 
between treaty and contractual claims. 
As evident from the above, although in cases of sovereign default investors 
can incur significant losses, nonetheless finding reparation can be a strenuous and 
lengthy procedure which may ultimately not lead to the desired result due to the 
inability to enforce an award in an investor’s favor. That is why investors are 
resorting to various mechanisms of added protection against such events. One of the 
most used mechanisms is the claim for credit default swaps. Credit default swaps 
(CDS) will be briefly examined below. 
VII. Remedies for Risks Incurred 
CDS are insurance contracts aimed to transfer credit risk. They are entered 
into between a buyer and a seller, by virtue of which the seller undertakes to protect 
                                                          
888 Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. the Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 
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889 See generally Glinavos, Ioannis, Investors vs. Greece: The Greek 'Haircut' and Investor Arbitration 
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the buyer from the risk of default of a specific entity or asset, in exchange for the 
payment of a fee or premium by the buyer throughout the swap’s duration or until a 
credit event takes place.893 In return, the protection seller will pay the protection buyer 
an agreed amount if a specified credit event occurs during the life of the swap.894 In 
other words, CDS constitutes a form of insurance against certain credit events. As per 
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association’s (ISDA) Credit Derivative 
Definitions, a credit event occurs in one of seven instances, including, inter alia, debt 
restructuring (individual CDS contracts may provide protection against all or some of 
the seven credit events).895 
Many investors, for example, noticing Greece’s worrisome declining course, 
have purchased CDS in order to minimize their loss or even make a profit. 
Consequently, these investors may be eligible for compensation in keeping with their 
CDS contractual arrangements. 
Conditions for Compensation 
As explained above, in order for a CDS to become active, one of the 
specifically named credit events must occur. Amongst the circumstances that 
constitute credit events, ISDA has included the sovereign debt restructuring, i.e. a 
sovereign haircut.  
Although, based on the above, one could easily come to the conclusion that 
the Greek haircut should have triggered a CDS, the decision for that was not an easy 
one to take. The ISDA had expressed a preliminary view according to which, as long 
as the restructuring is voluntary, it does not constitute a credit event.896 Although the 
CDS definitions do not make a distinction between voluntary and involuntary events, 
this line of thinking is valid, since the meaning of restructuring implies an event that 
is binding on all bondholders, i.e. even those that voted against it.897 On these 
grounds, in October 2011, the ISDA announced that the Greek restructuring was not 
likely to trigger payments under CDS contracts.898 Based on such reasoning, CDS 
would not be used, adding further to investors' losses as they would not only be 
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unable to collect insurance but, furthermore, they would be obliged to continue to pay 
the premium for the remaining years of the insurance policy.  
The above dilemma was resolved following Greece’s decision to retroactively 
implement CACs on all Greek law-governed GGBs. Indeed, in March 2012, the ISDA 
announced that the introduction of CACs by the Greece, unilaterally amending the 
terms of Greek law governed bonds, constituted a Restructuring Credit Event, as the 
latter was no longer a voluntary event.”899 
Receiving compensation is, however, not as easy as it sounds. Indeed, many 
legal issues could arise that may hinder compensation. Some of those issues are 
presented below. 
Document risk 
The document risk refers to the industry’s reliance on the documentation of 
CDS Agreements.900 
To illustrate the issues that might be raised, the case of Argentina is once 
again indicative. In November 2001, Argentina announced a “one-time offer” for 
bond exchange.901 According to Argentina, the bond swap was voluntary, and as such, 
did not constitute a credit event.902 Rating agencies disagreed with the voluntary 
nature of the bond exchange, given that the prior attitude of the Argentine government 
did not leave much room for restructuring negotiations, leaving those who did not 
accept the exchange at greater risk than those who did.903 Despite the rating agencies’ 
statement, however, it was considered by ISDA that the agency’s declaration and a 
CDS credit event were not connected.904 Consequently, many protection sellers 
refused to pay compensation on CDS on the basis that the restructuring was 
voluntary.905 This was not left unanswered by the buyers and many cases were 
brought before the Tribunals.  
A common theme in all the rulings was that the Tribunal first addresses the 
agreement between the parties to see if the issue of a sovereign debt restructuring may 
be considered, under the existing circumstances, tantamount to coercive obligation 
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900Lily Tijoe, Credit Derivatives: Regulatory challenges in an exploding industry, 2007, p. 405. Available 
at 
http://128.197.26.4/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/banking/archives/documents/vloume26/ti
joe.pdf   
901 Andrew F. Cooper, Bessma Momani, Negotiating Out of Argentina’s Financial Crisis: Segmenting 
the International Creditors, New Political Economy, Vol. 10, No. 3, (2005) 
902 David Vines and C.L Gilbert, The IMF And Its Critics (Cambridge University Press 2004). 
903 Alfaro, Laura. "Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Evaluating the Impact of the Argentina Ruling." 
Harvard Business Law Review (forthcoming) 
904 ISDA, ‘Update on Greek Sovereign Debt Q&A’, op.cit. p.2 
905 Louise Bowman, 'ISDA: 50% Greek Haircut &#39; Voluntary&#39;, Likely No Credit Event For CDS' 
(Euromoney, 2011) <https://www.euromoney.com/article/b12kjfhmd2654z/isda-50-greek-haircut-
39voluntary39-likely-no-credit-event-for-cds> accessed 24 November 2017. 
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exchange.906 One, however, should not overlook that it is not for the Tribunals to 
decide upon such an issue.907 This would require the tribunals to foresee whether the 
parties in question will elect to participate in an obligation exchange, and, 
consequently, to conduct an economic analysis of the obligation exchange.908 
One can also understand the difficulties encountered by tribunals when 
interpreting ambiguous terms in a credit derivatives agreement. They may provide the 
protection seller with an opportunity to argue that the triggering event did not occur 
and no payment is due. Consequently, the wording of each CDS agreement is 
extremely important in each and every case. 
Short Squeeze Risk 
Another risk that may jeopardize bondholders’ right to compensation was 
demonstrated in the case of the Delphi Corp. bankruptcy in 2005.909 In this case, the 
excellent market position of Delphi Corp’s CDS prior to Delphi Corp’s petition for 
bankruptcy did not change after such petition, but certain persons, eager to make 
quick money, continued to massively purchase Delphi Corp’s CDS.910 Consequently, 
when parties to these CDSs attempted to buy Delphi Corp’s bonds in order to obtain 
coverage payment, the bonds’ prices had climbed back up.911 It should be stated that 
in many cases without ownership of the reference bonds, protection buyers will be 
unable to make physical deliveries for settlement and hence will not be able to receive 
compensation.912 In the case of Delphi Corp, after months of negotiations between 
CDS holders, an auction was held to determine the remuneration the protection buyers 
were entitled to.913 It was then decided to price the bonds “according to the market 
participants’ open positions and not as a result of speculation in the open market”914 
and that no physical deliveries were required. 
Short squeeze risk is also of relevance in the Greek Haircut case. Since Greece 
entered into the bailout mechanism, the number of CDSs purchased increased 
significantly, partly because of fear of Greece defaulting and partly on account of 
                                                          
906 Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati, 'CDS Zombies' (2012) 13 European Business Organization Law 
Review. 
907 Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati, 'CDS Zombies' (2012) 13 European Business Organization Law 
Review. 
908ISDA, ‘Update on Greek Sovereign Debt Q&A’, op.cit. p.2 
909 Lily Tijoe, 'Credit Derivatives: Regulatory Challenges In An Exploding Industry' (2007) 26 Annual 
Review of Banking Law. 
910 Lily Tijoe, 'CREDIT DERIVATIVES: REGULATORY CHALLENGES IN AN EXPLODING INDUSTRY' (2007) 
26 Annual Review of Banking Law. 
911 Richard Beales, ‘Uncertain Road ahead for Delphi’, Financial Times, Nov. 8, 2005.  
912 Richard Beales, ‘Uncertain Road ahead for Delphi’, Financial Times, Nov. 8, 2005 
913 Richard Beales, ‘Uncertain Road ahead for Delphi’, Financial Times, Nov. 8, 2005 
914Lily Tijoe, op.cit. p. 403 
180 | P a g e  
 
speculators looking for quick gains.915 This demonstrates the absence of supervision 
and regulation in this field, as well as the unregulated and unsettled state of payments 
procedures. 
VIII. Conclusions and Perspectives 
When it comes to investors’ protection in such cases as sovereign debt default 
and the subsequent sovereign debt restructuring, it is obvious that the international 
community lacks a comprehensive, consolidated, and binding legal framework. There 
is a very large number of BITs, each of them – despite their similarities – attempting 
to prevent or solve specific bilateral investment-related issues, aiming to protect the 
investment by the establishment of mandatory standards of treatment. That stated, due 
to the large number and variety of BITs, the extent of protection offered may vary 
significantly from one BIT to another. 
All the above is verifiable in the case of Greece’s recent sovereign debt crisis. 
Spending more than it could afford in a period of global economic and financial crisis 
and, consequently, running growing budgetary deficits, Greece accumulated a sky-
rocketing public debt.916 Moreover, refinancing this debt proved to be extremely 
difficult due to the almost “dry” financial market and significantly higher interest 
rates.917 To this end, Greece resorted to two debt restructurings in 2011 and 2012, 
severely jeopardizing bondholders’ rights that were, to a certain extent, forced to take 
part in the restructuring due to the unilateral introduction of CACs by the 
Bondholders Law, No.4050/2012, and sustained significant losses as a result. 
Six years after the bond exchange, bondholders have still been unable to 
obtain reparation, despite having appealed both to the ECtHR and ICSID. In the 
former, substantive human rights law appeared to allow states much discretion to take 
measures in response to economic or social crisis, even when this can affect 
bondholders’ rights that should be aware of the risks. In the latter, ICSID did not rule 
on the merits, but instead denied jurisdiction on the basis of the BIT’s wording of the 
term investment. Although such a ruling may seem discouraging for investors, 
nonetheless, a large part of the BITs signed by Greece contain more favorable 
wording that could permit a different interpretation. 
If such hindrance is overcome, and bonds are deemed to fall under the 
protection of BITs, there are various arguments that investors may use in order to 
invoke a breach of the standard of such protection. These arguments have also been 
used in Argentina’s jurisprudence with relative success by investors. Greece might be 
                                                          
915 See Darrell Duffie, Is there a case for banning short speculation in sovereign bond markets? 
Banque de France, Financial Stability Review, No. 14 – Derivatives – Financial innovation and stability, 
(2010) 
916 R. M. Nelson, P. Belkin, D. E. Mix, Greece’s Debt Crisis: Overview, Policy Responses, and 
Implications,  CRS Report for Congress (2011) 
917 Stratfor, 'Greece Postpones A Crisis' (Forbes.com, 2015) 
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November 2017. 
181 | P a g e  
 
able to escape liability from such claims by invoking the doctrine of necessity, 
although its applicability is not yet definite in sovereign debt restructuring cases. 
Aware of these significant shortcomings, governments endeavor to continue 
negotiations for reaching an agreement capable of covering the most important 
aspects of FDI, including sovereign debt, sovereign default, and sovereign debt 
restructuring. Unfortunately, the pace of such negotiations is still very slow and has 
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I. ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the nature of sovereign bonds as contracts and studies 
whether contractual terms contained in sovereign bond contracts may offer sufficient 
protection to investors in case of sovereign bond restructuring or sovereign default. 
This paper focuses on the contractual terms found in Greek sovereign bonds prior to 
the Greek sovereign bond restructuring of 2012 and explores whether such terms were 
sufficient to award protection to bondholders that sustained losses due to the 
restructuring. Special attention is given to the ramifications of the governing law on 
the interpretation of all contractual terms. Lastly, the paper explores the development 
of contractual terms following the Greek sovereign bond restructuring of 2012 and 
how newly issued Greek sovereign bonds have additional or modified terms to 
address bondholders’ concerns and award them a more comprehensive contractual 
framework for the protection of their rights. 
II. INTRODUCTION 
Sovereign default is a paradox in and of itself; primarily because of the 
undeniable state power over the creditors, but also on account of the fact that creditors 
would need to overcome States’ sovereignty to secure their rights.918 
Looking through history one can see that not so long ago, prior to the Second 
World War, creditors would rely to diplomatic protection by their national state to 
secure their rights. Of course, that required that they were not nationals of the 
defaulting state and their national state had the willingness to pursue or force return of 
investments through diplomatic or military means.919 Indicatively, the Drago Porter 
Convention of 1907 provided that states should first attempt to arbitrate peacefully 
claims raising from sovereign indemnity before resorting to military means.920 If 
                                                          
918  K. H. F. Dyson, “States, Debt & Power: 'Saints' & 'Sinners' in European History & Integration”, 
Oxford University, 1995 p. 240 
919 M. Winkler, “Foreign Bonds: An Autopsy”, Beard Books, 1999, p.146, See also J. P. Bohoslavsky, M. 
Goldmann, “An Incremental Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Sovereign Debt Sustainability 
as a Principle of Public International Law”, the Yale Journal of International Law Online, Vol. 41(2), 
2016 
920 K. H. F. Dyson, op.cit. p. 240 
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creditors’ national states were unwilling or unable to assist in the pursuance of the 
creditors’ claims, lenders were left with no recourse, other than to negotiate an 
acceptable settlement by trying to assert pressure on the state through the threat of 
denial of future lending.921 
Resorting to litigation was not an option available for creditors, as states 
enjoyed absolute immunity from suit in national courts, which essentially rendered it 
impossible for a creditor to find a venue to pursuit his claims, other than the courts of 
the defaulting state, an option that seemed to provide little comfort with creditors.922 
Following 1945, however, as several studies923 seem to suggest, there has been a shift 
away from this approach and more and more cases of sovereign default have been 
brought before national Courts. This is partially because there was a change in the 
terms of sovereign bonds, so that it is now common practice for States to waive in 
advance their right to claim immunity from jurisdiction in the terms of issuance.924 
Additionally, the developments in international law, where the right to resort against 
States in national courts has been widely recognized,925 have also contributed to that 
shift. That stated, the issue of enforcement of judgement against States is still a thorny 
issue and it comes as no surprise that it has been a long-standing belief in 
international macroeconomics that sovereign debt cannot be enforced.926 
Hence, claiming and enforcing investors’ rights against sovereign states is not 
an easy task. Indeed, unlike insolvency of other entities, there is not any uniform legal 
framework regulating insolvency of sovereign states. Therefore, there is a regulatory 
vacuum not only in relation to substantive law, but also on all enforcement.  
This paper will address investors’ rights in case of sovereign default from a 
contractual perspective and will examine if the legal framework available for breach 
of contract suffices to provide an efficient and complete framework for the 
satisfaction of investors’ claims in case of sovereign default. This paper will primarily 
focus in the Greek bonds’ restructuring of 2012, but will draw wider conclusions for 
bondholders’ protection. 
III. The Legal Nature of Sovereign Bonds 
The legal nature of sovereign bonds can be difficult to define, as bonds can be 
understood in a number of ways, including as investments, capital rising tools, 
                                                          
921 W. Mark C. Weidemaier, “Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt”, University Of Illinois Law 
Review, Vol. 2014, p.68 
922W. Mark C. Weidemaier supra p. 68 
923 See J. Schumacher, C. Trebesch, H. Enderlein, Sovereign Defaults in CourtThe Rise of Creditor 
Litigation 1976 – 2010”, working paper, 15 February 2013.  
924W. Mark C. Weidemaier, A. Anna Gelpern “Injunctions in Sovereign Debt Litigation”, (draft dated 
November 15, 2013) available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1319/, last accessed 
02.02.2016 
925 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 
926C. M. Reinhart, K. S. Rogoff, The Aftermath of Financial Crises, American Economic Review, 
American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 466-72, (2009) 
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financial instruments, on balance-sheet debt security etc..927Additionally, sovereign 
bonds can take several forms including, inter alia, conventional bonds, convertible 
bonds, zero-coupon bonds floating rate notes etc.928 To better evaluate the legal nature 
of sovereign bonds, it is best we review how these are issued and the modus by which, 
these are offered to the public. 
Generally, the legal framework regulating the issuance of bonds is different in 
each state. That stated, in light of the establishment of the international bond market, 
one can notice several similarities in the bond-issuance process set by such 
frameworks. Especially, within the Eurozone the process followed for the issuance of 
sovereign bonds by the Member States is, to a large extent, similar. Such process can 
be broken down in roughly 3 phases:  the pre-issuance, the issuance and the closing. 
On the pre-issuance phase, the issuer will select a Lead Manager, which most likely 
will be an investment bank that will undertake to approach and negotiate with 
prospective underwriters for the formation of a syndicate,929 following the preparation 
of the legal documentation and prospectus for the new bonds. The involvement of a 
Lead Manager is necessary in light of the fact that states do not have their own 
banking facilities. 930 At this stage, the Issuer will also proceed to announce the new 
issue and will send formal invitations, along with the preliminary Offering Circular 
and timetable, to prospective underwriters to take part in the syndicate. The 
underwriters will normally be investment and commercial banks as well all other 
institutional investors. Following such announcement and in line with the timetable 
provided, the Lead Manager will liaise with other underwriters to form a Managing 
Group. The Managing Group will negotiate and finalize the terms of the issuance 
together with the issuer, following which the syndicate will need to accept or reject 
the finalized issuance terms within approximately 24 hours.931 This is where the 
issuance stage begins. If the terms are accepted, the Syndicate will enter into a 
Subscription Agreement together with the Issuer that will contain all details pertaining 
to the issuance. Once the Subscription Agreement is entered into, the underwriting 
syndicate (I.e. members of the syndicate that have agree to underwrite the bonds 
offered at the issuance) will “underwrite” the bonds by guarantying to the Issuer the 
payment of the previously agreed price for the shares.932 The Lead Manager will 
notify the members of the underwriting syndicate of their allotments and the final 
                                                          
927S. Weber, The law applicable to bonds, in Hans Van Houte (ed), The Law of Cross-Border Security 
Transactions, Sweet and Maxwell, 1999, p.29 
928For an analysis of the features of each bond instrument see M. Choudhry, The Eurobond Market in 
F. J. Fabozzi, Handbook of Finance, Financial Markets and Instruments, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (2008) 
pp. 276-278 
929Although notably a large number of countries no longer use syndicates, but instead these have 
been replaced by auctions, see G.J. Schinasi, R.T. Smith, Fixed-Income Markets in the United States, 
Europe and Japan: Some Lessons for Emerging Markets”, IMF Working Paper, 98/173, (1998) 
930 E. Borchard, J. S. Hotchkiss State Insolvency and Foreign Bondholders: General Principles, Volume 1 
Beard Books, (1951), p. 45 
931 M. Choudhry, Bond and Money Markets: Strategy, Trading, Analysis Butterworth-Heinemann p.387 
932 S. Heffernan, Modern Banking, John Wiley & Sons, (2005) p. 560 
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Offering Circular will be distributed.933 Following this, at the closing state, the bonds 
are offered in the secondary market by the members of the selling group, usually sold 
over the counter,934and the underwriting syndicate needs to pay the Issuer that agreed 
amount. 
Hence, despite the complexity of the legal framework and the many 
intermediaries that exist during the bond issuance process, we can summarize that 
bonds are generally treated as loan contracts between the issuer and the subscriber,935 
demonstrated by transferrable debt securities that the issuer issues to the initial 
subscribers,936 by virtue of which the subscriber acquires the bonds, thus providing 
medium or long-term financing to the issuer, in exchange for payment of the nominal 
amount plus interest upon maturity.937 This is confirmed by the wording found in 
several sovereign bonds when referring to the status of the bonds where it is stipulated 
that: “The Notes constitute direct, unconditional, unsubordinated and unsecured 
obligations of the Issuer”.938 
For the purposes, of this paper, only the closing stage is of relevance as this is 
the time sovereign bonds are granted to investors. Sovereign bonds are usually issued 
to investors by virtue of the following legal documents: 1) a fiscal agency agreement 
or trust agreement,939 2) a contract which entails the terms and conditions applicable 
to the bonds; 3) a prospectus disclosing the information necessary under applicable 
legislation to in relation to the issue of the bonds as well the issuer and the country 
itself and 4) a registration statement940 and based on such documentation investors 
purchase bonds that are sold/assigned to them. 
Therefore, the relation between the issuer and the bondholders is contractual. 
Hence, to explore bondholders’ rights under such contracts, primarily, we shall 
examine the law applicable to state contracts and sovereign bonds in particular. 
Applicable law is of the utmost importance to determine investors’ rights in case of 
sovereign default. It regulates both substantive and procedural issues and as will be 
                                                          
933 M. Choudhry, Bond and Money Markets: Strategy, Trading, Analysis Butterworth-Heinemann p.387 
934As to the reasons, bonds are usually sold over the counter see 
https://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/Secondary-Markets/Bond-
Market-Transparency-Wholesale-Retail/So-why-do-bonds-trade-OTC-/last accessed 02.09.2017 
935 S. Weber, The law applicable to bonds, in H. Van Houte, The Law of Cross-Border Security 
Transactions, Sweet and Maxwell, 1999, p.29 
936 P. R. Wood, International Loans, Bonds, Guarantees, Legal Opinions, Sweet & Maxwell, (2007) p. 
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937 J. Downes, J. E. Goodman, Barron's Finance & Investment Handbook. Barron's Educational Series, 
(2003), p. 12 
938See e.g, Greek Offering Circular dated 10 of April 2014 available at: https://ftalphaville-
cdn.ft.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Greece-Final-Offering-Circular-dated-10-April-2014.pdf 
939See Y. Liu, The Design and Effectiveness of Collective Action Clauses (2002) available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/liu.pdf 
940C. Stefanescu, Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign Bond Contracts and Their Effect 
on Spreads at Issuance (2016) available at 
http://www.efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA%20ANNUAL%20MEETINGS/2016-
Switzerland/papers/EFMA2016_0442_fullpaper.pdf , p. 10 
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demonstrated it can be a powerful weapon either in the hands of the state or of the 
investor. This explains why it is one of the “most sensitive legal issues”.941 
IV. Applicable law 
To determine applicable law governing the relation between the State and the 
investor(s), we must first explore how this relation was created, in other words what is 
the legal basis of such relation.  As already stipulated, in the case of bond issuance, 
the underlying relation between investors and the issuing state stems from sovereign 
bond contracts. 
The legal treatment of State contracts has been extensively discussed and although 
opposite views have been expressed,942 State contracts are generally treated 
differently from ordinary commercial contracts between non-state entities.943The 
reasons underlying such difference relate to the strong public policy considerations 
that usually apply in State contracts, while also the fact that a State differs from any 
other contractual party due to its exorbitant powers.944 These considerations are often 
interpreted in the application of public law and, in particular, administrative law,945 
and the exercise of State’s discretion on the negotiation, conclusion, operation and 
termination of such contracts.946Although, different states may regulate State 
contracts differently within their national law, nonetheless the distinction between 
ordinary commercial contracts between private parties and State contracts appears to 
be recognized universally in several national legal systems.947 
Hence, the question of the law applicable to such contracts is one that has raised 
questions amongst scholars as well as arbitral tribunals, with various theories coming 
forward. According to such theories we can distinguish between the following laws 
that can be applicable to state contracts: 1) national law, 2) international law 3) the 
law chosen by the parties and 4) lex fori. 
 
                                                          
941 R. Dolzer, Ch. Schreuer, “Principles of International Investment Law”, OUP, (2008), p. 74 
942See for example P. R. Wood, “Conflict of Laws & International Finance”, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007, 
p.60, where it is stipulated that “there are no special rules applying to state commercial contracts”. 
943 UNCTAD, “State Contracts”, UNCTAD Serieson issues in international investment agreements, UN 
Publication, 2004, p. 5 
944 P. Wautelet, International Public Contracts: Applicable Law and Dispute Resolution, available at 
https://orbi.ulg.ac.be/bitstream/2268/136404/1/Wautelet%20-%20Applicable%20Law%20(final).pdf, 
last visited 09.02.2017 
945Ch. Leben, La théorie du contratd'Etat et l'évolution du droit international des investissements», 
RCADI, 2003, t. 302, p. 197.  
946UNCTAD, ibid. p.5 
947UNCTAD supra. See also C. Turpin, Government Contracts, Penguin,1972., although see, P. R. 
Wood, “Conflict of Laws & International Finance”, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007, p. 60 where he argues that 
state contracts entered into between a sovereign government and non-state entity, should not be 
treated fundamentally differently than private contracts. 
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A. National Law as applicable to State Contracts 
The application of national law in State Contracts, absent a “choice of law 
provision” to the contrary, has been supported by several scholars.948 This opinion 
was reinstated by the judgment of the Permanent International Court of Justice in its 
early case concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France, where 
the Court ruled that:949 “Any contract which is not a contract between States in their 
capacity as subjects of international law is based on the municipal law of some 
country. The question as to which this law is forms the subject of that branch of law 
which is at the present day usually described as private international law or the 
‘doctrine of the conflict of laws”. According to the above, the law applicable to State 
contracts would be the law of the host State.950 
There are various reasons to support such a claim. Primarily, according to the 
gravity test, by virtue of which, a contract is governed by the law with which the 
contract is most closely connected to. Indicatively, in a sovereign bond agreement, the 
issuer’s country is most likely the place where the bonds will be issued and the 
agreement will be signed and delivered, where the funds will be remitted to and from 
where they will be repaid.951 Hence the issuing State’s law should also be 
applicable.952Additionally, a sovereign bond agreement is very closely related to the 
financial interests of the State.953 Furthermore, applying the law of the issuing State is 
in line with the notion of sovereignty.954 In fact, the Committee established by the 
League of Nations to study international law contracts, concluded that: “every 
contract which is not an international agreement-i.e. a treaty between States- is subject 
                                                          
948Indicatively see: F.V. Garcia Amador, State Responsibility: Fourth Report by the Special rapporteur 
in International Responsibility, Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, U.B. Doc A/CN.4/119, 1959, p. 126 and F.A. Mann, 
State Contracts and State Responsibility in Studies in International Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973 
p. 302 
949 Caseconcerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France, Permanent Court of 
International Justice Judgment Series A No. 20 (1929) at p. 41 
950H. E.Kjos, Applicable Law in Investor-State Arbitration: The Interplay Between National and 
international law, Oxford University Press, [Oxford Monographs in International Law] 2013, p.172, See 
also G. Schwarzenberger, International Law, Stevens, 1957 about the conflict of laws criteria used by 
international Courts and Tribunals. 
951D. Sommers, A. Broches, G. Delaume, Conflict Avoidance in International Loan and Monetary 
Agreements, Lam &Contem. Prob. 21 (1956) p. 466 
952 T.Gazzini,E. De Brabandere, International Investment Law: The Sources of Rights and Obligations, 
MartinusNijhoff Publishers, 2012, p.223 
953But see criticism of this view by T.W. Wälde, The Serbian Loans Case - A Precedent for Investment 
Treaty Protection of Foreign Debt?, TDM 4, 2004 p. 383 and also the outcome of the case Alsing 
Trading Co. v. Greece, Python (Sole Arbitrator), 1954, Rev. Arb., 1980, where despite Greece’s 
argument that Greek law should apply to the loan agreement the tribunal ruled in favor of the 
application of the law of the tribunal’s seat, as indirectly chosen by the parties along with the seat of 
the tribunal. 
954 H. E. Kjos, ibid  p.172 
194 | P a g e  
 
(as matters now stand) to municipal law”.955 Thus, it is often the case that the 
governing law of such State contracts is in fact their national law.956 
This is also supported by the International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility, but also by tribunals’ case law.957 Indicatively, in the F. Wintershall 
A.G. v. Qatar case958, which concerned a claim for expropriation of contractual rights 
by the Government of Qatar due to an alleged termination of an Exploration and 
Production Sharing Agreement, the Tribunal applied the gravity test and ruled that the 
law of Qatar was applicable. The same conclusion was reached by ICSID in the 
Société Ouest Africaine des BétonsIndustriels v. Senegal case959 where the Tribunal 
considered that the law applicable “in respect of a project that was to take place in 
Senegal, can only be Senegalese law”.960It should moreover be stated, that ICSID 
Convention particularly regulates this matter in Art. 42(1). The latter provides that, in 
the absence of a choice of law clause in the State Contract, the Tribunal will apply the 
“law of the Contracting State Party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict 
of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable”961 In fact, in the 
Noble Ventures Inc. v. Romania case962 the ICSID Tribunal explicitly stated that there 
is a distinction between national law and international law, while in the Sea-Land 
Service, Inc v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ports and Shipping 
Organization963 the Tribunal applied Islamic law as the law more relevant to the 
facts.964 
Currently, the large majority of sovereign bonds in Member States in the 
Eurozone are governed by the national law of the respective state, as part of a choice 
of law clause.965 The graph below is revealing to this end: 
                                                          
955Report on the Committee for the Study of International Loan Contracts, League of Nations 
Publication II, Economic and Financial, 1939, p. 21 
956UNCTAD, ibid p.5. 
957 H. E. Kjos, ibid p.173 
958 F. Wintershall A.G. v. Qatar, Partial Award of 5 February 1988 and Final Award of 31 May 1988, 
I.L.M. 795, 1989. 
959 Société Ouest Africaine des BétonsIndustriels v. Senegal, ICSID Case No. ARB/82/1,1988 
960 Société Ouest Africaine des BétonsIndustriels v. Senegal, supra par. 5.02 
961ICSID Basic Documents, Doc. ICSID/15, 1985 
962 Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11. 
963 Sea-Land Service, Inc v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ports and Shipping 
Organization, Award No. 135-33-1 of 22 June 1984 
964But see also Anaconda-Iran, Inc. v Iran and NICIC, 1986 where the ICSID Tribunal found that in the 
absence of a choice of law clause it could be inferred that that the parties had explicitly refuted the 
other party’s national law. 
965I. Tirado,  Current EU Mechanisms to confront Sovereign Insolvency in C.Espósito, Y. Li, Juan 
P.Bohoslavsky, Sovereign Financing and International Law: The UNCTAD Principles on Responsible 
Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, Oxford University Press, (2013), p. 317 
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Source: IMF Working Paper966 
 
It must be stated that in cases of sovereign bonds, applying the national law of 
the Debtor State can be highly prejudicial for investors’ rights, as the State will 
maintain the legislative power to amend the law and frustrate investors’ rights.967This 
is what happened in the case of the Greek Sovereign Bond Exchange. On February 
23, 2012, just days before the Exchange, Greece enacted the Greek Bondholders’ 
Law, No. 4050/2012 partially amending the terms of Greek sovereign bonds issued 
prior to December 31, 2011, through the introduction of Collective Action Clauses 
(CACs). Such clauses allowed the majority of 2/3 of the total number of Greek law 
governed bondholders, to bind all other bondholders with their decisions and not 
allow individual investor(s) to act solely by accelerating the bond or initiating 
litigation in the event of default.  
B. International Law as applicable to State Contracts 
Another theory that had recently gained some grounds in relation to the law 
applicable to state contracts is that of the internationalization of state contracts. This 
theory suggest that regardless of the application of national law to a state contact, this 
cannot “entirely exclude the direct applicability of international law in certain 
situations”.968 Hence, as per the theory of internalization of state contracts, 
international law is automatically applicable to state contracts as overriding, 
regardless of the provisions of national law.969  The application of international law to 
                                                          
966 U. S. Das, M. G. Papaioannou, C. Trebesch, Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950–2010: Concepts, 
Literature Survey, and Stylized Facts, IMF Working Paper, Monetary and Capital Markets Department 
(2012) p. 42 
967M. Gruson, R. Reisner, Sovereign Lending: Managing Legal Risk, Euromoney Publications, (1984). 
968 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/3, 1993, para. 80 
969A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, State Contracts in Contemporary International Law; Monist versus Dualist 
Controversies, EJIL (2001) Vol.12 (2) pp. 309-328 
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override applicable national law is of particular importance to safeguard investors’ 
rights, as, as indicated, otherwise states may simply “adjust” their national law to 
better suit their interests at the expense of investors’ rights. 
To avoid such instances and ensure the application of international law, state 
contracts often provide “stabilization clauses”, which aim to make the terms of a state 
contract stable and fixed, not subject to changes by legislation or other means, and 
therefore minimizing non-commercial risks.970 Indicatively, in the case of Revere 
Copper & Brass, Inc. v. OPIC971, the Tribunal concluded that despite the prohibition 
of national law for State Executives to enter into agreements in breach of the 
constitutional principle of separation of powers, the State Contract was still valid and 
binding under public international law, by virtue of a stabilization clause. Similarly, in 
the Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. The 
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic,972 the Tribunal held that the contracts fell 
within the sphere of international law and national regulatory measures, including 
nationalization, could not nullify the effects of the contracts.973 
Despite, however, the importance of such clauses for enhanced protection of 
foreign investors from regulatory changes, such clauses are hardly -if at all- found in 
sovereign debt instruments. 
C. Choice of Law  
However, not all scholars favour the view that state contracts should be treated 
in a different manner than private commercial agreements from a conflict of laws 
perspective. Indicatively, Phillip R. Wood noted that state contracts, are not governed 
by specific rules and therefore the law of the state is not necessarily applicable.974 In 
accordance with the conflict of laws rules in most countries in the event the contract 
contains a choice of law provision, such term will be upheld.975 Indicatively, Article 1 
of the Resolution adopted in 1979 by the International Law Institute with respect to 
State contracts provides that State contracts “shall be subjected to the rules of law 
chosen by the parties or, failing such a choice, to the rules of law with which the 
contract has the closest link”.976 This seems to indicate that the applicable law is not 
based a new theory designed to extend the reach of international law or impose the 
                                                          
970L. Cotula, Stabilization Clauses and the Evolution of Environmental Standards in Foreign Investment 
Contracts, in O. Kristian Fauchald, D. Hunter, Yearbook of International Environmental Law, Volume 
17; Volume 2006, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 120 
971 Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. OPIC, AAA Award of August 24, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1321 (1978) 
972 The Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government 
of the Libyan Arab Republic, Ad Hoc Tribunal, (1977) 
973For an in-depth analysis see A. A.Fatouros, "International Law and the Internationalized Contract" 
Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 1859,(1980) available at 
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1859 
974 Philip Wood, Conflict of Laws & International Finance, The Law & Practice of International Finance, 
Vol. 1 (2007). 
975Indicatively, see Art. 3 Rome I Regulation.  
976 P. Wautelet, International Public Contracts: Applicable Law and Dispute Resolution in M. Audit & 
S., Schill at The Internationalization of Public Contracts, Bruylant. (2013). 
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application of the State’s national law to contracts concluded by States, but instead the 
application of classical rules of private international law,977 whereby the parties’ 
choice would be prevalent. 
Hence, the starting point would in such case be the will of the parties as same 
is expressed in the terms of the contract, in other words the choice of law clauses are 
of outmost importance. Indeed, arbitral tribunals as well as national Courts will 
uphold the parties’ choice vis a vis applicable law, adhering to the universally 
accepted principle of the “proper law of the contract”.978 Such choice of law clauses 
are autonomously upheld, regardless of the provisions of the international private law 
of the state979, as this is permissible under international law.980 Based on such clauses, 
the law applicable to state contracts can be a law different than that of the national law 
of the state involved,981 which therefore raises the question of which law can/should 
be chosen by the parties.  
Initially the choice of another states’ national law appeared an unpopular one, 
due to states’ unwillingness to submit to the laws of another state. Indicatively, prior 
to introduction of the Greek Bondholders’ Law, only 10% of Greek bonds were 
governed by other national legislation, mostly English law.982 This is what allowed 
the Greek Government to retroactively introduce CACs to Greek law-governed 
sovereign bonds and achieve such high participation in the bond exchange. Instead, 
Greek Sovereign Bonds governed by foreign law, were not affected by the Greek 
Bondholders Law No. 4050/2012, and thus bondholders of such foreign law bonds 
were able to not accept the terms of the bond exchange and hold out instead. In fact, 
more than half of such bonds under English, Japanese and Swiss law were not subject 
to the exchange and have serviced according to their original terms.983 Similarly, other 
larger economy states within the EU, such as the UK and Germany, issue almost all of 
their bonds under national law.984 
Hence, this raises the question under which circumstances a state will accept 
to be subject to a foreign state’s law. This can be answered easily, if one reviews the 
applicable law to Greek sovereign bonds at present. Greece re-entered the capital 
markets on July 25th, 2017 after three years, by offering five-year sovereign bonds 
                                                          
977J. Verhoeven, 'Droit international des contrats et droit des gens',Revue Belge de droit international, 
203-203 (1978-79) 
978See Dalmia Cement Ltd. v. National Bank of Pakistan, International Chamber of Commerce, 
Arbitration Tribunal (1976), para 130 
979 Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial 
Arbitration Awards, Oceana Publications, 1978, p. 96 
980 R. D. Bishop, J. Crawford, W. M.Reisman, Foreign Investment Disputes: Cases, Materials, and 
Commentary, Kluwer Law International, 2005 p. 259 
981 M.Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge University Press, (2010), p. 284 
982 See Μ.Gulati, L.C. Buchheit, How to Restructure Greek Debt, Duke Law Working Papers, Paper No. 
47, (2010), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2336. 
983 M.Chamon, J. Schumacher, C.Trebesch, Foreign Law Bonds:Can They Reduce Sovereign Borrowing 
Costs (2015) available at https://events.barcelonagse.eu/live/files/801-icf15-chamonpdf 
984 A. Clare, N. Schmidlin, The Impact of Foreign Governing Law on EuropeanGovernment Bond Yields, 
(2014)available at  https://ssrn.com/abstract=2406477 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2406477 
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equal to €3 billion, all of which were governed by English law. In fact, Finland 
proposed to all EU members that were experiencing financial crisis to increase the 
number of foreign law bonds they would issue to remain attractive for investors in the 
capital markets.985Similarly, countries with smaller economies where the domestic 
investor base is not so developed (e.g. like Cyprus), tend to issue foreign law bonds, 
to render their bonds more attractive to foreign investors that view foreign law as a 
security element.986 On the contrary, countries where there is an abundancy of 
domestic investors, mainly due to the financial stability and economic growth of the 
economy of such countries, tend to issue national law bonds. The prime example here 
would be Germany. This goes to show that despite the fact that governments bonds 
are not negotiated; nonetheless, foreign investors may indirectly avert pressure to 
secure better terms for their interests, but only when the interest from domestic 
investors is low. 
To this end, currently a large number of sovereign bonds worldwide are issued 
under foreign law.987 Out of such bonds, the large majority, approximately 90 percent 
of the foreign law bonds, are governed by New York or English law by virtue of an 
underlying choice of law provision.988 The choice of the applicable foreign law is 
important for many reasons. Primarily, because, in all likelihood, apart from choosing 
a foreign law as applicable to the bond contract, the courts of the foreign state whose 
law was chosen, will also be selected as competent. This is so, as the national courts 
of the foreign state are deemed to be in a better position to interpret and implement 
their own law.989 As it will be further discussed below, the competent courts are 
important not only for granting a favorable judgement for investors’ rights, but also 
for allowing investors to enforce such judgement. Additionally, depending on the 
applicable law, bonds may or may not contain certain clauses, while also the 
interpretation of some clauses maybe different from one jurisdiction to another. 
Indicatively, we shall explore below the treatment of the pari passu clause under US 
and English Law. 
For now, it suffices to say that regardless the governing law, so long as this is 
not the national law of the issuing state, this is a safeguard for investors. This way 
they can resist a forced restructuring and hold out, insisting on full repayment, as was 
the case with foreign law bondholders in the Greek Debt restructuring, or at the very 
                                                          
985 M. Chamon, J. Schumacher, C. Trebesch, Foreign Law Bonds: Can They Reduce Sovereign 
Borrowing Costs (2015) available at https://events.barcelonagse.eu/live/files/801-icf15-chamonpdf 
986SA. Clare, N. Schmidlin, The Impact of Foreign Governing Law on European Government Bond 
Yields, (2014) available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2406477 or 
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987 Frankel, Jeffrey, Sovereign debt at square one, Project Syndicate (2014). 
988 THE WORLD BANK, «Legal aspects of sovereign issuance in international capital market», Debt 
Management Forum 2014, Background Note for Breakout Session 8, available at 
http://treasury.worldbank.org/documents/BREAKOUTSESSION8final_1.pdf, see also R.W. KOLB, 
Sovereign Debt: From Safety to Default, John Wiley & Sons, 2011, as well as R. LA PORTA, F. LOPEZ-DE-
SILANES, A. SHLEIFER, R.W. VISHNY, «Legal Determinants of External Finance», in The Journal of Finance, 
n. 3, 1997. 
989 F. PARISI, Public Law and Legal Institutions, Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 493. 
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least negotiate from a better standing. It is for this reason that, in times of financial 
distress, foreign law bonds of the distressed state are often sold at a premium.990 
D. Lex Fori 
 Last but not least, in cases where state contracts, including sovereign bonds, 
have no underlying provisions regulating the choice of law, but the investment treaty 
contains arbitration clauses rendering one or more tribunals as competent to 
adjudicate a dispute stemming from a contract, arbitral tribunals under ICSID, 
UNICITRAL and ICC adopt an almost identical simplified approach.991 In particular, 
if the investment treaty does not offer guidance on the applicable law for disputes 
between the host state and the investor, the tribunals will apply lex fori, i.e. the law 
applicable to the relevant tribunal.992 
Contrary to the global Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) practice, most BITs 
signed by Greece do not contain a reference to ICSID but provide for investor-State 
provisions that are purely ad hoc clauses993. Indicatively, the Germany-Greece BIT 
specifically provides for the creation of an ad hoc arbitrary body with 3 arbitrators, 2 
of which will be designated by each contracting party, while the third will be chosen 
by the 2 pre-chosen arbitrators. The aforementioned BIT further provides that if it 
does not become possible for the Parties to choose the Arbitrators, same will be 
decided by the President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the vice 
President if the former is unavailable. In such cases, the rules of procedure and the 
steps to be followed are prescribed in the BIT text and the investors must act 
accordingly.  
V. Basic Contractual Clauses 
However, apart from the above, applicable law is also of the utmost 
importance in the interpretation of contractual terms and thus to investors’ case for 
breach of contract. To examine bondholders’ rights in case of sovereign default, we 
need to examine the common contractual terms found in sovereign bond contracts that 
may be affected from such default. For the purposes of this paper, we shall limit our 
analysis to the clauses found in Greek Sovereign Bonds.  
 
                                                          
990SeeM. Chamon, J. Schumacher, C. Trebesch, Foreign Law Bonds: Can They Reduce Sovereign 
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991O.Dörr, K.Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, Springer 
Science & Business Media, (2011), p.78 
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A. The “pari passu” clause 
Sovereign Bond Contracts will, most likely include a pari passu clause that 
will usually state that the bonds rank “pari passu” with one another without any 
preference among themselves and with the other unsecured obligations of the 
issuer.994 The meaning of the said clause has recently puzzled both academia as well 
as practitioners, in light of recent adjudication re its interpretation.  
Summarily, the pari passu clause has been interpreted in two ways: in a 
narrow sense whereby, all obligations assumed under the bond rank and will rank pari 
passu with all other unsecured debt, and in a broad sense by virtue of which if a 
debtor is unable to pay all its obligations, such obligations will be paid on a pro-rata 
basis.995 
The meaning of pari passu in the context of sovereign default was first 
examined in 1936 in the case of AB Obligationsinteressenter v. Bank for International 
Settlements,996 although pari passu clauses were introduced in sovereign bonds as 
early as 1871.997 In the said case, the Swiss Federal Court, judging under Swiss Law, 
had no difficulty interpreting the pari passu clause under the broad sense, as a promise 
that payment to investors would be made pro rata.998However, despite this 
interpretation, nonetheless, the Swiss Court was not willing to enforce such finding.999 
It was for this reason that the clause, until recently, did not receive much attention, 
considered as a “harmless relic of historical evolution”,1000 while the predominant 
belief amongst practitioners was that the clause should be interpreted in the narrow 
sense. 
However, the Elliott Associates v. Peru1001case changed this belief by 
reaffirming the Swiss Courts judgement. In the said case, the Court of Appeal of 
Brussels, examining New York law sovereign bonds, ruled that the version of the 
clause,1002 where the word “payment” was used in relation to the “pari passu,” could 
be used by investors to effectively claim that a state is not allowed to pay certain 
investors before it pays others. In fact, the Court of Appeal concluded that the pari 
                                                          
994 R. Olivares-Camina, The paripassu clause in sovereign debt instruments: developments in recent 
litigation, BIS Papers No 72 (2013) available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap72u.pdf 
995 Financial Markets Law Committee, PariPassu Clauses, Issue 79, (2005) p.  2 
996AktiebolagetObligationsinteressenter v. The. Bank for International Settlements, Swiss Federal 
Tribunal, (1936) 
997P. Mauro, Emerging Market Spreads: Then Versus Now, 117 Q.J. ECON. 695,695-96 (2002) 
998 A. Gelpern,Courts and Sovereigns in the Pari Passu Goldmines, Capital Markets Law Journal, Vol. 
7b(2016), p.2 
999 A. Gelpern, Courts and Sovereigns in the PariPassu Goldmines, Capital Markets Law Journal, Vol. 7b 
(2016), p.3 
1000 M. Gulati,R. E. Scott, The Three and a Half Minute Transaction: Boilerplate and the Limits of 
Contract Design, University of Chicago Press, 2013, p.46 
1001 Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Peru, Court of Appeal of Brussels, 8th Chamber, (2000). 
1002The wording of the 1983 sovereign bond contract provided that "The obligations of the Guarantor 
hereunder dorank and will rank at least pari passu in priority of payment with all otherExternal 
Indebtedness of the Guarantor, and interest thereon”, Declaration of Professor A. F. Lowenfeld, 'Il'll I, 
8, Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, Southern District of New York, (2000) 
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passu clause “has as a result that the debt should be paid down equally towards all 
creditors in proportion to their claim.”1003 To this end, the Court of Appeal granted an 
injunctive relief to Elliot Assocs. by virtue of which, Chase Manhattan and, most 
importantly, Euroclear were barred from making interest payment on Peru’s Brady 
bonds to European bondholders, as Elliot Associas. had a right of pro rate payment. 
Faced with a potential new default on its restructured Brady Bonds, Peru entered into 
an agreement and paid Elliott Associas. in full.1004 
Similarly, the District Courts of New York were asked to examine the 
meaning of the “pari passu” clause in the context of the recent Argentine sovereign 
default that concerned bonds of over $100 billion. The case was brought by NML 
Capital, an affiliate of Elliot Associas, who held sovereign bonds issued under a 
Fiscal Agency Agreement. Argentina was unable to fully repay the nominal value and 
interest of such bonds, that amounted approximately to 1,33 billion USD and to thus 
resorted to two offers of bonds’ exchange, whereby investors that held bonds under 
the Fiscal Agency Agreement could exchange their existing bond for new, 
unsubordinated and unsecured debt instruments1005 of lesser value reduced at 
approximately ¼ of the original value.  
To ensure the success of such bond exchanges, Argentina passed a law 
restricting payment to bonds that did not participate in the exchange. NML Capital 
argued this was breaching the pari passu obligations of Argentina under the sovereign 
bond contracts. The pari passu clause that was examined by the New York courts was 
two-pronged; the first prong related to the securities themselves, while the second 
prong related to the payment obligations of the Republic under the Securities. The 
District Court looking at the language of the clause, in line with US law standard 
principles of contract interpretation, noted that the second prong of the clause meant 
that Argentina was prohibited from making any payments on other bonds, unless 
payments were made also on the defaulted FAA bonds.  As such, the Court concluded 
that Argentina had breached the pari passu clause. To reach such conclusion, the 
District Court relied solely on the wording of the clause and did not make any 
reference to previous caselaw. The results of the said judgement were monumental for 
Argentina, as, in essence, Argentina was barred from issuing new bonds or servicing 
its restructured debt instruments.1006 
It should be stated that the outcome of the above cases might have been 
different, had these been examined under English law. Indeed, the Financial Markets 
                                                          
1003 Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Peru, Court of Appeal of Brussels, 8th Chamber, (2000), para. 
6. 
1004 R. Olivares-Caminal, "The Pari Passu Interpretation in the Elliott Case: A Brilliant Strategy but an 
Awful (Mid-LongTerm) Outcome?," Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40 (1) (2011), p. 44 
1005 'The PariPassu Clause As Applied In Argentina Sovereign Bonds Litigation' (Financier Worldwide, 
2017) <https://www.financierworldwide.com/the-pari-passu-clause-as-applied-in-argentina-
sovereign-bonds-litigation/#.WcQFVbJJbIU> accessed 21 September 2017. 
1006 M. Voris, M.Porzecanski, 'Argentina Debt Injunction To Be Lifted In Blow To Hedge Funds' 
(Bloomberg.com, 2017) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-19/argentina-bonds-
judge-says-he-will-lift-injunctions-on-debt-iku9ykz3> accessed 21 September 2017. 
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Law Committee issued a report on the role and meaning of pari passu clauses under 
English law. The report was triggered after the Elliott Associates v. Peru case and the 
Committee noted that apart from the literal interpretation of the wording of the clause, 
also the consequences of each interpretation should be considered. To this end, the 
Committee noted that as “a matter of English law the ranking (narrow) interpretation 
is the proper interpretation of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt 
obligations.”10071008 After all, English Courts ruled differently on the examination of 
the above facts, noting that Euro-denominated bonds were not subject to the rulings of 
US Courts as they were governed by English law.1009 
In the context of the Greek sovereign bond restructuring, such clause could not 
be used by the majority of investors, as, with a few exceptions, almost all Greek-law 
governed bonds, did not contain such “pari passu” clauses.1010 In fact, even in the new 
English law bonds that have been recently issued by Greece,1011 that contain pari 
passu clauses, Greece has introduced specific wording to avert the broad 
interpretation of such clauses by specifically denouncing the pro rata payment to 
bondholders, in line with the new pari passu model clause proposed by the 
International Capital Market Association (“ICMA”). ICMA’s proposed clause aims to 
exclude a pro-rata interpretation of the pari passu clause issuing explicit language to 
this end. In particular, the proposed clause reads: 
“The Notes are the direct, unconditional and unsecured obligations of the 
Issuer and rank and will rank pari passu, without preference among themselves, with 
all other unsecured External Indebtedness of the Issuer, from time to time 
outstanding, provided, however, that the Issuer shall have no obligation to effect 
equal or rateable payment(s) at any time with respect to any such other External 
Indebtedness and, in particular, shall have no obligation to pay other External 
Indebtedness at the same time or as a condition of paying sums due on the Notes and 
vice versa.”1012 
                                                          
1007 Financial Markets Law Committee, Pari Passu Clauses, Issue 79, (2005) p.  25 
1008See also L. Burn, Paripassu clauses: English law after NML v Argentina, Capital Markets Law 
Journal, Vol. 9 (1), (2014), where the author reaches the same conclusion in the context of the NML v. 
Argentina dispute. 
1009 See Knighthead Master Fund et al v. The Bank of New York Mellon et al (2014) as well as M. 
Guzman, J. Antonio O campo, J. E. Stiglitz, Too Little, Too Late: The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt 
Crises, Columbia University Press (2016), p.51 
1010M. Gulati & J. Zettelmeyer, Making a Voluntary Greek Debt Exchange Work, 7 Capital Markets Law 
Journal 169-183 (2012) 
1011Although, the paripassu clause contained in the terms and conditions of the exchanged bonds in 
the 2012 restructuring did not contain such specification and instead simply provided that “The Bonds 
rank, and will rank, pari passu among themselves and with all unsecured andunsubordinated 
borrowed money of the Republic. The due and punctualpayment of the Bonds and theperformance of 
the obligations of theRepublic with respect thereto arebacked by the full faith and credit of the 
Republic.”, which again is different from the wording found in Argentina bonds and would not allow a 
pro-rate interpretation. 
1012 G. Makoff, R.Kahn, Sovereign Bond Contract Reform Implementing the New ICMA Pari Passu and 
Collective Action Clauses, CIGI PAPERS, NO. 56 (2015), p.5 
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Hence, although the pari passu clause, can prove invaluable for the protection 
of some investors (usually the holdouts), nonetheless such clause is not always 
present in sovereign bonds, while even when such clause exists the wording and 
applicable law can diminish the broad interpretation of the clause, contrary to the 
holdouts aspiration. This was required so as to facilitate sovereign bond restructurings 
and therefore allow non-holdout bondholders to receive some compensation on their 
bonds, while also to limit the wide powers creditors enjoyed by holdouts under the 
broad interpretation of the clause that literally allowed creditors to hold states 
“hostages” in a state of financial duress.1013 
B. Collective Action Clauses 
As demonstrated in the case of Argentina, holdout creditors can have negative 
implications not only for the state and its ability to issue new bonds, but also for the 
entire restructuring process and therefore for other bondholders. To this end, an 
effective tool to minimize hold-out creditors are CACs. 
CACs take various forms but, despite their form, they all aim to resolve 
coordination problems between bondholders, especially in times of bond 
restructuring. CACs can be in the form of collective modification clauses, which 
allow a qualified majority of bondholders to decide for all bondholders, including 
dissenting bondholders, vis a vis modification of bonds’ terms, as well as in the form 
of acceleration clauses, whereby bondholders can accelerate or instigate legal action 
against the state only after a qualified majority of the bondholders has consented to 
this. Additionally, there also other less prominent forms of CACs, such as 
representation clauses, aggregation clauses and disfranchisement clauses.1014 
The importance of CACs was demonstrated after the peso crisis in Mexico, 
where CACs were promoted as a contractual tool to facilitate sovereign debt 
restructurings and eliminate the increasing cost of adjudication.1015 To this end, in 
1995 the Ministers and of the G10 countries formed a working group to study 
sovereign defaults and the problems faced in the said context. The Group issued its 
report in 1996 and it noted that introducing CACs into sovereign bond contracts might 
prove beneficial in smoothing negotiations during sovereign debt crises.1016 Despite 
however the Group’s recommendation, States met CACs with hesitation and 
                                                          
1013 Elmar B. Koch, Challenges at the Bank for International Settlements: An Economist's (Re)View, 
Springer Science & Business Media, (2007), p.91 
1014C. Stefanescu, Collective Action Clauses in International SovereignBond Contracts and Their Effect 
on Spreads at Issuance (2016) available at 
http://www.efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA%20ANNUAL%20MEETINGS/2016-
Switzerland/papers/EFMA2016_0442_fullpaper.pdf , p. 14 
1015 S. Haeseler, Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign Bond Contracts – Whence the 
Opposition? German Working Papers in Law and Economics from Berkeley Electronic Press (2007) 
1016 J. Drage, C. Hovaguimian, Collective Action Clauses (CACS): an analysis ofprovisions included in 
recent sovereign bond issues, Bank of England (2004), p.1 
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especially in bonds issued under local law, CACs were absent.1017Indicatively, before 
January 2013, the vast majority of sovereign bond contacts issued by Eurozone 
members were governed by each state’s national law and did not contain CACS.1018 
Greece was not an exception to this rule. As indicated, prior to the adoption of 
the Greek Bondholders’ Law, No. 4050/2012, the Greek sovereign bonds contained 
no collective action clauses and instead Greece unilaterally introduced such clauses 
retroactively by the Greek Bondholders’ Law. This unilateral modification of 
Eurozone sovereign bonds’ terms by legislative intervention of the issuing state, was 
what prompted the revision of the Treaty Establishing the European Stability 
Mechanism. The latter, inter alia, provides for a model CAC, developed by a sub-
committee of the Economic and Financial Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets, 
which must be mandatorily included in all Eurozone sovereign bonds with a maturity 
of greater than one year issued as of January 1st, 2013.1019As per Gelpern and Gulati, 
this revision was led by mostly two reasons; primarily the need for bonds to aspire 
security to investors that such unilateral acts, as that of the Greek Government, would 
not take place again in the future, but instead bondholders could rely on the terms of 
the sovereign bond contracts; secondly, the potential of CACs reducing bail-outs, as 
defaulted states had the ability to restructure their debts.1020 
Similarly, in 2014 the International Monetary Fund as well as ICMA both 
stressed the importance of CAC in facilitating restructuring processes and to this end 
suggested the reformation of sovereign bond contacts accordingly.1021 In fact, ICMA 
published proposed terms for aggregated CACs, which in revised again in May 
2015.1022 
 At present, we are going to review briefly the model CAC introduced in 
sovereign bonds in the Eurozone and shall explore if this can facilitate investors rights 
in the future, as, as indicated, it was used against investors in the case of Greece. 
Primarily, the model CAC is mandatorily applicable to issues of bonds 
internationally, as well as domestically, regardless if offered in the stock market or 
offered privately1023 and it can refer to a single bond or series of bonds. The model 
                                                          
1017 C. Hofmann, Sovereign-Debt Restructuring in EuropeUnder the New Model Collective 
ActionClauses, Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 49 p. 390 
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1020A, Gelpern, M. Gulati,"The Wonder-Clause", Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other 
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1022 'Sovereign Debt Information' (Icmagroup.org, 2017) 
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CAC sets a series of processes that need to be followed prior to the adoption of a 
binding modification on all bondholders. Primarily, the model CAC distinguishes 
between reserved matters, that are matters pertaining to the most crucial terms of the 
bonds, such as the payment date, interest rate etc., and non-reserved matters that relate 
to less crucial terms of the bonds. In the case of amendment of a reserved matter, a 
meeting of bondholders should be duly convened, in which bondholders holding at 
least 75% of the aggregate principal amount of outstanding bonds should vote in favor 
of the amendment. The percentage drops at 66 2/3% of the aggregate principal 
amount of outstanding bonds in case of written resolution. On the contrary, an 
amendment of a non-reserved matter can be achieved by the positive vote of 
bondholders’ holdings more than 50% of the aggregate principal amount of 
outstanding bonds present, either at a duly convened meeting, or in the form of 
written resolution.1024 The model CAC also provides rules for the conveyance of the 
bondholders’ meetings as well as the procedure to be followed during the meeting.   
As explained, the introduction of CACs in sovereign bonds’ issuance is a step 
in the right direction, both for the defaulting states, but mostly for bondholders. 
Especially the latter can now facilitate debt-restructuring negotiations, take binding 
decisions on issues that have a crucial bearing on the restructuring process and reduce 
the threat of holdouts that may lead to the inability of all other bondholders to collect, 
even partially. Indeed, even in the case of the Greek debt restructuring, where, as 
indicated, CACs were unilaterally and retroactively introduced by the Greek State, 
without the introduction of such clauses the restructuring of the sovereign debt might 
not have been possible,1025 something that could lead to Greece’s unregulated default. 
However, despite the fact that, indeed in the case of the Greek debt 
restructuring CACs allowed the successful completion of the restructuring, 
nonetheless the fact remains that bondholders sustained significant losses, which 
raises the question of whether there is a contractual term that may address such losses. 
To this end, we shall explore the use of “events of default” clause in such cases. 
C. Events of Default 
The “Events of Default” clause is of particular importance to bondholders as it 
allows them to accelerate the maturity of their bonds and take enforcement measures 
over the issuer’s assets in satisfaction of their claims.1026 In other words, bondholders 
may initiate proceeding against the issuing state to recover the nominal value of the 
bond plus interest, only once an event of default has taken place. Provided such an 
event of default has indeed occurred, bondholders would be able to accelerate all 
                                                          
1024Economic and Financial Committee, 'Common Terms of Reference Supplemental Explanatory Note 
– 26 March 2012' (2017) <https://europa.eu/efc/sites/efc/files/docs/pages/cac_-
_text_model_cac.pdf> accessed 27 September 2017. 
1025 A. E. Stolper, S. Dougherty, Collective action clauses: how the Argentinalitigation changed the 
sovereign debt markets, Capital Markets Law Journal (2017) 
1026M. Gulati, G. Triantis, Contracts without Law: Sovereign versus Corporate Debt, University of 
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amounts owed under the sovereign bond contract. Notably, however, bondholders 
rarely resume to such acceleration as a result of an event of default. Instead, in most 
cases bondholders will refer to an event of default so as to improve their bargaining 
power, however small that power may be.1027 Indeed, although in case of an event of 
default, bondholders have the right to accelerate and remove the issuing state’s assets, 
investors may not select to exercise this right. Instead, they will often enter into 
negotiations with the issuing state towards a modification of the terms of the 
sovereign bond contracts, without however this meaning that they forfeit their right to 
accelerate and enforce their claims. 
As to what constitutes an event of default, this will depend on the wording of 
each sovereign bond contract. That stated, we may broadly categorize events of 
default into two broad categories, whereby the first would include instances of non-
payment of amounts due and the second would refer to certain events of anticipatory 
non-payment. Indicatively, the majority of Greek sovereign bonds prior to the 2012 
restructuring would include the following definition of an event of default:1028 
• Failure to pay interest or principal (usually after a 30-day grace period) 
• Failure of other covenant obligation (usually a grace period is granted, 
and notice of default is required) 
• A government order or presidential decree is issued preventing Greece 
from performing its obligations under the bonds 
• A General Moratorium is declared on non-payment of principal. 
The question that arises therefore is whether the sovereign bond restructuring 
may constitute an event of default. Notably although the two terms intertwine, 
nonetheless they are not identical. To this end, in most cases an event of default will 
precede a sovereign bond restructuring.1029 Indeed, an event of default is directly 
linked to non-payment after the grace period has expired, when a restructuring is 
required. In the case of the Greek sovereign bond restructuring of 2012, however, 
there was no missed payment on the side of Greece vis a vis bondholders. However, 
what is of interest is whether the unilateral introduction of CACs can be deemed a 
“government order or presidential decree is issued preventing Greece from 
performing its obligations under the bonds”. 
A similar issue was examined by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (“ISDA”) that examined whether the unilateral introduction of CACs by 
the Bondholders’ Law was a “credit event” in the context of marketed credit default 
swaps (CDS). Although credit events are not limited to the events of default listed 
above and in fact name restructuring as a credit event, nonetheless it is of importance 
to review how ISDA treated the Greek sovereign bond restructuring. Primarily, ISDA 
                                                          
1027 P. Wood, How protective are Ukraine’s international bonds? Allen &Overy, (2015), p. 8 
1028E.g. See Hellenic Republic Offering Circular dated 21 February 2005 available at 
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took the view that given the voluntary nature of the bond exchange, the latter did not 
constitute a credit event. According to ISDA, no credit event is deemed to take place 
when the bond restructuring is voluntary. This reasoning does not stem from the CDS 
definitions which make no distinction between voluntary and involuntary events, but 
from the purposive interpretation of restructuring which intends to refer to an event 
binding on all bondholders, even those dissenting to it.  On these grounds, ISDA ruled 
Greek restructuring of 2011 was not likely to entail payments under CDS 
contracts.1030On the contrary, in 2012 ISDA concluded that the introduction of CACs 
by Greece, which unilaterally amended the terms of Greek law governed bonds 
constituted a Restructuring Credit Event. This was in light of the effect of such CACs 
was that it rendered the sovereign bond restructuring binding on all bondholders of 
Greek-law governed bonds, even those dissenting to it.1031 
However, despite this determination within the CDS context, contractually it is 
unlikely that the unilateral introduction of CACs could constitute an event of default 
and therefore be in a position to award bondholders an additional “card” on the 
restructuring negotiation table. Indeed, given the nature of CACs clauses, these do not 
constitute a change in the payment terms of the bonds, nor did they prevent Greece 
from performing its obligations under the bonds. Instead, it appears in the context of 
the Greek sovereign debt restructuring, the introduction of CACs was used to avert an 
event of default by Greece.  
D. Other Clauses 
Other clauses that can be found usually in sovereign bonds include clauses such as 
“negative pledge clauses” prohibiting the issuance of new collateralized debt unless 
existing debt is enhanced in the same way, “secured debt clauses” and “cross default 
clauses” that define a default on another government bond as a default event. 
 Prior to the Greek sovereign debt restructuring of 2012, Greek Bonds did not 
provide any security or other guarantees for the satisfaction of creditors in case of 
default. In addition, they did not entail negative pledge clauses protecting the 
bondholders who took out an unsecured loan. Negative pledge clauses provide that a 
State that has awarded unsecured loans cannot subsequently take out other loan(s) 
with a different lender, securing the subsequent loan(s) by the same specified assets. 
Use of the same assets as collateral would mean that the original lender would be 
disadvantaged because the subsequent lender may have a priority position to satisfy 
his claim by the assets in an event of default.  
Following the restructuring, however, this has changed. Indeed, the bonds that 
were offered to bondholders at the time of the restructuring contained negative pledge 
clauses, therefore preventing Greece from issuing any secured bonds for as long as 
                                                          
1030'ISDA - International Swaps And Derivatives Association, Inc.' (Www2.isda.org, 2011) 
<http://www2.isda.org/news/greek-sovereign-debt-qampa-update> accessed 6 October 2017. 
1031  ISDA - International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. 'ISDA EMEA Determinations 
Committee: Restructuring Credit Event Has Occurred with Respect to the Hellenic Republic, News 
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any of the restructured bonds remained outstanding. Interestingly, in the bonds issued 
during the Greek bond exchange of 2012, a wider definition of event of default was 
adopted including any failure by the issuing state to comply with any of the covenants 
contained in the new bonds, subject to a thirty-day cure period. Hence, a violation of 
the negative pledge clause would, under the new exchanged bonds, also constitute an 
event of default. 
Thus, such clause may be a useful tool for investors’ protection in case of 
future default, but are not relevant for investors’ rights prior to the 2012 restructuring. 
E. Waiver of Immunity clauses.  
One of the most important clauses for bondholders’ protection is the clause that 
specifically waives issuing state’s immunity for jurisdiction and enforcement.  
Enforcement is the motive for investors to pursue their claims against the Host State. 
It is the result of the judicial process. Nevertheless, enforcement against States is 
neither easy nor common. Indeed, up to the middle of the 20th century courts and 
scholars treated claims under sovereign bonds as unenforceable. Indicatively, in the 
English case of Twycross v. Dreyfus,1032  Sir George Jessel noted that sovereign 
bonds are only “engagements of honour” and not enforceable contractual obligations 
as no tribunal would enforce them absent the consent of the issuing state.  Indeed, 
States used to enjoy absolute immunity.1033 However, since the late 20th century, there 
has been a shift from absolute to relative immunity.1034  
We must here distinguish between immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from 
enforcement. The former provides that the national courts of a foreign state do not 
have jurisdiction to hear a lawsuit against another state, unless the letter has so 
consented.  On the other hand, immunity from enforcement restricts the powers of 
enforcement of national courts or other organs of state against the property of another 
state found in its jurisdiction. Absolute immunity awards to a state both immunity 
from jurisdiction, as well as from enforcement. On the contrary, relative immunity 
provides that when a sovereign chooses to enter the international marketplace and act 
in the way a commercial actor would, it cannot escape liability through invoking 
sovereign immunity, but instead it shall be similarly accountable to the judicial 
process similarly to other commercial actors.1035 
The issue of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction was recently examined by the 
Courts of Germany in the context of the Greek Sovereign Bond Exchange. Several 
German bondholders that had acquired Greek sovereign bonds from German Banks, 
in Germany, resorted to German Courts against Greece claiming damages for the 
unilateral introduction of CACs in their bonds that led to them sustaining a haircut on 
                                                          
1032 Twycross v. Dreyfus LR 5 Ch D 605 (1877)  
1033 W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt and the “Contracts Matter” Hypothesis, 
Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics (2017), forthcoming 
1034 W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt and the “Contracts Matter” Hypothesis, 
Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics (2017) forthcoming 
1035 L. Buchheit, Sovereign debt restructurings: the legal context, BIS Papers No 72 (2013) p. 107 
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their bonds. Bondholders’ claims were raised on two bases. Primary the claimed 
based on tort, asserting that the bond exchange was wrongful exchange and breach of 
contract. Secondly, bondholders raised claims for breach of contract. In all cases, 
German Courts examined whether they were barred from hearing any claims against 
the Greek state by virtue of sovereign immunity.  
As per German law, sovereign immunity does not apply to a State’s commercial 
acts, but only when a State is acting as sovereign. Hence, the German courts 
examined whether bondholders’ claims related to sovereign or commercial acts. 
Based on this, the Federal Court of Justice concluded that claims in tort were 
inadmissible, as the Greek Bondholders Law and the subsequent decision of the 
Council of Ministers’ ratifying the majority vote and extending its binding result on 
all bondholders, were acts taken by Greece as sovereign and therefore sovereign 
immunity applied.1036 The Court however noted that this was not necessarily the case 
for claims brought for breach of contract.  
Indeed, when German Courts examined bondholders’ claims for breach of contract, 
two Higher Regional Courts in Oldenburg and Cologne noted that no sovereign 
immunity was applicable as the claims stemmed from a contractual relation and the 
Greek Bondholders’ Law could not change this. However, the Schleswig Higher 
Regional Court contested that the significant point was not the non-payments by the 
Greek State, but the introduction of the Bondholders’ Law, which was in fact a 
sovereign act.  As per the Schleswig Court, the issue in question was whether the 
introduction of CACs by the Bondholders’ Law was legal, and examining the legality 
of foreign legislative acts was falling with the scope of immunity. In all cases, 
however, German Courts did not proceed to examine the merits of the case, as even 
the Courts in Cologne and Oldenburg dismissed bondholders’ claims as the Courts did 
not have jurisdiction under the old Brussels Regulation (EC) 44/2001.1037 Similarly 
also the Austrian Courts ruled that Greece did not enjoy immunity on the introduction 
of CACs, but similarly the Austrian Court noted in did not have jurisdiction.1038 
This matter was also examined by the CJEU, which issued a preliminary ruling in 
the case of Stefan Fahnenbrock v Hellenische Republik.1039 The preliminary ruling 
was issued following the request by the Regional Court of Landesgericht Kiel in 
relation to the interpretation of Art. 1(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1393-2007 vis a vis 
the Greek Bondholder Act and in particular the unilateral introduction of CACs. 
CJEU noted that, despite the fact that the introduction of CACs was done through a 
legislative act, namely the Bondholders’ law, this did not in and of itself suffice to 
render the introduction of CACs, a sovereign act. Hence, proceedings brought by 
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1037 S. Grund, Enforcing Sovereign Debt in Court – A Comparative Analysis of Litigation and Arbitration 
Following the Greek Debt Restructuring of 2012, University of Vienna Law Review, Vol. 1 (2017), pp. 
34-90 
1038 Case OGH 80b 125/15 (Austrian Courts) 
1039 Stefan Fahnenbrock and Others v Hellenische Republik (2015) All ER (D) 171 (Jun) 
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individual bondholders for violation of their right to property, fell within the scope of 
the Regulation in question, to the extent that such proceedings were not manifestly 
outside the concept of civil or commercial matters. Following this ruling, national 
Courts of other EU member state may rule on the legality of the Greek Bondholder 
Law under Greek law leading to holdout litigation.1040 Of course the case of Stefan 
Fahnenbrock v Hellenische Republik related to Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 that 
relates to the service of documents between authorities in different EU Member States 
and not the Brussels I Regulation that regulates the adjudication of cross-border (civil 
and commercial) lawsuits, which still leaves some ambiguity as to the whether this 
would still be applicable under the Brussels I Regulation.1041 
The scope and content of State Immunity from enforcement is far more disputed 
than jurisdictional immunity and there is no uniform global practice. Indeed, different 
countries have adopted different approaches, and the practice of nationals Courts in 
Europe is anything but uniform in this field. Nevertheless, some common elements 
have emerged as most States have abandoned the notion of absolute sovereign 
immunity against enforcement and have adopted a more limited application of the 
aforementioned doctrine. 
Most specifically, one of the most decisive factors to determine the extent of 
immunity from enforcement is prevailingly the purpose of the property against which 
enforcement measures are sought.1042 Indeed, in the Philippine Embassy Bank 
Account Case, the German Constitutional Court stated that:1043 
“There is a general rule of international law that execution by the State having 
jurisdiction on the basis of a judicial writ of execution against a foreign State, issued 
in relation to non-sovereign action (acta iure gestionis) of that State upon that State’s 
things located or occupied within the national territory of the State having 
jurisdiction, is inadmissible without assent by the foreign State, insofar as those 
things serve sovereign purposes of the foreign State at the time of commencement of 
the enforcement measure”. 
As evident, the aforementioned decision differentiates between property 
serving for sovereign purposes that is immune from execution/enforcement and 
property for non-sovereign/commercial purposes that is not immune. This distinction 
is also found in the case law of other European countries, such as Spain, Italy and the 
Netherlands.1044 The aforementioned principal was also upheld in a Belgian judgment, 
while even Swiss Courts that used to accept an absolute immunity have now accepted 
                                                          
1040 J. P. Bohoslavsky, M. Goldmann, “An Incremental Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: 
Sovereign Debt Sustainability as a Principle of Public International Law”, the Yale Journal of 
International Law Online, Vol. 41(2), 2016, p.30 
1041 S. Grund, Enforcing Sovereign Debt in Court – A Comparative Analysis of Litigation and Arbitration 
Following the Greek Debt Restructuring of 2012, University of Vienna Law Review, Vol. 1 (2017), p.72 
1042 L. J. Bouchez, ‘The Nature and Scope of State Immunity from Jurisdiction and Execution’, 10 New 
York International Law (1979) p. 17 
1043Philippine Embassy Bank Account Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 46 BVerfG 342; 65 ILR 
146,(1977) p. 167 
1044 A. Reinisch, European Court Practice Concerning State Immunity from Enforcement Measures The 
European Journal of International Law Vol. 17 no.4, 2006; Vol. 17 No. 4, p. 803–836  
211 | P a g e  
 
that property used for commercial purposes may be the object of execution. France 
also acknowledges the aforementioned distinction between property used for 
sovereign as and property used for private/ commercial purposes but further requires 
that a link between the property against which execution is sought and the original 
claim is proven. The link need not be proven if the property is public but not national. 
Another limitation to the doctrine of immunity from enforcement is the private 
law character of the transaction.1045 French Law goes even further granting immunity 
only if the State’s act is either an "acte de puissance publique" or that it have been 
carried out "dansl'intérêt d'un service public".1046 It needs to be mentioned that if 
states could easily invoke the aforementioned doctrine to avoid their obligations out 
of awards, any action taken against them and in this case against Greece, would be 
without any purpose.  Therefore, a State that successfully relies on the doctrine of 
State immunity from enforcement may be in violation of its obligation under Bilateral 
or Multilateral Investment Treaties or European Law. However, in cases of extreme 
financial distress, as in the case of Greece in 2012, where imminent default and 
collapse of the financial system was pending, it appears that the acts taken by the 
Greek State were in fact for the public interest. 
 In the case of ICSID adjudication, as in the case of Argentina, it would be a 
treaty violation for a Contracting State to refuse to enforce an award, and non-
compliance with Article 54 would then carry the consequences of State responsibility, 
including the revival of diplomatic protection under Art.27(1) of the ICSID 
Convention. On account of the above, it comes as no surprise that since ICSID's 
creation, all countries have complied with their obligation to pay an arbitral award 
once its determination was finalized. 1047 
 To address the issue and award bondholders’ security that in case of default 
they would be entitled to enforce their claims, the new bonds that have been issued 
contain a waiver of immunity clause from both jurisdictional immunity as well as 
immunity from enforcement. Indicatively, the bond issued in 2015 provided that:1048 
“13. Waiver of Immunity (a) The Republic hereby irrevocably waives, to the extent 
permitted by applicable law and international conventions, (i) any immunity from 
jurisdiction it may have in any Proceeding in the courts of England, and (ii) except as 
provided below, any immunity from attachment or execution to which its assets or 
property might otherwise be entitled in any Proceeding in the courts of England, and 
agrees that it will not claim any such immunity in any such Proceeding. (b) 
                                                          
1045D. Gaukrodger, Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors OECD 
Working Papers on International Investment 2010/2, p. 18 
1046 P. Mayer, V. Heuzé, Droit international privé 9th ed (2007) p. 325. 
1047 Although Argentina had repeatedly non-complied, and made public its intent to continue tonon-
comply, with court orders designed to enforce a prior judgment issued by the US Courts, see an in-
depth analysis on this by Amanda Tuninetti, “Limiting the Scope of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act After Zivotofsky II”, Harvard Journal of International Law, Volume 57 (1), 2016 
1048 OFFERING CIRCULAR THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC (2015) http://docplayer.gr/981694-The-hellenic-
republic.html 
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, the above waiver shall not constitute a waiver of 
immunity from attachment or execution with respect to: i. assets and property of the 
Republic located in the Republic; ii. the premises and property of the Republic’s 
diplomatic and consular missions; iii. assets and property of the Republic outside the 
Republic not used or intended to be used for a commercial purpose; iv. assets and 
property of the Republic’s central bank or monetary authority; v. assets and property 
of a military character or under the control of a military authority or defence agency 
of the Republic; or vi. assets and property forming part of the cultural heritage of the 
Republic. (c) For the purposes of the foregoing, “property” includes, without 
limitation, accounts, bank deposits, cash, revenues, securities and rights, including 
rights against third parties. (d) The foregoing constitutes a limited and specific 
waiver by the Republic solely for the purposes of the Notes, and under no 
circumstance shall it be construed as a general waiver by the Republic or a waiver 
with respect to proceedings unrelated to the Notes.”  
VI. Conclusion 
Sovereign bonds, despite their particular nature of being contracts with the 
sovereign, nonetheless they continue to be contracts. To this end the terms included in 
such contracts are of importance, especially in cases of sovereign debt restructuring or 
sovereign default. Recent case law in sovereign default cases has demonstrated this 
importance and, although, undoubtedly, in cases where there is an event of default 
political concerns will also come into play; nonetheless contractual terms are still 
important. Perhaps, the most important clause in a sovereign bond contract is that of 
the choice of law, as it has wide ramifications on the entire interpretation of the 
sovereign bond contract. Traditionally, states used to “impose” their own national 
law, as this granted them power to control their debt.  Indeed, in cases where the 
governing law of a sovereign bond contract is that of the issuing state, then the later 
retains the power to change that law to its favor.  
 This is what happened during the Greek Sovereign Debt Restructuring in 
2012, when Greece adopted the Bondholder’s Law unilaterally amending the terms of 
the sovereign bonds’ contracts by the introduction of CACs that made the bondholder 
majority’s resolution for restructuring binding even on dissenting bondholders.  
Indeed, prior to 2012 Greek bonds were issues under Greek law and contained no 
standard creditor protection clauses, such as pari passu clauses, secured debt, CAS, 
negative pledge or immunity waiver clauses. 
 However, since 2012 we have seen a significant change in the terms of the 
sovereign bonds that have been issued by the Greek Government. New bonds are 
issued under English law and contain pari passu, negative pledge and immunity 
waiver clauses. What’s more, responding to the Greek unilateral amendment of the 
sovereign bond contract terms in 2012, the euro area Member States committed in the 
ESM Treaty signed on the 2 February 2012 that all Euro-denominated sovereign 
bonds will contain CACs.  This reformation of contractual terms was brought about to 
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restore investors’ faith in Greek bonds and demonstrates the importance and power of 
contractual terms. 
 As such, although bondholders of Greek sovereign bonds have not been 
successful in claiming for damages for losses they sustained by the Greek Bond 
Restructuring of 2012, nonetheless their position has been strongly reinforced given 
the changes brought about since to the terms of Greek bonds. Thus, in the unfortunate 
event of a new sovereign bond restructuring or sovereign default in the future, their 
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I. Concluding Remarks 
A. The vulnerabilities of the protection of investors 
The recent financial crisis in Europe has demonstrated the vulnerability of 
investors, even when investing within the EU. Investments in sovereign bonds of 
Eurozone Member States, which were once considered as safe and prudent investment 
of funds, have proven to be a risky and potentially devastating business for 
bondholders. Indicatively, reviewing the development in interest rates of the 10-year 
Greek Government Bonds, one can see that the interest rate was steadily below 6% 
for almost a decade (between 2000 -2008), while it raised by 10 decimal points in a 
period of less than 3 years (2009-2012). 1049 This was the case not for Greece, but for 
other EU Member States as well. The graphic below is telling in this respect. 
 
             Source: Stijn Verhelst1050 
The sudden and abrupt rise in interest rates is indicative of the unforeseen rise 
of interest rate risk, which has devastating consequences on the issuing State’s ability 
to repay the interest and the principal.1051 Hence, it was not surprising that in 2012, at 
the peak of Greek sovereign bonds’ interest rates, Greece resorted to the infamous 
Greek sovereign bond restructuring, the largest sovereign bond restructuring in 
history. 
 The sovereign bond restructuring of 2012 had devastating consequences on 
bondholders, including foreign banking institutions that held Greek sovereign bonds. 
The case of Cyprus Banks is indicative, where the implications of the Greek sovereign 
default, greatly contributed to the Cyprus Banking Crisis, which in turn had 
overwhelming consequences on both depositors and shareholders. The above facts 
                                                          
1049 Thomson Reuters Datastream  
1050 Stijn Verhelst, The Reform of European Economic Governance: Towards a Sustainable Monetary 
Union?, Egmont Papers 47, Academia Press, (2011), p.17 
1051 D. Wiedemer, R. A. Wiedemer, C. S. Spitzer, The Aftershock Investor: A Crash Course in Staying 
Afloat in a Sinking Economy, Wiley, (2014) p.163 
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demonstrated the weaknesses of the EU financial system to “shake off” external 
shocks, but also left investors with significant losses. 
The negative implications of sovereign defaults on investors’ rights have been 
heavily explored by academics already following Argentina’s sovereign default. 
Moreover, following the financial crisis of 2009, the academic interest for the 
exploration of the ramifications of sovereign default has risen, both from academia as 
well as from various international institutions.1052 Primary focus has, however, shifted 
from investors’ rights, to averting sovereign defaults in the future, by ensuring 
“sustainable sovereign debt”. As to what constitutes sustainable debt, the IMF has 
defined same as a status where a borrowing state is “expected to be able to continue 
servicing its debts without an unrealistically large future correction to the balance of 
income and expenditure”.1053  The principle of sustainable sovereign debt demands 
the need for expedient sovereign restructurings based on the principles of general law, 
i.e. good faith, transparency etc..1054 This principle is now a recognized principle of 
public international law. 1055 However, despite the ambitious and important 
developments to this end, the fact remains that there is still a lack of binding 
regulatory norms to govern sovereign default and safeguard investors’ rights.  
II. CHAPTER ANALYSIS 
This thesis set out to examine investors’ rights in case of sovereign default in 
the EU as well as in case of banking crisis as a direct effect of such sovereign default. 
The factual background that prompted the relevant question was the recent Greek 
Sovereign Default and the Cyprus Banking Crisis that was, partly, a spillover effect of 
such default. In this context, this Thesis set out to respond to the below questions in 
case a sovereign takes measures detrimental to investors rights: 
1) Can investors raise claims against the EU for such measures? 
2) Is Investment Law as provided under Investment Treaties sufficient to 
safeguard and restore investors’ rights? 
3) Similarities of Investment and Human Rights Law. Is Human Rights 
Law able to safeguard and restore investors’ rights and/or offer 
additional remedies to investors? 
4) What are the procedural hurdles faced by investors when resorting to 
claim against states in sovereign default and how to overcome these? 
                                                          
1052 Indicatively, see UN General Assembly Resolution 69/319 (2015), which proposes a list of basic 
principles to be followed during the process of sovereign debt restructuring, including sovereignty, 
good faith, impartiality, transparency, immunity, equitable treatment, sustainability, legitimacy, and 
majority restructuring. 
1053 International Monetary Fund, Assessing Sustainability, IMF Policy Paper 4 (2002) 
1054 J.P. Bohoslavsky, M. Goldmann, An Incremental Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: 
Sovereign Debt Sustainability as a Principle of Public International Law, the Yale Journal of 
International Law Online Vol. 41(2), 2016, p. 42 
1055 J.P. Bohoslavsky, M. Goldmann, An Incremental Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: 
Sovereign Debt Sustainability as a Principle of Public International Law, the Yale Journal of 
International Law Online Vol. 41(2), 2016, p. 26 
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Hence, this thesis is divided into two parts, one that explores Greek 
bondholders’ rights as a consequence of the sovereign bond exchange of 2012; and 
the second part that explores depositors’ rights due to the haircut of their deposits 
during the Cyprus Banking Crisis.  
Chapter One examined the question of whether there is a legal basis for EU’s 
Institutions to be held accountable for measures taken by an EU Member State in case 
of financial distress. In particular, this Chapter explores the allegations made by the 
Cyprus Government that it was “forced” to accept the measures effecting the haircut 
on banking deposits due to pressure exercised on it by the European Central Bank and 
Eurogroup. Hence, this Article examines if, in fact, a state can be coerced by an 
International Organization to which it has agreed to concede powers, by exploring the 
concept of sovereignty and its limitations, as well as the notions of economic coercion 
and countermeasures. As was demonstrated, however this is not an easy argument to 
make, let alone prove. Indeed, in the case of Cyprus even if, in fact, there was 
coercion, this was not forced through military use, but instead through economic 
pressure. Economic coercion is neither as established, nor as clear, as military 
coercion and it is subject to individual interpretation on a case by case basis.  
Within this context, it appears unlikely that coercion may be found when an 
International Organization, such as the EU, is acting within its scope of competences.  
Even if coercion was, indeed, found, however, investors might still be barred from 
achieving a successful result in their claims, if such coercion was triggered as 
countermeasures, that are able to justify an illegal act, such as coercion. The Chapter 
also examined whether liability of EU institutions for the losses sustained by Cyprus 
depositors could be founded on EU law and, in particular, the TFEU. Again however, 
reviewing the relevant provisions of TFEU, as these have been interpreted by the case 
law of CJEU, it appears that these provisions could not also lead to liability for the 
EU institutions on the facts of the Cyprus haircut.   
The Second Chapter continues, in the context of the Cyprus Banking Crisis, 
and explores depositors’ rights against the Republic of Cyprus. In particular, the 
Chapter starts with reviewing the measures taken by depositors over the last 4 years. 
Depositors have to date resorted to national courts in the Republic of Cyprus, the 
European Court of Justice (“CJEU”) and international tribunals, such as the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”). The common 
element in all such proceedings were the human rights’ claims. Regretfully, however, 
none of these forums examined such claims, as all cases were rejected on procedural 
grounds. Hence, this Chapter explores why such proceedings have been unsuccessful 
and looks into whether a claim before the ECtHR might prove to be more successful. 
The Chapter explores whether the facts of the Cyprus Banking Haircut could be 
deemed a violation of the right to property (Article 1 of the 1st Protocol of the ECHR), 
the right to a fair trial (Art. 6 ECHR), the right to an effective remedy (Art. 13 ECHR) 
and the right to non-discrimination (Art.14 ECHR). However, as the analysis of the 
ECtHR’s caselaw demonstrates, the protection awarded by all such Articles is not 
absolute and may be subject to restrictions. These restrictions will be allowed to the 
extent that these are justified on grounds of general or public interest and a fair 
221 | P a g e  
 
balance is struck between the interests of public as a whole and that of the individual. 
It appears, that in times of extreme financial crisis, as in the events of the Cyprus 
Banking Crisis, ECtHR is likely to find that both these conditions are met, despite the 
fact that depositors’ right may be greatly aggrieved by the measures taken in the 
course of a banking crisis. Thus, this paper concludes that it is likely that depositors in 
Cyprus Banks may not be able to obtain restitution for the damages they have 
sustained, perhaps except for damages that might be awarded by the Cyprus courts in 
the civil cases. In light of this vacuum in depositors’ protection, the introduction of 
the new Banking Resolution framework put in place by the EU, appears as a 
significant development towards the safeguarding of depositors’ rights, although the 
aspired European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) would also be an important step 
in this direction.  
As of the Third Chapter, we explore the events of the Greek Debt 
Restructuring. In particular, the Third Chapter examines Greek Bondholders’ right 
from a human rights perspective and attempts to examine the interaction between 
human rights law and investment law. By the examination of ECtHR’s and 
investment tribunal’s caselaw, this chapter draws analogies between human rights law 
and investment law and the similarities between the remedies available to investors 
under these legal frameworks. From such examination, it becomes clear that these two 
fields of law have extensive similarities and they can be used jointly to offer a more 
complete framework of protection to investors. Hence, they should not be treated as 
opposite, but in fact complementary to one another towards the common aim of 
investors’ protection against States’ arbitral acts. This was made clear in the case of 
the Greek Sovereign Debt Restructuring, where despite the fact that ECtHR did not 
award the anticipated protection to investors, on the same grounds as analyzed for the 
Cyprus Banking Crisis, nonetheless, such decision had several shortcomings that 
allow investors to be more optimistic about the handling of similar claims in the 
future.  
On the same context, Chapter Four presents the legal measures that have been 
taken by Greek Bondholders to date. This Chapter discusses once again the actions 
brought before Human Rights’ venues and, although it recognizes their importance, 
nonetheless it explores why these have not awarded restitution to investors. Therefore, 
the Chapter studies if a claim before investment tribunals could be more successful. 
To respond to this question, the Chapter explores the case of Poštová Banka v. 
Hellenic Republic and critically discusses ICSID’s ruling at the said case. The 
aforementioned case has limited investors’ possibilities for an effective remedy, as 
ICSID ruled that sovereign bonds acquired in the secondary market did not constitute 
“investments” under the Greece-Slovakia BIT. That stated, the said ruling was 
directly linked to the wording of that specific Bilateral Investment Treaty. Hence, 
despite the discouraging effect of such Award for investors, nonetheless, other BITs 
may allow for a different interpretation. Should bonds be considered to constitute 
investments under BITs’ protection, investors would be in a position to raise several 
arguments that have proven invaluable for investors in other sovereign default cases, 
as can be seen from Tribunal’s caselaw. Such arguments might still be rejected by 
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Greece by invoking the doctrine of necessity, whose applicability, however, in such 
cases is still challenged.  
Last but not least, Chapter Five explores bondholders’ rights from a 
contractual perspective on the basis of the sovereign bond contract. This Chapter 
examines the legal nature of the sovereign bond contracts, as state contracts with the 
sovereign that, however, have a commercial background. On this basis, this Chapter 
examines the most common contract terms found in sovereign bond contracts and 
examines if they would be in a position to safeguard Greek bondholders’ rights. This 
Chapter recognizes that the most important clause in a sovereign bond contract is that 
of the choice of law, whose ramifications affect all other provisions and their 
interpretation. It examines the choices of law made by the states and the 
circumstances under which states would select a foreign national law to govern their 
bonds. The Chapter finds that states with an abundancy of domestic investors are 
unlikely to select a foreign law as applicable, given that their own national law allows 
them to have effective control over their sovereign bonds and their terms.  
This is demonstrated in the case of the Greek Sovereign Debt Restructuring in 
2012, when Greece unilaterally amended the terms of its Greek-governed sovereign 
bonds contracts by the introduction of CACs though the Bondholder’s Law. The 
Chapter finds that the terms of the Greek-governed sovereign bonds issued before 
2012 could afford little or no protection to bondholders. Nonetheless, since 2012 the 
terms of Greek Sovereign Bonds have been significantly modified. New bonds are 
issued under English law and contain pari passu, negative pledge and immunity 
waiver clauses. Most importantly, not only Greek sovereign bonds’ terms have been 
amended, but also all Euro-denominated sovereign bonds must now contain CACs.  
This revision of contractual terms brought about to restore investors’ faith in Greek 
bonds demonstrates the importance and power of contractual terms, which have now 
strongly reinforced the position of investors in case of a new sovereign bond 
restructuring or sovereign default in the future. 
III. LITERATURE CONTRIBUTION 
Primarily, it needs to be stipulated that sovereign debt crises are neither a new 
phenomenon, nor an uncommon one. Instead, as it was demonstrated in the case of 
the Greek financial crisis, sovereign default is always likely, despite the mechanisms 
and regulations that might be in place to avert it. What’s more, sovereign default has 
severe implications to the rights of millions of people including investors’ rights. 
Especially in the case of sovereign default in the EU, this can have particularly 
devastating consequences; due to the spillover effect, such default might have to the 
economies of other EU states. The significance of the recurring event of debt default 
has been the subject of several theoretical and empirical literature on sovereign 
debt.1056 
                                                          
1056 Indicatively, see Laura Alfaro & Ingrid Vogel, International Capital Markets and Sovereign Debt: 
Crisis Avoidance and Resolution, Harvard Business School Background Note 707–018 (2006), Mark 
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Despite, however, the many instances of sovereign default and the catastrophic 
repercussions of such instances, nonetheless there is no sovereign debt-restructuring 
framework nor sovereign default mechanism available at present. Indeed, if a country 
becomes insolvent, there are few, if any, applicable rules, in either national or 
international law, governing the relationship between the sovereign and its 
creditors.1057 This is in stark contrast to corporate debt, which is governed by 
corporate bankruptcy law, rendering insolvency an essential feature of the functioning 
of the market economy on the national scale.1058 
Academic literature has focused on the economic aspects of sovereign default, 
with part of the academic literature on sovereign debt claiming that law has little role 
to play.1059 This thesis examines whether the existing legal framework at the time of 
the recent financial crisis can prove sufficient to protect investors’ rights from 
infringing actions taken by the State, due to sovereign default. In particular, this 
Thesis examined the events of the Greek Sovereign Default and the Cyprus Banking 
crisis and explored actions taken by investors to date. This thesis offers a collective 
review of investors’ remedies from a human rights, investment law, contract law and, 
to a certain extent, EU law in the aforementioned contexts, which cannot be found in 
other literature. This is the main contribution of this Thesis, which not only reviews 
available remedies, but also critically examines them to reveal possible shortcomings 
in investors’ protection. Additionally, this Thesis displays subsequent developments 
in the protection of such rights, and critically explores the effectiveness of such 
developments to amend the shortcomings of the pre-existing legal framework. This 
thesis, has, however, not examined the recent changes in the EU Banking Law, 
brought about after the Cyprus Banking Crisis, due to the extensive nature of this 
subject that falls outside the scope of this study. 
IV. WAY FORWARD  
 Although there have been significant changes and developments in the field 
of sovereign debt restructuring, nonetheless there are still steps that are required to be 
taken to ensure a comprehensive framework that would safeguard investors’ rights. 
Indeed, it is the authors’ view that neither investment law, nor human rights nor 
contract law alone suffice to offer a comprehensive framework for investors’ 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Aguiar & Manuel Amador, Sovereign Debt, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 
647,Elhanan Helpman et al. eds., 4th ed. (2014); Jonathan Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, Sovereign Debt, 
in G. Grossman & K. Rogoff, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (eds), (1995); Ugo Panizza, 
Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Law and Economics of Sovereign Debt, 47 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 651 (2009) 
1057 Michael Wolfgang Waibel, Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Seminar Internationales 
Wirtschaftsrecht, (2003) 
1058 Michael Wolfgang Waibel, Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Seminar Internationales 
Wirtschaftsrecht, (2003) 
1059 See a review of this literature on  W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt and the 
“Contracts Matter” Hypothesis, in Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics (forthcoming) 
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protection. The Greek and the Cyprus Financial Crisis has demonstrated the hurdles 
investors have to face in search of restitution that may never come, even after many 
costly and long procedures.  
Hence, it is important that the issue of sovereign default is no longer treated as 
a “taboo”. As the Greek Sovereign Default has shown, treating sovereign default as a 
taboo can prove to be very costly and potentially dangerous both for investors and for 
countries in default. Instead, investors’ rights in case of sovereign default should be 
tackled by international law. However, although it appears that there is the necessary 
momentum and consensus to move towards this direction, nonetheless views seem to 
differ as to how sovereign default should be addressed.1060  
On the one hand, as demonstrated in Chapter Five, an attempt has been made 
to strengthen investors’ rights, while deterring phenomena of abuse, through the 
revision of the terms of bond contracts. Although the new terms that have been 
proposed and implemented (aggregation of CACs and clarification of the pari passu 
clause) have strengthened investors’ bargaining position, nonetheless they do not 
suffice to safeguard investors’ rights. On the other hand, the United Nations have 
instigated efforts in order to create a statutory mechanism for sovereign debt 
restructuring.1061 Indicatively, the UN General Assembly in September 2015 adopted 
resolution A/RES/69/319 on Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Processes, which, inter alia, stresses "the importance of a clear set of principles for the 
management and resolution of financial crises that take into account the obligation of 
sovereign debtors and their creditors to act in good faith and with cooperative spirit to 
reach a consensual rearrangement of the debt of sovereign States".1062  
To this end, it is the author’s view that investors’ rights in case of sovereign 
default should be addressed by the means of an international treaty. Such a treaty 
would be beneficial for States and investors as it could encourage them to come 
together to a mutual understanding, in analogy with the process followed in domestic 
bankruptcy regimes.  
This Thesis has demonstrated some of the issues that this Treaty should 
particularly address. In particular, as it has been shown, such treaty must focus the 
contrasting interests of the different stakeholders and that of the debtor-State leaving 
ground for economic recovery and eventual repayment), while simultaneously 
                                                          
1060 M. Guzman, J.E. Stiglitz, “Creating a Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring That Works: The 
Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises” in M. Guzman, J. A. Ocampo, J. E. Stiglitz “Too Little, Too 
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safeguarding the human rights of the both the people and the investors.1063 Such treaty 
would need to ensure the negotiation process and guarantee that investors would have 
the right and effective opportunity to not only participate, but also effectively 
negotiate a debt restructuring. This process would therefore provide for a standstill 
period for negotiations whereby investors would refrain from taking actions against 
the State in exchange for some guarantees by the debtor state for repayment.  
Most importantly, one of the most contentious issue that should be addressed 
by such Treaty would be to ensure that investors in sovereign debt restructurings 
receive equal treatment. As has been shown in Chapters Two, Three and Four 
ensuring equal and non-preferential treatment can be a highly contentious and 
difficult due to the high volatility of investors, the contractual obligation of “pari 
passu” treatment of investors and other factors. Regretfully, the courts and tribunals in 
the case of the Greek Sovereign Default and the Cyprus Banking Haircut, have not 
secured the equal treatment of investors, by reaching generic decisions, disregarding 
the difference and similarities between investors, all on the face of emergency.    
Although such a Treaty is neither easy to enforce nor without problems,1064 it 
would be the first step to cover the vacuum in investors’ protection that exists today. 
Indeed, as it was stated by Adam Smith in 1976 “When it becomes necessary for a 
state to declare itself bankrupt, in the same manner as when it becomes necessary for 
an individual to do so, a fair, open and avowed bankruptcy procedure is always the 









                                                          
1063 Michael Wolfgang Waibel, Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Seminar Internationales 
Wirtschaftsrecht, (2003) 
1064 See A. Krueger, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring -- Address by Anne Krueger, 
First Deputy Managing Director, IMF (2001) 
<https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp112601> accessed 29 October 2017. 
1065 , Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations; Edited, with Notes, Marginal Summary, and Enlarged Index 
by Edwin Cannan. New York :Modern Library, 2000, p. 883 
